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Politics in Western Europe

By JOHN G. HEINBERG

ALL OF US are much concerned over tension in world politics of which the Berlin Question has become symbolic. There is little doubt that Russia aspires to dominate the continent of Europe. The United States appears to be determined not to allow that aspiration to succeed. This conflict between the two giants is also revealed in the internal politics of England, France and Italy-particularly in that of the Latin Sisters. Symbolic of the weakness of both in post-war world politics are similar passages in their new constitutions. In the Preamble of the French constitution one reads that "On condition of reciprocity France accepts the limitations of sovereignty necessary to the organization and defense of peace." In Article 11 of the Constitution of the Italian Republic there is the more elaborate statement that "Italy repudiates war as an instrument of offensive action against the liberty of other peoples and as a means for the resolution of international controversies; it consents, on condition of parity with other states, to limitations of sovereignty necessary to an order for assuring peace and justice among nations; it promotes and favors international organizations directed toward that end." These "leads" would appear to be from weakness rather than from strength.

I

It is rather obvious that Italy, France—and Britain too—have Communist parties that are directed from abroad mainly through native leaders who have been trained in Moscow. The Italian Communist Party has a claimed membership that runs to more than two and a quarter million. The membership of the French Communist Party is said to be less than 900,000—having dropped from a high of more than 1,000,000

in the post-war period. The British Communist Party is supposed to embrace a total less than 50,000. Communist strength in the British House of Commons is negligible, with 2 seats out of 640. But in the French National Assembly the Communist Party (counting in the M.U.R.F. fellow travelers) is the largest one with a total of 183 in 618 members. Communists and left-wing Socialists together have almost one. third of the total seats in the Italian Chamber of Deputies-182 of 574. Of the 8,000,000 votes cast for the Italian "Popular Front" in April, 1948. it is estimated that three-fourths were cast by Communists. As the Rome Correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor observed after the April elections, "No party which can attract an estimated 6,000,000 votes under the relentless pressure to which the Communist Party was subjected is either weak, moribund or resourceless." The pressure, it may be recalled, came from the Vatican, from the American Government, from Drew Pearson and the Friendship Trains, and from private persons of Italian ancestry in the U.S., who deluged relatives in Italy with thousands of letters urging them to vote against the Communists.

In painting the present political picture we cannot stop with party membership and election statistics. Organized labor-the General Confederations of France and Italy-are largely controlled by the Communists, although their Communist officers have never been able to marshal all the workers for a general strike. It is estimated that about 50 per cent of the organized workers in France are officered by Communists, and 80 per cent in Italy. Widespread strikes have been called, particularly in the late months of 1947 and 1948-some of which proved rather inopportune. The newly organized French Force Ouvrière has recently taken more than one and one-half million French workers away from the General Confederation and separatist movements have evidenced themselves in Italy. In Britain, where Communist strength in the labor unions is negligibleso far as numbers is concerned-Clement Attlee has considered it necessary, periodically, to warn Labour Party and co-operative officials, as well as trade unionists, that their organizations throughout the country stand in constant danger of being captured, as he puts it, "by small and active Communist minorities."

On the other side of the picture, there is no American political party in these European countries. The nearest approach was exhibited on the local level during the Rome municipal election in 1947 when a fly-by-night group calling itself the *Movimento Unionista Italiano* came forward with the proposal that Italy be incorporated into the United States as the forty-ninth state. Its vote was very light.

All the while, however, the American government has been making friends and influencing people in European politics. Secretary of State Marshall outlined the ERP in his speech at Harvard early in June 1947. On June 1, de Gasperi formed an Italian cabinet with Communists and Nenni Socialists left out-and they have not got back in since. About a month earlier, Communists were forced out of the cabinet of French Premier Ramadier, and they have not got back since. Perhaps there are no causal connections here, but de Gasperi had been in the United States conferring with President Truman the previous January. It was reported from Rome that he had returned from Washington with promises of a large loan and a firm intention to oust the Communists from his government. There are other pieces that fit into the picture. On Nov. 22, 1947, when Robert Schuman was seekingly parliamentary approval of his designation as French Premier, Foreign Minister Bidault interrupted a Communist speaker in the National Assembly to report, "Yesterday I received word from the American government that 54,000 extra tons of wheat will be shipped to France soon." On Oct. 5, 1947, de Gasperi was being subjected to three motions of no-confidence in the Italian Constituent Assembly. But before the voting started the Foreign Minister, Count Sforza, broke into the debate and brought the members of the Assembly to their feet, cheering, through the announcement that the United States had renounced its share of the Italian fleet. The American State Department indicated, previous to last April's Italian elections, that if the Communists won it would mean the end of ERP aid to Italy. These examples of coincidences are chosen at random.

The Socialist parties of Britain, France and Italy have broken ties with the Communists on their left and have become oriented toward the center. A special reservation must be made for Italy, however, where the Socialists have split. British, French and part of the Italian Socialists are in their governments. The Communist parties of France and Italy have not been in governing coalitions since mid-1947. Of course, ever since the British General Election of 1945, the two Communist members of Parliament have been more in the opposition than Winston Churchill himself—although for different reasons.

The break between Socialists and Communists came first—and came decisively—in Britain. The Communists formally attempted to adhere to the Labour Party but were rebuffed at the annual Labour Party Conference at Bournemouth in June, 1946. At that session the Labour Party, which is largely composed of associations rather than individual

members, amended its consitution so as to exclude from affiliation all organizations "having their own program, principles and policy for distinctive propaganda. . . or owing allegiance to any political organization situated abroad. . "

Progressively, the determination was more difficult for French and Italian Socialists. Both of these countries are normally governed, not by a single party that emerges from an election with a majority position in parliament, but by party coalitions. Initially, after the Liberation, the French Communists, Socialists and the post-war Popular Republican Movement joined together in the government, and in the framing and adoption. upon a second attempt, of a new constitutional document. Co-operation also existed in the enactment of a number of nationalization statutes which had been foreshadowed in the Resistance Charter, which was supported by all political parties and Resistance groups. The French Socialist attitude toward the neighboring party to its left during this period is partially revealed in the statements made by Socialist leaders. Leon Blum observed that "although the [French] Communists have regained their freedom to think for themselves they have not yet acquired the ability to do so." An example or two of Blum's theses might be supplied. The Paris correspondent of The New York Times reported in November of 1947, that the Communist daily, L'Humanité, "commented almost favorably on the European Recovery Program until Foreign Minister Molotoff came to Paris to denounce it." Later, after Andrei Zdhanov's report to the Cominform in Warsaw had been published in the French language, the French Communist leader, Jacques Duclos, used exact phrases from it in a speech before the National Assembly, and l'Humanité printed quotations from the same source. Later, on Nov. 21, 1947, Blum, as Premier-designate, told the National Assembly that "international Communism has openly declared war on French democracy." This charge of Blum's was given specific meaning by a fellow Socialist, Minister of the Interior, Jules Moch, in an address to the Socialist Party Conference on Oct. 10, 1948. Moch disclosed that Zdhanov had, shortly before his death in 1948, announced directions to the French Communists to sabotage the ERP by all means, "to begin [strike] operations in September," and to secure the complete collapse of the French economy by means of strikes. Responsibility for the French October coal strikes, interestingly enough, came to be a matter of controversy between John L. Lewis and William Green in the United States a few days before the Presidential Election. According to Associated Press dispatches, Green contended,

as did the French Socialists, that the strikes were sponsored and managed by Communists.

In Italy, the break between Communists and Socialists has been less sharp and much more entailed, for the Nenni Socialists aligned with the Communists in the Popular Front and waged electoral contests under this banner for both chambers of the new Italian parliament in April, 1948. The Italian Socialists split, however, at the end of 1946, and the dissident Saragat group, polling over 7 per cent of the total popular vote in the April, 1948 elections, entered the Christian Democrat—de Gasperi government, even before that election had taken place. Close and careful observers of these elections seem to agree that although the Communists did not lose strength in the balloting the Nenni Socialists lost very heavily. So much so, indeed, that the break between Communists and Socialists in Italy follows the same trend—although haltingly—that had been exhibited in England and France. The Saragat Italian Socialists—the Italian Workers Socialist Party—originally broke with the Nenni group on the issue of co-operation with the Communists.

П

So FAR, the current internal politics of the three countries has been set forth in terms of its relation to world politics. Only a rash foreigner would expect a high degree of success in attempting to appraise British French or Italian politics as it is viewed internally in each country. Hazardous as our quest may be, it is necessary here for several reasons. For one, it scarcely needs mention that the British, French and Italians do not regard themselves as mere phenomena for outside exploitation. For another, they have many political problems internally, the intensity of which foreigners cannot comprehend either precisely or adequately; and, for a third, the political parties of each of these countries are attached to a unique history, interwoven with episodes, relationships and personalities which escapes the understanding of a foreign observer. Take, for example, the widespread policy of nationalization that has been applied in the three countries during the Nineteen Thirties and Forties. By and large, the three countries have not nationalized the same things. By and large, both the motives and the political parties engaged have been different, as have schemes of remuneration and patterns of management after the nationalizations took place. Page upon page of explanation would be required to spell out these differences.

In Britain it is well understood that the white collar people-the swing-

able vote-determines whether Labour or the Conservatives will have a majority in the House of Commons. Due to the workings of the electoral system, the oscillations in party strength in Commons are greater than oscillations in the popular vote. In July of 1945, the Labour Party got the swingable vote, and with it 393 seats in the House of Commons to 189 for the Conservatives. For the first time in its history the Labour Party possessed a good working majority in Parliament, a majority sufficient to carry to the statute books its distinctive program of nationalization and expansion of the social services. Save for the measure for the nationalization of the iron and steel industry—behind which the impulsion seems to have been uncertain and unsteady—the program has been put into effect. An Englishman might recall that it is rather fatal for a political party to achieve such a high degree of success. The Liberal Party did this early in the twentieth century. For a long period it has split into two main groups, but the sum of the splits reached the grand total of twenty-five members of the House of Commons as a result of the elections of 1945. The Conservative Party has recently moved—as it has usually done in the past-to accept large parts of recent nationalization. In the "Industrial Charter" approved at the Party Conference in 1947, it accepted nationalization of the Bank of England, the coal industry and the railroads, but took the position that road transport and civil aviation should be denationalized. On the other hand, there seems to be a good deal of difference of opinion among Labour Party leaders over the nationalization of iron and steel. Meanwhile, the new Parliament Act-which reduces the House of Lord's suspensive veto over the Commons from two years to one year-is being passed through Commons the required three times. Labour will have all of 1949 and part of 1950 in which to make the nationalization of iron and steel an accomplished fact. The terms of its statute for this purpose were revealed late in October, 1948. The measure will be subject to prolonged debate, but, whatever its fate, the nationalization contemplated will undoubtedly be a source of major contention in the next parliamentary election, which must take place before the middle of 1950. If the explanation of Labour's success in the 1945 election by Labourite G. D. H. Cole is correct—that doubtful voters were swung to the Labour side because the program of nationalization appeared to be a cure for past unemployment and depressed industries -these voters may have changed views, or other views, by 1950. Or, some other unpredictable issue may arise in the interval.

French politics is always interesting, although the present writer finds

every semester that students are first inclined, and strongly-inclined, to call it a "mess." At first view there may seem to be neither rhyme nor reason in the record since late July of 1948. Premier Marie lasted four and one-half weeks; then Schuman failed during the interval of his acceptance as Premier by the National Assembly and the formation of his cabinet; then Schuman formed a cabinet but resigned the same evening. Queuille was approved on Sept. 10. Queuille, a Radical-Socialist, composed his Council of Ministers of representatives of all parliamentary groups-from Socialists on the Left, to, and including the Party of Republican Liberty on the Right. Then the National Assembly took a vacation. There is one steady clue to French politics, and that clue is the word "Centripetal." The Center governs France-under the Fourth Republic as under the Third. Upon the fall of the Marie government, the chief of the Paris Bureau of the Christian Science Monitor was "caught" in Normandy. Fortunately for our quest of French views on French politics, Mr. Volney D. Hurd recorded the interview with his hosts, M. Quibel and M. Duchêne.

"There you are," said Mr. Quibel, concluding some offhand remarks about the situations. "Well, I guess I'll be running along."

"But," I pressed, "your government has just fallen!"

In a polite Norman version of "so what," he told me that that was a very frequent happening and that he had to hurry along and see about some details in the hotel.

A government falling had about the same effect as the failure of the milkman to arrive on time-in fact, not as much.

"But," I said, turning to M. Duchêne, "this can't go on forever. What happens next?"

"Oh, there'll be another government, but it won't last. Look at this

newspaper cartoon."

It showed an endless belt, like one sees at Christmas time in toy windows with the same sleigh and reindeers coming up time after time to make it look as though there were many.

On it were portrayed the various personalities which have headed the 13 French governments since the war. They would pop up, go across the scene for a brief few minutes, and then go under, only to come up again as the belt continued its endless course.

Everyone laughed heartily. It was the most apt thing they had seen. Little, silly, smiling, figures repeating over and over their short playand of course getting nowhere. It delighted these Normans.

"But there must be end to this sometime." I said. "Even belts

wear out."

"Well, if it gets too bad, then we will have to have a dictatorship to restore order," replied M. Duchêne.

"Yes, but will the French, who are so against tight controls, permit a dictatorship?" I asked.

"Of course not," replied my friend, in the most casual tone of voice. "The French won't stand a dictator—so we will have a revolution."

M. Duchêne might have been announcing that we were going to have ice cream and cake. And it was not child's play. It was just typically French that the thing that would shake Anglo-Saxons to their heels would be tossed off with a shrug of the shoulders by these people.

I persisted in trying to make M. Duchêne follow through. "But after the revolution you would have to form a new government. After all, the war was, in effect, a revolution, in that you had a chance to start from scratch. And from it you formed the present endless belt of rotating cabinets. What else would you get but the same thing?"

"You are right, my American friend," he said. "That is exactly what would happen. Dictatorship, revolution, and then back to the old

formula. Still the endless belt."

"But what about France's international position? What will become

of the country in the meantime?"

"Monsieur, look around you. Here in the farming country of France we have been going on exactly as our forebears for hundreds of years. We have had since the French revolution four republics, three Kings, and two empires. We have had hundreds of governments. But nothing changes here.

"In fact, it doesn't change enough. Many houses should have water and electricity which still go without them. Do you think that this new postwar version of government changes will make any real difference?"

The Frenchman, whose point of view about French politics we are attempting to ascertain, would not be nearly as certain as some of our American columnists and newspaper headline writers that democratic and parliamentary France will fail—and that there will soon be a clash between the Communists and de Gaulle for mastery. French politics is an intimate game, as much played from the vest as an American presidential nominating convention. Integrations and reintegrations are involved in the formation of French cabinets, but bargaining is constant and there must be give and take. Every group that takes must give.

The breach between Communists and Socialists was described previously. Conceivably, if the Russians were to occupy France by armed force the French Communists would become the government. It was mentioned that the Communists control most of the members of the General Labor Confederation. But the recently organized Force Ouvrière, Labor Strength, the new labor organization—with over one and one-half million

¹ Volney D. Hurd, "But Still There is France,' say Peasants as Cabinets Fall." Reprinted by permission from The Christian Science Monitor, September 9, 1948.

workers—supports the Socialists Party. The French Confederation of Christian Workers is a supporter of the M.R.P.

General de Gaulle and his Rally of the French People—founded early in 1947—really has no formal parliamentary group support. He has support in the emotions of many Frenchmen and is given tangible assistance with his R. P. F. by French military authorities. His chief claim to present political importance is that his R. P. F. secured almost 40 per cent of the vote in the French municipal elections of October 1947. Its goal had been set at 20 per cent. Since then he has been demanding the dissolution of the National Assembly and new elections thereto.

It must be obvious that municipal elections and national elections are altogether different. A Frenchman might easily change his voting in the two. In early cantonal elections, for example, the Radical Socialists attained far greater results than they did in national elections—either to the Constituent Assembly or the National Assembly. French observers of the results of the municipal elections of 1947 are of the conviction that de Gaulle's party received a goodly part of its vote from former supporters of the Radical Socialists and the M.R.P. Could he gain their support in a national election? Some Frenchmen have pointed out that it is very difficult to get rid of a Savior. We come back to what has been called the Third Strength—the groups in the National Assembly stretching from the Socialists on the Left to include the M.R.P. on the Right. On a chart this "Center" could be readily identified. The "Center" governed France under the Third Republic. It is governing now.

What is the present trouble? The trouble is that France cannot stabilize her currency. This is no new problem and de Gaulle himself tried his hand at it and failed before he retired in January 1946. All things are remembered in France. And—in spite of de Gaulle's bitter present opposition to the Communists—they were in his own cabinets while he was in power. It was Ramadier, a Socialist, who threw the Communists out. For some months now there have been plans for balancing the budget and dealing with the franc. But all plans contain proposals that one or more political groups have been unable to accept. In spite of the split between the Socialists and Communists on the question of world politics, both parties represent the workers of France. To a lesser extent the M.R.P. does also. The Socialists must stand for things the workers wish to have. Although they have been represented in all recent cabinets, including the present one, they have been forced to ask for increased wages

for workers—budget balancing or no budget balancing—and let the franc turn out to be what it may. This explains the fall of Marie and Schuman.

It is easy to say that a stronger executive power is what France needs—as General de Gaulle says. But the French always raise the question to which there is never a unanimous answer: Which person is to have this power?

With France's Latin Sister we encounter a problem from which France is free —the problem of a yearly excess of 500,000 births over deaths and most avenues of migration throughout the world closed. Italy is the country in which writers have calmly claimed at periods in modern history that "we were better off when we were worse off." It is a land where people may turn to affairs spiritual because there is not much in the way of affairs temporal to which they can turn. It possesses mountainous terrain, little coal and iron and a non-land-holding peasantry. Truly, here is a most appropriate client for ERP, and by the same token a country in which membership in the Communist Party-according to latest published figures—is second only to the membership within Russia itself. These remarks are not made as criticisms; they are made in an attempt to portray the difficulties faced by any Italian government. The very results of the Chamber elections of April 1948, are likely to be misleading, for a chart would show the huge Christian Democrat Party in a majority position in the "Center." It has been pointed out, for one thing, that as many as three or four of the thirteen million who voted for the Christian Democrats were not particularly sympathetic to the party: they voted for the one main anti-communistic group. For another thing, about eight million Italian voters, confronted with a choice between Church and a Popular Front directed from Moscow, cast their ballots for the latter.

Perhaps the most that can be said is that the April election furnishes an opportunity for five years for Italy to attempt to solve some of its problems in a parliamentary manner. Paper proposals exist. The Christian Democratic Party's National Council has called for land reforms, tax reforms, and for raising the workers' standard of living. The last-mentioned objective would be achieved by half-a-dozen methods, including the encouragement of large scale emigration from Italy. Without outlining these reforms more fully, it can be easily comprehended that some of them would prove costly to the very groups that supported the Christian Democrats in the last election. Six months after the elections little seems to have been accomplished.

University of Missouri

Problems of Cartel Policy1

By RAYMOND V. McNALLY

WORLD WAR II suspended cartel activities, partly because of the important place that German industry held in most international cartels but chiefly because of governmental pressure for "all-out" production. However, international tensions focus attention on this problem once more, for the question naturally arises as to what the prospects are for resumption of these activities. The purpose of these five books¹ is to acquaint the public with the nature of the cartel problem, to disclose the relationship between these international alliances and domestic monoply, to impress upon the American people the effect they have on our own economy, and to suggest remedies. All of these authors differ somewhat in their approaches to the problem and in their understanding of it.

That there is need for a clear presentation of the facts is obvious, for when the United States entered the war, the people were so stunned by the revelations concerning the threat to their national security that emotions ran high and reason went out the window. Without any clear idea of what was meant by cartels, the word quickly gained sinister connotations in the mind of the man on the street, for, conditioned as he had been for fifteen years by the irrational vilification of businessmen by politicians, intellectuals and many of the clergy, he applied the term indiscriminately to all private commercial agreements, to mere bigness, and indeed to practically anything he did not like. In such an atmosphere, dispassionate discussion or appraisal of the situation was impossible.

Simply defined, cartels constitute a voluntary, impermanent arrangement among producers engaged usually in the same line of business, designed to limit or eliminate competition among them by regulating production, sharing markets and fixing prices. But not all cartels are necessarilly illegal under the antitrust laws of this country, and in England and most other foreign countries, they are not usually regarded as outside

¹ Cartels: Challenge to a Free World. By Wendell Berge. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1944, 260 pp., \$3.25. National Interest and International Cartels. By Charles R. Whittlesey. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1946, 164 pp., \$2.50. Cartels in Action. By George W. Stocking and Myron W. Watkins. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1946, 517 pp., \$4. Cartels or Competition? By George W. Stocking and Myron W. Watkins. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1948, 505 pp., \$4. International Cartels. By Ervin Hexner. Chapel Hill, N. C.: The University of North Carolina Press, 531 pp., \$6.

the law. In fact, many foreign governments including so-called democracies actually sponsor and direct such activities.

But Mr. Berge, former Assistant Attorney General of the United States, makes a vigorous and uncompromising attack on all cartels. With the zeal of a crusader, he argues that in peace time their high-price restricted-output strategy has impeded the advance of our living standards and general economic well-being; and by wantonly abusing our patent system, these cartels obtained a strangle-hold on a considerable part of our technology, bringing about deliberate deterioration of quality standards and even endangering the health and lives of consumers through adulteration of products.

Further, he insists that large corporations, such as Standard Oil and du Pont, entered into agreements with foreign companies without any regard for the safety of their own country and actually played into the hands of totalitarian nations like Germany. When war came, we discovered serious shortages of vital materials such as aluminum, magnesium and rubber; and the lack of vital drugs endangered our fighting men in fever-stricken areas.

Mr. Berge views the cartelization of industry as a means for exercising political and military control over other nations and asserts that totalitarianism represents simply the ultimate consummation of cartelism. As an example, he refers to Germany's influence in South America as a result of American cartelists agreeing not to compete in that area. Thus the United States lost valuable business and Germany was able to carry on Nazi propaganda and espionage.

The Cartels and Free Competition

WHILE PROF. WHITTLESEY agrees with Mr. Berge that cartels are not desirable, he gives little weight to the argument that they are a political menace, contending that the most fundamental objection to the cartel system is that it is inconsistent with the functioning of the economic system in a free competitive society.

He insists that the wartime shortages were almost entirely the result of expansion in demand due to the extravagant needs of war and not of prior restrictions of supply. Moreover, he claims that the situation was aggravated by the pressure on shipping facilities resulting from wartime conditions and that the list of commodities that were rationed during the war consisted chiefly of items in which cartelization had never been alleged to exist. And apparently it was not necessarily the existence of

cartels that led to Germany's preparations for war, for in view of her national policy, these would have taken place even in the absence of cartels. As for cartel agreements that excluded imports of strategic materials from the American market, he believes that their net effect might have been to strengthen our military preparedness by increasing our self-sufficiency in these materials.

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But Mr. Berge argues that the participation of American business concerns in foreign cartels led to military information passing to Germany and obstructed the production of strategic materials in this country. As an illustration, he cites the alliance that Standard Oil made with I. G. Farbenindustrie, the German chemical trust, to meet the threat arising from the new process by which oil could be made from Germany's plentiful coal resources, thereby surrendering its own rights in the chemical field including those in the United States. Thus no one was permitted to manufacture synthetic rubber, which belongs to the chemical field, not even Goodrich and Goodyear, and Standard Oil received little if any information on synthetic rubber from I. G.

On the other hand, Prof. Whittlesey claims that cartels as a device for conveying essential information cut two ways. The rights to the German oil-hydrogenation process which Standard Oil bought from I. G., became the basis of intensive research that led to the discovery of a new method of producing toluol, principal ingredient for TNT, making it possible for this country by 1941 to produce explosives at one-fifth of the cost and on a scale equal to any demand. Spokesmen for cartel interests expressed the opinion that this country was spared years of research and developmental work as a result of the information obtained from the Germans.

Persisting in his effort to view the problem objectively, Prof. Whittlesey writes that because international cartels have been made an instrument of war is not a sound reason for banning them for then, logically, we should also ban airplanes, tanks, submarines and atomic power. In fact, he suggests that the same objection can be made against foreign educational institutions, foreign missionary endeavors, travel abroad and any sort of business activity that crosses frontiers. The important question, he thinks, is whether cartels are essential to the fullest and healthiest development of American economic life.

The proponents of cartels insist that they are, for they regard them as a means of establishing order in an industry, of preventing over-capacity and of conserving capital values. Critics see them as a device to raise

prices and garner huge profits. There is some truth in each of these contentions; but while the desire to increase profits may sometimes give rise to cartels, the risk of losses provides a stronger motivation for attempting to reduce competition. We have only to remember the illadvised attempt by our own government to cartelize all industry through the NRA to understand this side of the case.

Then also, many businessmen insist that cartels are one of the established institutions of international trade and that Americans must be able to participate in them if this country is to play an active part in the world trade of the future, for otherwise we shall be excluded from foreign markets. They point to the Webb-Pomerene Act as legalizing cartel practices, but Mr. Berge denies this, contending that the Act was designed to help small businessmen to compete with foreign cartels and not to provide a means of joining them.

Prof. Whittlesey ridicules the idea that American business requires cartelization in order to hold its own in markets abroad, pointing out that the history of trade between the two world wars shows that the countries that made free use of cartels were on the whole less successful in export trade than those that did not. This view is supported by Prof. Theodore J. Kreps in his paper, "Experience With Unilateral Action Toward International Cartels" ("A Cartel Policy for the United Nations," 1945), in which he states that not more than a third of world trade is under cartel control and less than 10 per cent is dominated by well-organized foreign businesses supported by the power of their governments.

The Cartels and Economic Dislocation

BUT A STUDY of cartel history leaves one with the impression that it is essentially an instrument used by desperate men to avoid the ravages of competition, which is particularly intensified by the over-expansion created by wars. Yet almost invariably, while cartels seem to remedy a bad situation temporarily, they encourage more production by keeping prices high and attracting new competitors and tend to drive efficient producers out of business and to protect inefficient and high-cost producers.

Stocking and Watkins make this clear in "Cartels in Action," the first volume of a series of three reports issued by the Twentieth Century Fund on the subject of monopolies, as they review the development, describe the methods and analyze the results of international cartels in several important industries: sugar, rubber, nitrogen, iron and steel, aluminum,

magnesium, electric lamps, and chemicals. This book, well documented and replete with tables and charts, and despite the objective and factual style of the authors, reads like a veritable nightmare. In these words, couched in a somewhat nostalgic vein, they express their own viewpoint: "The discrepancy between the truths men live by—in business—and the truths which they profess but do not live by, is one of the most signficant, and disturbing, revelations of this survey."

But these writers bring out the fact that governments themselves in some cases took a very active part in cartel arrangements or restriction measures. As in the case of sugar, the pressure exerted on them because of the terrible plight of the growers was too great to resist. Cuba particularly was in a very bad spot because it is practically a one-crop country, and its government could not possibly refrain from interfering. Our own government made matters worse by maintaining a high tariff and imposing quotas on the various sugar-exporting countries, which tended to encourage the high-cost beet sugar producers to continue and even to expand their operations.

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The restriction of competition in foodstuffs and raw materials has been due less to international agreements than unilateral national policies involving protection and subsidization of local producers. However, some people favor government action rather than private agreements despite the fact that it increases economic nationalism and makes for much more restriction and much less flexibility.

Yet it would be naive to expect that men will soon learn that neither cartels nor government controls can possibly correct basic maladjustments. History is all against such hopes, for it seems that the dynamic forces of life are constantly driving men from one phase to another—from monopoly to freedom and back again.

This is excellently illustrated in Stocking's and Watkin's second volume, "Cartels or Competition?" Cartel practices are as old as business, but the cartel movement is young, as it is the product of a mature, not an infant, industrial society. "It represents a rejection by businessmen and statesmen, after more than a century of almost reverent acceptance, of Adam Smith's obvious and simple system of natural liberty."

By the beginning of the twentieth century economists and humanitarians were questioning the assumptions on which the logic of competition rested. The competitive ideal assumes a market of many sellers and many buyers, but modern technology was demanding larger and larger production units requiring vast amounts of capital. This fact, coupled with the mysteries of physics and chemistry which were becoming more and more essential for productive efficiency, shut off business opportunities from the uneducated man of small means.

Mass production with its requirements of large quantities of fixed capital brought increasing overhead or fixed expenses in relation to variable expenses with the result that rapid adjustments, when necessary, were difficult to make without sacrificing capital values. Out of these evolving conditions trusts were born, and as businessmen began to rely more and more on collective action, these soon became international in scope.

Competition or Cartelization

IN THE LIGHT of these historical facts it seems absurd to denounce private cartel practices as essentially wicked or as un-American. The question is whether competition or cartelization promotes the general welfare; but if we refrain from *a priori* conclusions, no definite answer on an empirical basis is available.

Dr. Hexner insists that generalizations have little value unless they are based on scientific investigation of both cartellized and non-cartellized markets and the behavior patterns of consumers and businessmen. In "International Cartels," which is heavily documented, he discusses the over-simplification and confusion resulting from the lack of case material and offers descriptions of more than a hundred international combinations together with appendices containing the complete texts of many important cartel documents. Other writers would do well to emulate his objectivity and realism.

It does not follow, he points out, that competition, increased volume and low prices inevitably exist in the absence of restrictive agreements, nor that cartels always result in contraction. Frequently the anticipation of profits and "stable" markets attract large investments leading to improved production techniques and greater output. Thus it is a fallacy to assume that a combination must operate against the consumer, for it is questionable whether the consumer, in some cases, would receive the benefits that flow from large-scale, long-term investment were it not for the existence of some degree of private monopoly.

However, Dr. Hexner is not unalterably opposed to competition since he seems to regard the frailty of private marketing control schemes as a virtue compared to the hardships and rigidities of government controls. But the fact that underground competition and the constant jockeying for the dominant position within many cartels force the members to

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expand goods and services whether they like it or not is ignored by cartel critics. Thus they demand legislation to force businessmen to compete, for their attitude is based on two strange propositions: 1. Free enterprise does not embrace the freedom to refrain from competition. 2. Businessmen have no moral right to conserve capital values; only consumers and labor have rights.

The problem is further confused by the lip-service Americans pay to the ideal of free enterprise in the face of their predilection for all kinds of trade restraints. In fact, there is nothing more fantastic than the spectacle of the government piously exhorting other nations to establish free international trade while at the same time maintaining tariffs, immigration laws, farm parities, fair trade practice laws, and laws for the protection of labor unions.

Perhaps the issue is not competition vs. monopoly after all but rather private planning vs. government planning, for the pathological fear of private monopoly leads to acceptance of the myth that government monopoly is always in the public interest. But the psychological implications are sensed by Dr. Hexner, for if man is not actually shown up here as a sham, at least his muddled state is clearly revealed for all to see. In fact, compared to man as he really is, Adam Smith's "economic man" is too simple and artificial a creature to command belief.

Problems of Policy

What then is to be our cartel policy? Stocking and Watkins believe there is no simple solution for the problem. They have little hope that, in a world devastated by war, freedom of production and trade can be fully established, due to the reluctance of nations to give up the controls and regulations that they regard as essential for survival. Furthermore, while they deplore the growth of monopoly, these writers have little faith in competitive market forces to do the proper job in the case of certain raw materials except over a long period and at very great human and social cost.

To avoid that cost and to reduce the risks of unstable production and trade, they think that intergovernmental commodity agreements with suitable safeguards are justified (despite past experience), but they do not favor unilateral or bilateral agreements. At the same time, they are opposed to the United States assuming a weak attitude toward cartels generally and believe that because of its magnificent industrial set-up, it should and can make an effort to preserve as much freedom of op-

portunity as possible. Specific proposals for attaining this the authors are deferring to their next report. However, in a general way, they recommend repeal of the Webb Act and replacing it with new legislation permitting the formation of export associations and subjecting them to clearer and stricter rules; also the reforming of the antitrust and patent laws.

Prof. Whittlesey agrees that we should work for economic freedom but, nevertheless, favors some degree of latitude on the part of our administrative authorities to permit cartel practices "when they can be shown to be clearly in the national interest." Also he recommends a re-examination of the Webb-Pomerene Act, modification of existing patent provisions, and continuance of antitrust enforcement plus, unfortunately, an expansion of bureaucracy in the form of new agencies to handle cartel problems.

Mr. Berge is much more uncompromising and asserts that the most effective weapon for combating monopolies and cartels is vigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws, although the record shows that enforcement of the Sherman Act since it was placed on the statute books in 1890 has utterly failed to achieve the desired results. The Department of Justice has lost most of its suits, and it is significant that most companies prefer to sign consent decrees rather than spend the time and money to defend themselves, but these decrees involve the acceptance by the government of the companies' assertions of innocence.

In fact, natural laws have been more effective in curbing unnecessary combinations, for most trusts have been unsuccessful. Moreover, it is well known that small business has been fighting a losing battle against economic forces during the last eighteen years, the very period in which antitrust suits increased by about 3,000 per cent. And, besides, Mr. Berge must know that attempts at enforcement inevitably interfere with production, for it was for this very reason that in March, 1942, President Roosevelt ordered these suits to be postponed until after the war. Nevertheless, we can expect that trust busting will continue indefinitely, for the Sherman Act is sacred in this country, and prohibitive measures are generally regarded as the only way to correct economic maladjustments. But any fool can prohibit something if he has the power to do so. If competitive conditions do not seem to exist, what could be easier than to hamper the functioning of large corporations?

In view of his profound understanding of a complex subject, it is not surprising, on the other hand, to find Dr. Hexner taking a more or less

neutral position. However, the human mind seldom knows its own limitations, for despite his insistence that considerably more research is necessary to arrive at definite conclusions and to formulate policies, he ventures to offer twenty suggestions centered chiefly in the idea of supervision of cartels by an international convention of governments. At the same time, he warns the reader that even his own generalizations are suspect if unsupported by adequate information.

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Land Monopoly in Argentina

Wherever the scholar who has a special interest in land economics seems to turn, he finds the perennial land question in one form or another. Dr. Carl C. Taylor, the distinguished rural sociologist, was in Argentina from March, 1942, to April, 1943, on a research assignment for the United States Department of State. He traveled 20,00 miles within the country, interviewed more than 120 families and gathered data on population and rural life. One product of this opportunity is his book, "Rural Life in Argentina," published last year by the Louisiana State University Press.

The book contains a wealth of information on the life of the rural family in Argentina and there is much interesting information on land tenure in the country, as in Dr. Taylor's classic text on rural sociology. N. Y. Whetten of the University of Connecticut summarizes this aspect of the book in *Rural Sociology* (Sept. 1948) as follows:

"There is probably no other society wherein the inhabitants prize owner-ship of farm land more than in Argentina, yet 44 per cent of the farmers are tenants and there is a semi-monopoly of the land in large holdings. Most of the tenants are hired men trying to ascend to ownership, not dispossessed owners" (p. 331).

Whetten declares that one of the book's important results should be to stimulate Argentines to make rural life studies of their own country. The fact is, of course, that fundamental studies of the agrarian land problem in Argentina have been made by such men as Prof. C. Villalobos Dominguez. Taylor's work may stimulate them to undertake more rounded studies.

Government by Concurrent Minorities

WE AMERICANS born north of the Mason and Dixon line have done scant justice to one of our ablest political philosophers, John C. Calhoun. We think of him as merely an apostle of slavery, defender of a detestable and bygone system. Of late a change in our attitude toward Calhoun has been dawning. In Professor Hofstadter's book, "The American Tradition," one of the most brilliant chapters is devoted to Calhoun. Today Calhoun is coming to stand out in history as the philosopher of a republic with majority and minority living under a rule of justice.

Straight majority rule, Calhoun declares, is tyranny; the worst form of tyranny. Political liberty requires the consent of the minority to every issue deeply affecting them. That means government by the concurrent minority.

Is not that a fairly close approximation to the government of the United States, as we know it? The overwhelming majority of our people is for abolition of the poll tax and against the exclusion of the Negro vote in the South. Have we of the majority ever been able to put our convictions across? No: the concurrent minority has vetoed our intentions, as arrogantly and effectively as Vishinsky vetoes every move of the United Nations toward a world not dominated by Russia.

The Farm Bureau minority is prepared to veto any real effort to put the cost of food where you and I can afford to eat it. The organized labor interest is prepared to veto any measure that asks labor to consider that it is after all only one of the group interests that compose our society. The far western irrigated land agriculture is prepared to veto any limitation upon reclamation activities.

Calhoun, in the simple environment of the early nineteenth century, conceived of only one minority. One minority, concurrently dominant, admitted the possibility of action. But how about three minorities, six or ten? Who could devise a better set-up for governmental imbecility?

We are not yet so bad as that. But the time is coming when we can no longer be content with two parties, each so completely hamstrung by concurrent minorities that it is not worth a man's time to go out to vote. Necessity whispers in our ears: "Our party system, with a bunch of concurrent minorities vetoing everything, may be conceivable to you mortals who can conceive of anything. But I am History."

ALVIN JOHNSON

New School for Social Research

Employment Handicaps of Older Workers

By PHILIP M. SMITH

1

THE ACCELERATED PACE of technological progress, especially since World War I, has placed a premium upon the services of youth in American industry. With the transition from an agricultural to an urban-industrial economy, numerous older persons who otherwise might have been gainfully employed long after the conventional retirement age were committed to the industrial scrap-heap. Due largely to greater productive efficiency in agriculture, moreover, the long-term trend unquestionably has been toward proportionately fewer workers on farms. In this connection, it is significant that agricultural employment in the nation as a whole actually attained its peak nearly forty years ago. According to the United States Bureau of Agricultural Economics, if figures for the years 1910-14 are used to represent the base period, with an index number of 100, by 1946 the index for farm employment had dropped to 83, while that of production per worker had climbed to 192. The cityward migration of surplus farm population, which was so pronounced during and after the two world wars, tended to aggravate further what was already becoming a serious problem in industrial areas, the displacement of men of maturity and experience by younger workers.

On the farm the older worker traditionally has been at a distinct advantage, compared to the city, since it is customary to assign the less strenuous routine tasks to elderly persons. Furthermore, the work usually can be tapered off in keeping with the physical limitations of advancing age. But in modern, large-scale industry, opportunities for sustained employment at a slower pace are decidedly limited. Particularly is this true of those desirous of utilizing their previous training along lines in which they are most proficient from the standpoint of quality of output rather than of speed of production.

It was the depression of the Nineteen Thirties that accentuated the discouraging problems faced by older workers. For those in the labor force, temporarily unemployed, who were seeking employment in their former occupations, the prospects were especially dismal. Symptomatic of diminishing employment opportunities for the middle-aged was the growth of the "Forty Plus" movement in large cities scattered throughout the

nation. According to the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, there were as many as thirty-eight "Forty Plus" clubs in operation at one time. As a rule, they were designed primarily to place men of superior ability, training, and experience, who had previously held responsible positions at excellent salaries, in occupations where their talents could be utilized to advantage. How the "great depression" resulted in agitation for federal relief services, because of widespread unemployment, is now a matter of record. Yet such measures as were adopted did not meet the needs of older workers, nor solve their problems, because the sources of the difficulty were too deeply rooted in social change to be reached by what were at best only temporary expedients.

II

DURING THE PAST TWENTY YEARS, social scientists seem to have become increasingly conscious of the economic implications of the shifting age distribution of our national population. Whereas in 1850, for example, only 12.4 per cent of our people were 45 years of age and over, by 1940 the ratio had climbed to 26.5 per cent. The Census Bureau has estimated that by the year 2000 the corresponding figure will be 39.7 per cent, or more than three times that of 1850 for the same age group. Although the proportion of persons aged 45 to 64 doubled between 1850 and 1940, the percentage increase was even more striking with respect to those aged 65 and over. It is estimated, on the basis of conservative projection, that the percentage of our population aged 65 and over in the year 2000 will be over five times as high as in 1850. (Owing to an unprecedented number of births during the immediate postwar years especially, certain of these estimates are now undergoing necessary revision.) Of approximately 10 million persons in this country who are 65 years of age and over, only a small proportion, about 27 per cent, are self-supporting as a result of gainful employment.2 About 25 per cent receive public assistance of various types, mainly Old Age Assistance; 28 per cent are partially dependent upon their families, friends, or private charities; while 20 per cent are retired on pensions or income from investments.3 During the summer of 1948, a period of marked inflation, some economists estimated that only about one person in ten aged 65 and over was financially independent.

¹ The founder of the "Forty Plus" movement was Mr. Henry Simler, although Mr. Roland Darling started the first "club," in Boston.

^a See Henry W. Steinhaus, "Financing Old Age," National Industrial Conference Board, Inc., New York, 1948, (Studies in Individual and Collective Security, No. 4), p. 2.
^a Loc. cit.

Although the changing age composition of the population has been due in part to the long-term drop in the birth rate, a phenomenal increase in the life span of the American people accounts for the unexpected increments statistically in the upper age brackets. More people are living to a ripe old age because of the progress of medical science. Improved facilities for the diagnosis and treatment of disease, the effective use of new drugs, advanced surgical techniques, better hospitals and physicians, a growing emphasis on preventive medicine, and more adequate public health services have combined to effect a surprising increase in longevity. For example, in 1900 average life expectancy in this country was about 47 years. Today it is estimated at nearly 67 years. This represents a gain of 42 per cent. Even more impressive is the contrast between the figures for the period 1879-89 and those of 1945 for industrial policyholders of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. For the former period, average expectation of life was 34 years. By 1945 it had increased to 65 years.4 Dr. A. C. Ivy, University of Illinois physiologist, has stated that an average life span of 75 years is possible for our people if available medical knowledge be fully applied, and that men may someday live to be 150 years old.5 On the other hand, when it is realized that possibly three-fourths of all permanently disabled persons are 45 years of age and over, the problem of the economic burden of invalidism during senility becomes increasingly apparent.6

III

Following the entry of the United States into World War II, the demand for qualified workers possessing the requisite technical skills for war industries far exceeded the supply. In many instances, experienced specialists who had been retired because of age were recalled by industry to serve as instructors in trade schools operated in connection with war plants. Motivated partly by high wages, partly by considerations of patriotism, numerous older persons of both sexes went into war work. After a few weeks of intensive instruction, followed by a longer period of employment under close supervision, many such individuals rendered services of substantial value to the war effort.

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Statistical Bulletin, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, January, 1946.

⁵ Detroit News, April 17, 1948.

⁶ Statistical Bulletin, December, 1946: "Health Problems of an Aging Population" (Summary of a paper by Dr. Louis I. Dublin presented at the annual meeting of the American Public Health Association, November 14, 1946.)

See also "Older Workers in Wartime," Monthly Labor Review, July, 1944.

To fill the gaps resulting from the movement of younger workers into "essential" jobs, many elderly persons not ordinarily included in the labor force found positions in stores, restaurants, service industries, and transportation. Many of the better educated in the upper middle-age group who had a suitable backlog of specialized experience secured responsible administrative positions in various types of businesses. Still others had little difficulty in obtaining well-paying jobs in federal, state, and municipal service.

According to the Federal Security Board, a sizeable proportion of persons otherwise entitled to benefits under Old-Age and Survivors Insurance, and Old-Age Assistance grants, postponed making application for aid during the war period because of remunerative employment. Payments to beneficiaries under the plan had also been suspended in many cases for the same reason. After the termination of the war, however, the downward trend was reversed, while the number of claims for unemployment insurance benefits mounted rapidly. Postwar changes in such statistics largely reflected industrial conditions which were becoming less favorable to older workers. Despite the fact that the proportion of older persons in the labor force in 1947 was considerably above normal—with nonfarm employment reaching a record peak of 43.5 million workers— there was a strong feeling in industrial circles that this situation was temporary rather than permanent and that another depression would change the picture overnight.

IV

As EARLY AS NOVEMBER, 1945, Mr. Roland R. Darling reported to the Bureau of Labor Statistics that the Forty Plus Club, of Boston, planned to resume its activities, in view of growing unemployment among its potential constituency. The group contacted for information purposes, according to Mr. Darling, included the following:

1. Those who held responsible positions before the war and went into uniform to serve as specialists in various branches of the service. One, who returned recently at 58, a lieutenant colonel, before the war had been general manager of one of the largest food firms. The organization had been completely changed and he was out of a job.

2. Older men who were in sales work before the war and who, during the war years, went into war work and on their return were being told, 'Sorry, but we are building our postwar sales staff around youth.'

3. Older men who could find no jobs for them listed in public and private employment agencies except those which failed to take advantage of their skills. For example, one man who formerly earned \$6000 was

offered an elevator operator's job, since it was the only opening on the books for an older man.

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4. Older men who reached the age of 40 during the war years and after the war were amazed at the changed attitude on the part of employers.8

If modern industry reveals a preference for workers under 40 years of age, what are some of the reasons why this is so? Certainly, there is no proof that employers as a group are engaging in a conspiracy to discriminate against applicants for jobs merely because they happen to exceed a theoretical age deadline. There are definite advantages which youth enjoys in a competitive labor market—disregarding, for the moment, the effects of union seniority rules which may materially change the picture in future years. Some of these alleged advantages are said by employers to be as follows:

Greater physical strength and endurance; more adaptable to change; less likely to become involved in accidents resulting in serious or fatal injury; less absenteeism because of illness; shorter period of convalescence required prior to returning to duty; does not expect preferential treatment by virtue of previous experience; less difficult to supervise-more responsive to suggestions of superiors; more readily absorbed into the organization; less prejudiced—opinions less crystallized; of greater value in forming the nucleus of a new organization intended to be permanent; does not live in the "good old days", but tends to look ahead in an age of progress; will usually accept a lower starting salary; more attractive in meeting the public; essential in occupations where physical hazards are great; faster rate of learning new techniques; makes friends of fellow workers more easily; greater productivity, due largely to speed of movement; less sensitive to criticism than older worker; less inclined to think of the job as a temporary source of added income, as in the case of an older worker newly hired.

On the other hand, many employers seemed quite enthusiastic about the performance of older workers during the war years when the labor shortage was at its worst and their help was sorely needed. A list of their alleged points of superiority is included below:

Greater reliability—less absenteeism for reasons other than illness; steadier worker—less time wasted on the job; better judgment, mellowed by experience; less inclined to "fly off the handle" and quit the job; deeper understanding of human nature, based on keen observation through the years; less inclined to "shop around" for a better job; more familiar with operational short-cuts which save both time and money; deeper appreciation of the value of a job; not inclined to create safety hazards by taking

⁸ "Employment and the Older Worker," Monthly Labor Review, March, 1946, p. 390. (Prepared by Mary T. Waggaman of the Bureau's Publication Staff.)

chances; better understanding of the methods and traditions of the establishment; does not engage in "horse-play"; fewer outside distractions, in the sense of amusement or romantic interests; greater sense of loyalty where the employer-employee relationship has been of long-standing; more respect for authority; greater appreciation of the problems of management; less inclined to dissipate his physical energy—knows how to conserve his strength; invaluable for holding old customers when good-will is largely a personal matter, built up through the years; indispensable for instructing younger employees; more careful in the use of expensive machines and equipment; tries harder to prove his worth to his employer; tends to evaluate his job more in terms of pleasant working conditions than on the basis of monetary returns; more likely to be a dependable, established citizen of the community.

Judging from the foregoing, it would seem that there is considerable overlapping, and that some of the alleged advantages and disadvantages, in both instances, are purely fictitious. It is only fair to conclude that much depends upon the individual worker's ability to adjust himself to his surroundings, to follow instructions faithfully, and to get results, regardless of his age. To exclude capable persons from gainful employment, en masse, merely because of age, is indeed a reprehensible practice, striking as it does at the very roots of the American way of life. But so long as employers are convinced that they can obtain greater production at lower net cost by hiring younger men, there seems nothing that can be done, under the law, to prevent it. (It is quite generally conceded that the higher cost of insuring older workers against industrial accidents is a factor in such discrimination.)

V

THE WAR PERIOD DEMONSTRATED conclusively, nevertheless, that older workers are capable of performing many tasks in industry at a high level of efficiency. Hence, a partial solution to their employment problem would seem to lie in more scientific job placement, in better classification, in putting the individual in an environment designed to stimulate him to do good work despite his physical, mental, or emotional handicaps. There is a distinct possibility that further study of gerontology, or the science of aging, will yield a deeper appreciation on the part of employers both of the potentialities and the limitations of older workers. Certainly, in an expanding economy many kinds of positions could be found which would meet their individual needs. But so long as the labor market is contracting, youth appears almost inevitably destined to receive the preference. The next few years may well prove of crucial importance to our older

wage-earners.9 Should a serious business slump occur, they will be among the first to suffer. A possible alternative to employment may lie in the direction of an earlier retirement age-say 55-with much greater liberalization of coverage and benefits under the Social Security program than may be contemplated at present. It is encouraging to note that certain leaders in the major political parties are becoming increasingly aware of the widespread social and economic implications of this problem. From the standpoint of medical opinion, however, it appears certain that the premature retirement of a formerly active worker, with almost complete cessation of purposeful activity, is injurious to health and morale. In view of wide variations in physical condition among workers, as related to the aging process, a uniform and arbitrary retirement age could prove a grave injustice to those of our oldsters who are both able and willing to work. Furthermore, the support of a large group of superannuated persons, which is constantly increasing in numbers, might eventually be an almost prohibitive burden if imposed on those engaged in productive labor who have families of their own to support. Whether the experience of the Nineteen Thirties in relation to persons past the age deadline is to be repeated, time alone will tell. But if it is repeated, not only will our nation have been guilty of a grave injustice against the dignity of human personality but it will likewise suffer an irreparable social and economic loss as well.

Central Michigan College of Education

⁸ The following references are of value in this connection: Michael T. Wermel and Selma Gelbaum, "Work and Retirement in Old Age," American Journal of Sociology, July, 1945; S. J. Mushkin and Alan Berman, "Factors Influencing Trends in Employment of the Aged," in Social Security Bulletin, August, 1947; Edward J. Stieglitz, M.D., "Gerontology Comes of Age," Scientific Montbly, January, 1946; Harold Wool, "Recent Trends in the Labor Force, Montbly Labor Review, December, 1947; George Lawton (editor), New Goals for Old Age, New York, Columbia University Press, 1943; Wingate Johnson, M.D., The Years After Fifty, New York, Whittlesey House, 1947.

Foreign 'Images' of America

HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS of Americans have, by now, returned from vacations spent abroad. A good many of them had never before seen the landscapes, architecture, or any of the art treasures, which the older nations accumulated over the centuries. Even more important, these visitors mingled, for the first time, with men and women of other civilizations, ate their food, watched them at their daily work, joined their games and dances and, if luck brought the right companions together, even exchanged impressions and ideas. While doing this, they spent a billion dollars or more in foreign countries.

Our travellers have certainly done a good deed to themselves and to the countries they visited. How good a deed have they done to America? The answer depends on the "image" of America they have created in the minds of the people with whom they came in contact.

There are in international contacts two fundamental facts which a vistor to another country usually disregards, to his detriment. Every foreigner, even the most interesting individual, is always taken as a representative of his nation. And there exists in all countries a number of stereotyped notions which serve as a sort of warrant with which the native compares the behavior of his guest. We know, as yet, very little about the origin of these stereotypes.

Does it matter what other peoples think about us? We are the most powerful nation in the world ready to out-compete any other economic or cultural center. Why bother about their prejudices contenting us, which they hardly dare to express when we are around. It is not our sermons, not even our solemn declarations from the rostrum of the United Nations, that persuade the world of our true intentions. It is our behavior, that of our Government as well as of every individual American, abroad, which breaks through the wall of prejudices or builds a new one.

We, at the New School's Institute of World Affairs, are studying very carefully the "image" which other nations have formed, over the ages, of the United States. We hope to have some preliminary results in the near future. They might well serve as a sort of mirror, into which it would be wise to look before we go abroad again.

ADOLPH LOWE

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The Politics of 'Pan-Slavism'

By GEORGE C. GUINS

T

Pan-Slavism as a Political Force

Among the Russian monarchs, Alexander I was probably the only one who planned unifying the Slavs in the form of a federation of the Slavic nations. The liberal constitution he granted Poland was, possibly, the first step in the realization of his large scale political scheme.¹ The second step, however, never followed.

In 1848, a revolt spread in Hungary with the aim of separating Hungary from Austria. If this movement had been successful, Austria would have been doomed to Anschluss, its amalgamation with other German states. The Slav nations, then incorporated in Austria, would have been drowned, in those circumstances, in the German sea. The other ones connected more closely with Hungary would have been absorbed by the latter. Neither of these perspectives attracted the Slaves. Relations between Hungary and the southern Slavic nations were especially strained. In the meantime Austria acknowledged the Czech language in Bohemia as equal with the German, and it had appeared as probable that Austria would let the Slav nations establish national self-government.

Therefore, the Slavs had predilections for supporting the Austro-Hungarian monarchy rather than for separation from it and individual unification. Serbian students in Budapest began to campaign for Slav unity, and in spite of the pressure from the Hungarian nationalists this movement became increasingly radical. However, it was not supported by the other Slavic nations.

In 1848, a Slav Congress was convocated in Prague. A Polish poet, Wincenty Pol, greeted the Congress with a poem Slowo a Slawa (Word and Glory). That was a period of so-called Sturm und Drang. National self-consciousness was awakened, but the Congress in Prague proved to be more moderate than was expected. Any idea of uniting the Slav nations into a federative state was unsuccessful. The Austro-Hungarian Slavs considered it more advantageous and realistic to remain loyal toward

¹ Alexander I gave his Polish kingdom a parliament, full internal self-government with separate finance and tariffs, and an army. Details on the plans of Alexander I are given by G. Vernadsky, "Alexandre I et le problème Slave," (Revue des Etudes Slaves, VII, 1927); also, G. Vernadsky, "La Charte Constitutionelle de l'Empire Russe de l'an 1820," (Paris, 1932); B. Mirkine Guetzévitch, "Un project de fédération europeenne," Melanges Nicholas Iorga, Paris, 1933.

the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and correspondingly, the Slav Congress of 1848 proclaimed the loyalty of the Slav nations to Vienna.²

No matter what Emperor Nicholas I's attitude was toward the Slav movement, his anti-Hungarian campaign in 1849, suppressing the Hungarian revolt with the aid of Russian troops and saving Austro-Hungarian integrity, corresponded to the wishes of the southern Slav nations and to the predominant moods of the other Slavs in Austria-Hungary.

The masses were not yet ready for a political union, and gave but little support to the Slavs prominent in Pan-Slavism. The venture of a federation of western Slavs was undertaken once more in Vienna. Back in August, 1866, there took place in Vienna a Congress of Austrian Slavs. Palacki and Rieger represented the Czechs, Goluchovski the Poles, Strossmayer the Croatians. They drew up plans for a federal union that would primarily benefit all Slavs. Their plan was a so-called "pentarchy." The scheme called for a reorganization of Austria and provided for its division into five parts: Upper Austria, Lower Austria, Bohemia, Yugoslavia, and Poland. The central government was to have among its members five chancellors representing each section of the Pentarchy. This project was never put into effect.

In the meantime, the Pan-Slavic movement in Russia had been confined to a very limited activity of the Slavophiles, and never received open official support. Alexander II received the eminent Czech Palacki, Rieger and others while on their pilgrimage to Moscow, but was very distant with them. Evidently the Russian Government at that time was trying to avoid international complications with the Western Powers.

As it was many times disclosed, the early Slavophiles rather vaguely envisaged the unification of the Slavs as one based upon the brotherhood of the Slavs; however, with time, the idea found its expression in the form of a Slavic Imperialism, the idea of merging all Slav States into one Russian Empire. This idea became especially popular in Russia toward the end of the nineteenth century. It was particularly well expressed by Danilevsky in his book "Russia and Europe" (1871).

Danilevsky saw the Slavic problem as a struggle between two different types of culture: The Romano-Germanic, individualistic and egocentric on one side, and the Slavic culture—permeated by a spirit of national unity and Orthodox Christianity—on the other. The Slavic people had to unite to defend their culture.

² Documents relating to the Slav Congress in Prague, in 1848, were published in St. Petersburg in 1860 under the title "Slavianskii s'ezd v Prage v 1848." Many details are given also by Vlaho Vlahovic, "Two Hundred 50 Million and One Slavs" (New York, 1945).

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According to Danilevsky, Russia had to keep her national capital at St. Petersburg, yet at the same time to create a Pan-Slavic union with the capital at Constantinople. Such plans were never adopted by official circles, and it would be most unjust to explain all steps taken by Imperial Russia regarding the Slavic problem, by Russia's imperialist aspirations, and to see in the Slavophile movement nothing but a reactionary doctrine.³ One would never repeat it who knows the work of the Moscow Slavic Committee⁴ and the part played by Ivan Sergeevich Aksakov, who represented the purely idealistic tendencies of Russian public spirit in regard to the Slavic problem in the Seventies.

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The Moscow Committee had succeeded in establishing an active contact with the Slav countries. The committee freely expressed sympathy toward the idea of an independent Poland, and formulated the idea of forming a free Czechoslovakia under Russia's protectorate. Ivan Aksakov personally undertook two trips throughout the Slavic lands, where he communicated with statesmen and the masses of the people. Each public appearance of Ivan Aksakov on the Slavic problem was an event. The extent of his popularity is shown by the fact that a Bulgarian electoral committee nominated him as a possible candidate for the throne of Bulgaria. Yet, his activities and his popularity, while expressing certain definite trends, certainly had nothing in common with imperialism.

No one will deny that both in Russia, Bulgaria and Serbia—as, probably, even in this day in Czechoslovakia and Poland—the consciousness of the brotherhood of Slav peoples still plays a great rôle as a political factor.

The actions of the Russian government had not always been in complete accord with the true aspirations of the people. Thus, the Moscow Committee was dissolved by the authorities without much ado. Had the Russian government been motivated by imperialist aims, it would hardly have prosecuted an organization which was preparing fertile grounds for the rapprochement of Slavic nations, and might have been of assistance in the work of unifying the Slav countries. The Russian government, however, was not inclined to create international complications, and avoided anything that could be construed as furthering imperialist views toward the Balkans. It therefore displayed much caution, and disappointed the people, who were enthusiastic toward the idea of Slav unity.

chestvo" (A Prophecy), March 1, 1850.

⁴ A. Georgievskii, "The Moscow Slav Benevolent Committee and its Fate" (Memoirs of the Historical-Philological Faculty at Vladivostok, v. 1, Sect. I). In Russian, 1919.

³ This is an interpretation of the late Edouard Benes in "The New Slav Policy" (Free World, May 1944). This interpretation contradicts the facts: "Slav currents found no response within the Russian government" (Vlaho Vlahovic). The Russian poet Tyutchev expressed his indignation against the official policy of his government in ignoring the Panslav feelings, see his poems "To Count K. V. Nesselrode" (May 1850) and "Prozochestvo" (A Prophecy). March 1, 1850.

Actually, both formerly and in our own days, Russia has worked to liberate the Slav peoples: once, from the Turkish yoke; latterly, from the Germans, and never had she evidenced, at least officially, any desire to swallow all Slav nationalities or even unite them into one Slav union.

Soviet Russia and the Slavs

A VOLUNTARY FEDERATION of Slav countries was hardly possible before World War II, and did not become easier after the defeat of the Axis powers.

The idea of a Pan-Slavic Union was easily disseminated and found many adherents among the Slav peoples while they were subjugated and striving for freedom. Until they had tasted of the sweet fruits of independence, and established their own government, they had welcomed the idea of unification with Russia. Naturally enough, they preferred unification with Russia to the yoke of an alien people.

Hatred toward the Germans has been the most effective unifying stimulus among Slavs. The famous Slavy Dcera, a great poem composed by Jan Kollar, glorified Slavism and depicted the Germans as the traditional enemy of the Slavs. Hitler had brought to an end the everlasting struggle between the German and Slav worlds. However, as soon as this struggle was over the most important stimulus for unification disappeared. Such a possibility had been anticipated long ago by the Czechs:

"Pan-Slavism is an alleged aim of a political unification of Slavs that Germans ascribe to them thus creating a kind of scarecrow. Partially an innate sympathy of all Slav peoples to their kin and their hatred for their common enemies and partially the idea of reciprocal relation between their literatures, as proclaimed by Kollar in particular, could suggest such an opinion." (The Czech Scientific Dictionary).

Some Russian Slavophiles dreamed about a "World Orthodox Empire" the foundations of which the Slavs were called upon to lay. On the way to such a fantastic Empire it would be necessary to first reconcile the Greek Orthodox Church with Catholicism. Poles, Croats and the majority of Czechs and Slovaks are Catholics, while millions of Ukrainians in the Western Ukraine, as well as the Moslem Serbs in Bosnia, hate militant Catholicism no less than they do the Germans.

In connection with the war against Hitlerism the Pan-Slav banner was raised again. It was hoisted in Moscow, but with none of the old Pan-Slavic slogans. The new "Pan-Slavic" organization created at Moscow in 1941–43 has nothing in common with the old Pan-Slavism of the nineteenth century. The president of this organization was a general, A.

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Gundoroff, and its activity was still limited by the problems of war with Germany.

The old Slavophiles believed in religion and in moral ties.⁵ They thought that a State is perfect only which has grown organically, not through armed occupations (Ivan Kireevski), that the old Russian State was wholly established upon an ethical and religious basis (Homiakov) and that the Slavic organization, in its pure form, is pacific in character, based upon free conviction. The Slavophiles were, therefore, antagonistic to the State built with the aid of coercion (Konstantin Aksakov). Their beloved and idealized Russia was "Holy Russia," strange to any bureaucratism, and adverse to coercive Russification.

It would be more dangerous, indeed, to propagate or even repeat such ideas in present-day Russia than it was at the time of Nicholas I, when most old Slavophiles developed their doctrines, and were considered suspicious or insane persons.

Practically nearer, but still an ideological stranger to contemporary Soviet Policy, are the ideas of the later Russian Pan-Slavists (Danilevskii, Tyutchev) who dreamed to unite all Slavs under the sceptre of the Russian Czar, who had to become a "Vseslavianskii Czar." There was, however, an element of "biological nationalism," a complex of national superiority in those political dreams, a kind of messianism close to Hitler's Naziism. Communists are resolutely averse to such ideas, and believe in unification through the understanding of class interests and class solidarity, not through national kinship. It is impossible, therefore, to expect a renascence of any kind of Slavophilism or Pan-Slavism in Moscow.

There is in Moscow a Pan-Slav organization, but no Pan-Slavic ideology. The magazine Slaviane (The Slavs), published at Moscow since the war, contained proclamations to Slavic peoples to support the war against Germany, information about German abuses and violations, and reports about conferences of the Pan-Slavic Committee. After the liberation of the Slav countries from the German yoke, the same magazine began publishing articles attacking anti-communist statesmen, and promoting Marshal Tito in Yugoslavia (then a Moscow favorite) the so-called Lublin

⁵ Religion was considered by many of Slavophiles as a potential weapon of unification. Jura Krizanic, a Croatian clergyman, pioneer and apostle of Panslavism—whose manuscript on Slav History had lain for more than two centuries in Moscow and only recently was uncovered by the eminent Russian academician Eugene Tarle—dreamed to unite all Slav nations with a common language and one national church.

The Russian Slavophil, Kiriyevsky, believed that Slav Orthodox was a genuine Slav religion, and that Russia's duty was to gather all the Slavs around her. The Soviet policy at present is not quite alien to these ideas. An anti-Catholic and anti-Uniat movement is evidently encouraged by the Soviets in Poland, Karpatho-Russia, and Croatia, and the Russian Orthodox Church and Moscow Patriarkhat has become a weapon for strengthening the Soviet influences in all Slavic countries.

government in Poland, the Fatherland Front in Bulgaria, etc. General Gundoroff in his article "Congress in Belgrade" (Slaviane, 1946) also pointed out that one of the aims of post-war Slav policy was to establish closer connections and ties with the organizations of Slavs in foreign countries.

The Soviet government does not neglect any means that might assist it in widening and strengthening its influence. The Orthodox Church, after re-establishing the Patriarchate, is used by the Soviets as an instrument not only to attract the hearts of the orthodox population of Bulgaria and Serbia, but also to compete with and displace wherever it is possible, Catholicism.⁶

The term "Pan-Slavism," when used, is merely a disguise for the real political motives of the Soviets. Unquestionably, Soviet policy is pursuing its own goals, and with the aid of its own specific methods.

As a substitute for religion the Soviets propagate the Marxian doctrine of the class struggle and socialism, and instead of "Pan-Slavism," the proletarian International. As concerns a Slav nationalism, if anything it has served but as an instrument for edging into Central Europe. Kindred relations are not of great importance in Soviet policy, and it is not less significant for the U.S.S.R. to establish a rapprochement with Rumania and Hungary than with Bulgaria and Poland. Social and economic problems are generally at the fore, and the creation of an East-European bloc fits a Soviet ideology better than a Pan-Slavic one.

Having occupied the Slav countries, the Soviet government transforms them into its satellites, trying to exterminate any anti-Soviet opposition. There are no traces in the policy of the human Slavophile philosophy of the first half of the nineteenth century. On the contrary its policy looks like imperialism, though permeated with new ideas, and is no less repulsive.

The Soviet methods of consolidating different countries round the Kremlin are well known. To organize a provisional government composed of absolutely loyal communists was the first step, in Poland just as in Azerbaijan and Korea. Dimitrov and Kolarov in Bulgaria; Gottwald in Czechoslovakia; Broz in Yugoslavia; Beirut and Osobka- Morawski in Poland are all active members of the revived Comintern. Since those provisional governments have been organized they have been receiving every assistance from Soviet Russia in exterminating any kind of opposition. No means are neglected. Executions, imprisonment, penal servitude and forced labor, and in all cases confiscation of property are the most

⁶ A conference of the Uniats gathered in Lvov, March 8, 1946, decided to abolish the Brest Union with the Vatican of 1596, and to return to the orthodox church. (Izvestia, March 17, 1946).

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habitual. In order to attract the sympathies of the toiling masses, persecutions of "enemies of people" are accompanied by social reforms such as distribution of confiscated lands.

According to the Soviet patterns only the most radical political parties are permitted in all Slav countries; the others are dissolved and persecuted. National armies and police forces absorb a number of Soviet officers, soldiers, and agents of the M.V.D., the Soviet secret police. Disguised in a new uniform they practically control, or at least support, the system of terror and extermination of real and even potential enemies of communism and Soviet Russia and even of Soviet communists.^{6a}

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Since all "bourgeois" freedoms are suppressed, and the opposition exterminated or deprived of freedom, elections show only spectacular support of the existing government by the population. Step by step the system of government becomes identical with that of the Soviet Union. And not only the system of government, but also the ideology, and political interests and aims. It is, therefore, but natural that the hegemony of Soviet Russia does not appear as aggression. It looks rather like leadership and protection by a stronger and more experienced power. There is no reason to call it imperialistic or militaristic; practically, however, it is a peculiar system of political and economic expansion and domination.

There were many obstacles to the unification of the Slav countries: religious differences, dynastic intrigues combined with forzign influences, historical competition and discords about boundaries. All these obstacles disappear together with the liquidation of the old order. Differences of religion cease to be important since all churches are equally suppressed. Dynasties are abolished, and national discords are obliterated by the dominant ideology of internationl brotherhood of all working people. The so-called "iron curtain" protects the sphere from influences from abroad, and all political and economic interests are submitted to those of the U.S.S.R. Newman has correctly said that "the Soviet economic and political system are such that a close association inevitably means absorption." But from the communist point of view, all means are justified by

⁶a "To resolve general problems, to judge and condemn," writes A. Ciliga, a Yugo-slav communist expelled from the Comintern in 1929 for his opposition to the policy on Yugoslav problems advocated by Moscow leaders, "there exists the Russian Communist Party; the others are there merely to carry out its decisions. It seems incredible that such a system of servility could have been born and developed within an international workers' movement; yet it exists and it triumphs." "The militant Yugo-Slav communists did not escape the reprisals." "Action was taken in a progressive, slow way, by gradually tightening the meshes of the net." "The Russian Enigma," (London, 1940), pp. 54, 58.

Thus, the first conflict between Moscow and Belgrade took place in 1929.

⁶⁰ B. Newman, "Balkan Background" (New York: Macmillan Co., 1945), p. 314.

an end, and all victims and sacrifices of the present are compensated by the bright future.

There are, naturally, in every Slav country, many people who are dissatisfied and incensed with the new government and regime. In spite of repressions, the opposition still exists.

By the end of 1946, the amalgamation of all Slav countries was practically accomplished, all of them signing trade pacts with Soviet Russia and promising mutual assistance. On December 8, 1946, a Slav Congress took place in Belgrade, Yugoslavia. This was the first post-war gathering of all the Slav nations. According to the Soviet press, the Belgrade Congress might be called "a Congress of brotherhood and unity of the Slav peoples." It was in fact a Congress of victorious Slav communists.

There were no poets to greet the Congress as Wincenty Pol did a hundred years ago, at the first Slav Congress in Prague. Instead, the Soviet press greeted the Slav Congress with reassurance: "The Soviet Union is lending unselfish aid to the Slav sister-peoples; it lays no claims to predomination, it is not out to seize their territory, and it does not attempt to impose its social system upon them."⁷⁸

The purposes of that Congress were formulated in its message of greeting to Stalin and Molotov, and in its "Appeal to all Slav and freedom-loving nations of the whole world"; the Congress proclaimed its aims to win a stable democratic peace, to expose war-mongers, and to exterminate the last remnants of fascism. It was not only to the Slav nations but to "all freedom-loving nations of the world" that the Congress addressed its appeal "to strengthen their brotherly friendship with the Great Soviet Union."8

A consolidation of all communist and pro-communist nations round Moscow is proclaimed by the Slav Congress with the purpose of mastering all forces against the "fascists," in other words anti-communists. A Pan-Slav Union is thus transformed into a specific group of Slav Nations inside an expanding Union of Socialist Republics which has a tendency to absorb and control Romania, Hungary, Korea, as well as Slav countries.

Pan-Slavism has degenerated as a philosophy of Slav ethnic culture in contradistinction to the West-European one; it has also degenerated as a conception of an eventual Slav Federation or even a Slav Empire.

Contemporary Russia neither is nor wishes to become a Slav nation. She is the U.S.S.R., a great socialist empire of a variety of nations, with boundless ambition for expansion.

University of California

8 Izvestia, Dec. 15, 1946.

⁷ Izvestia, Dec. 10, 1946.

^{7a} N. Leonidov, "The New Phase in Slav History," New Times (1946), p. 9.

Kant's Law Of Freedom

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By FRANCIS NEILSON

THERE IS NOTHING quite like a war with a foreign State for opening up an opportunity to belligerent patriots to make use of the concept "freedom." Indeed, it is like an old-fashioned Fourth of July when orators in every town and village delivered speeches about the founding of this Republic. Then, this word "freedom" was played upon with the vox bumana stop pulled out, and the throb of the eloquence of the local Demosthenes stirred the congregations to their very depths.

Surely the notion of freedom must have meant more to the people of two generations ago than it does to the masses of our day. Yet, it may be inferred that it was not necessary sixty years ago to ask an orator who used the term what he meant by it. If he were questioned, I can imagine that he would readily reply that it was what was gained by the American people when they threw off the Hanoverian yoke. And a very sensible reply that would be.

War and the Loss of Freedom

During the past two world wars I have oftened wondered what would happen if any man were so bold as to ask our politicians, our editors, and our pulpiteers what the term really meant to them. For it must be acknowledged even by modern philosophers and historians that war is a denial of freedom. Although we may enter a conflict against a foreign power because it denies the principles of democracy and we fight in the name of freedom, the righteous nation begins to lose whatever freedom it has just as soon as the war starts. It is not necessary to quote the thinkers who have laid down maxims and axioms on this point. I think it will be conceded that those philosophers who have told us that freedom is lost when war begins have been right; at least, history confirms the conclusion they have reached.

Now this loss to the righteous nation is in so many cases a political and social one that we overlook the deeper loss of spiritual and economic advantages enjoyed in days of peace. The restrictions that curtail our political and social freedom do not end there, for all activities of life are affected and suffer grievously. After World War I, when the shocking consequences were patent to everyone who had the capacity to observe what had taken place, the moralists gave us volume after volume lamenting

the grave state of affairs wrought by the restraints that had been placed upon the people. Now those who have the courage to describe the consequences of World War II depict a condition such as was never conceived by the medieval artists who gave us representations of hell itself.

I have recently read several books on various aspects of the war and how certain States suffered the loss of freedom. Three works on Poland and one dealing with the expeditions in Finland and the Baltic States—all reveal that freedom was the issue. Over and over again we meet the phrase: "We fought for freedom."

Strangely enough, the authors of those books I have looked through do not saddle the whole responsibility for the loss of freedom in many European States upon the wicked enemies that we fought. They indicate that our own government was not blameless in many cases. Indeed, it is suggested that the righteous Allies practiced not only downright mendacity but a reckless breaking of solemn pledges.

Perhaps it might be just as well at this time for us to give thought to the matter of what freedom is and how it can be defined so that the ordinary taxpayer will be able to understand it; for to him it is a most expensive political luxury, and often brings him face to face with spiritual and material ruin.

Side by side with the books published by politicians and diplomatists of the various States affected by the war there have come from the presses many notable volumes from the pens of philosophers, which deal with this bothersome word "freedom." One work that will help to purge the mind of its political and social dross and make for a healthier spiritual outlook is the Gifford Lectures of Dr. W. Macneile Dixon, entitled "The Human Situation." It is an exhilarating analysis of conditions as they exist, although the lectures were delivered in the University of Glasgow eleven years ago. Not for a long time has anything so virile come to my notice.

There is also "The Myth of the State," by Dr. Ernst Cassirer, which is a particularly illuminating record of the vicissitudes suffered by political freedom since classical times. These authors do not pretend to have discovered what the word really means, but a far better conception of it may be gathered from a study of their two books than is to be found in volumes written by politicians and diplomatists. If we desire to delve more deeply into the meaning of this term, we must perforce seek what knowledge we can gather of it in other channels of thought.

¹ New York, Longmans, Green and Co., 1938. ² New Haven, Yale University Press, 1946.

Personality and Individuality

THE FIRST WORK I should like to bring to the notice of the reader is "Ideas Have Consequences," by Richard M. Weaver.³ It is, in the main, a diagnosis of the religious and cultural decline of western civilization. The author draws a distressing picture of the welter of strifes under which we exist, brought about not by "biological or other necessity but of unintelligent choice." He assumes that we live in an intelligible world and that man is free, but he does not tell us directly of what this freedom consists. We are left to infer from his survey that the actions of men who have contributed to this decline have been free only in a very limited way. He realizes, however, that: "There is ground for declaring that modern man has become a moral idiot." 5

Mr. Weaver is an unusual critic, for he reveals in his book that he is spiritually and intellectually equipped to conduct the clinical examination of the west, now sick unto death. Yet, I doubt whether the cure he prescribes will set the patient on its legs again and restore to it that vigor expressed in the long past, when religious, social, and cultural miracles were wrought. He says in conclusion:

It may be that we are awaiting a great change, that the sins of the fathers are going to be visited upon the generations until the reality of evil is again brought home and there comes some passionate reaction, like that which flowered in the chivalry and spirituality of the Middle Ages. If such is the most we can hope for, something toward that revival may be prepared by acts of thought and volition in this waning day of the West.⁶

To accomplish this essential change he depends very much on what he calls "personality," to which term he gives a meaning that differs somewhat from the one that was accepted by philosophers several generations ago. One of the prevalent sins of our moral philosophers is that they take many leading words and give them alien meanings. This tendency to twist or reshape the meaning of leading terms is causing much confusion of thought. In some cases I find it is done palpably to adjust the sense of a word to the fortuitous circumstances which exist, with the result that a new connotation is given to it. Philosophical and economic terms suffer severely from this abuse.

Such a term is "personality." Mr. Weaver says that in its true definition it is theomorphic. This is stretching a meaning out of all shape. Why it

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Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1948.

¹bid., p. 1.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid., p. 187.

should be so defined we are not told, but the term is presented to us in contradistinction to that other abused one—"individuality"—which for some unexplained reason he regards with contempt. He writes:

. . . Individualism, with its connotation of irresponsibility, is a direct invitation to selfishness, and all that this treatise has censured can be traced in some way to individualist mentality. . . . ⁷

This is quite a new way of defining individualism, and our author would be hard put to it to explain clearly to any philosopher of the nineteenth century why the term should be used so opprobriously. Two generations ago, an individual (even in a social sense) was regarded as a person of esteem and distinction, and one guilty of the offense suggested by Mr. Weaver was either a bounder or a criminal.

But this notion does not originate with our author. It came into fashion with the advent of the Fabians, who realized that the individual—or individualism—was antagonistic to socialistic doctrine. It may be news to Mr. Weaver that a generation ago there were many debates on "Individualism versus Socialism." I think it may be held that the individuals in America at the time of the founding of this Republic were those who had a far better knowledge of right and political freedom than the bureaucrats of the government in London. If the true definition of the term personality is "theomorphic," there is no reason why individuality should not be so. For there can be no personality without the individual.

Unfortunately for us, millions are born into this world who seldom bear the stamp of an individual, for they never have the opportunity to develop themselves. The one great factor which is an obstacle to this is the economic condition in which these people are placed. And, as it is in so many books that have been written in recent years, there is no practical suggestion in "Ideas Have Consequences" as to how they are to work out their own salvation. Indeed, it may be said today that the millions of small wage earners have been taught by their political mentors to look to the State to relieve them of all responsibility. They are now regarded as mere automata, essential in the industrial process which denudes them of individuality and, therefore, leaves them no chance whatever of cultivating a personality. Mr. Weaver continues:

. . . But personality is that little private area of selfhood in which the person is at once conscious of his relationship to the transcendental and the living community. He is a particular vessel, but he carries some part of the universal mind. . . There is piety in the belief that personality, like the earth we tread on, is something given us. 8

⁷ Ibid., p. 181.

⁸ Ibid.

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I am inclined to agree with this statement, but I cannot dissociate his idea from that of individuality. Before the term "personality" became popular with the moral philosophers of our day, individuals of worth possessed the attributes that are now given to this nebulous something called personality. If it is to be described as "piety" (in the old sense it bore), then there is no difficulty in comprehending the meaning of the term. Perhaps what millions in the world lack is the pious mind, one that appreciates the bounty of the Creator and realizes that the good life may be sought in observing the divine law as it was interpreted by the inspired teachers of all religions.

Notwithstanding the exceptions that I take to Mr. Weaver's book, it is one that should be carefully studied by those who understand the mighty problems that confront us and desire to find a way out of the chaos created by the unthinking.

Malinowski on Freedom

THE NEXT WORK I would present for consideration is Bronislaw Malinowski's "Freedom and Civilization." The title is something of an anachronism, for to my mind the latter destroys the former. The very fact that bureaucracies increase as civilizations grow when, under a system of taxation of wealth, producers are exploited for the upkeep of the State, indicates there can be little freedom. Perhaps what is left of it is limited to the electoral badge of voting for one bureaucrat or the other. Malinowski agrees that no clear definition has been formulated. He quotes Professor Walton Hamilton of the Yale Law School, who says: "For all our knowledge and understanding, we can no more define freedom than we can realize it." 10

Presumably Mr. Weaver would be surprised to learn from Malinowski:

Freedom in individual existence is this selection of specific differential bondage. Freedom however is very real; it is the range in molding the individual's existence, in choice of mate, career, hobby, creed and art; it is the organization of opportunities, the supply of wherewithal, the range of initiative in creative change. This is the treasure-house of freedom in democratic cultures.¹¹

Let us concede that the choice of mate may be accepted as an example of freedom, but I doubt very much indeed whether the millions would agree with our noted anthropologist that there is much choice in the matter of

11 Ibid., p. 243.

⁹ London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1947. ¹⁰ Ibid., p. 63, quoted from Walton H. Hamilton, "Freedom in the Modern World,"

a career, a creed, or art. Moreover, I question the range of initiative for the masses, and as for "the organization of opportunities," in a democracy such as this, they are reserved in great part for the politicians and their friends. At least, it has been so for the past fifteen years.

"Freedom and Civilization" is what the critics call a provocative work. It really does make one think, because so much of it is in the nature of a challenge to many of the latter-day sociologists. Malinowski considers that: "Freedom is closely related to the proto-democratic, and in historical times, to the democratic constitution of culture." He goes further still and asserts:

. . . Freedom in fact is essential to the survival of culture at its earliest stages. Culture, let us repeat, is a gift of this early freedom. All means, technical and intellectual, and social achievements are at the very primitive levels embodied in the members of the group. Culture lives in their memories, in their acts, in their forms of organization. . . . 13

There can be little doubt about this, although so many men of our period have been under the impression that the cultural monuments we revere in States east and west were raised by serfs. In this respect it surely must be held that it is merely a relative term. For what man today who must compete for a job in the labor market, join a union, and be under the dictatorship of a labor czar would not change places as a politically free man with the serf of the Middle Ages who had twelve acres, a hut, privileges in the lord's forests and could earn sufficient in thirteen weeks to keep himself and family for a year?

During the past twenty years scores of books have been written by authors of repute on this question of freedom. Philosophers, economists, physicists, historians, and sociologists are only a few of the learned people who have tried their hands and minds at elucidating for us an understandable definition. Nothing seems to fit the rapidly changing conditions of the period. One of the reasons for this is expressed by Malinowski:

... This unpreparedness is natural since democracy is the denial of both war and preparedness. Total war is the most fundamental contradiction of everything which a democracy believes to be true, real and valuable.¹⁴

And, yet, our rulers war to suppress totalitarianism and, in so doing, are obliged to place its chains upon us who enjoy a modicum of freedom. A war in our day seems to be the best way to cultivate the obnoxious thing. There is something wrong with the reasoning of those authors who think

¹² Ibid., p. 236.

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 237-8.

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 3-4.

that freedom is to be preserved by going to war to destroy totalitarianism in an enemy State. Curiously enough, Malinowski lays it down clearly that freedom may be defined as "the smooth and effective, as well as successful, run of an activity undertaken by a group of men who with a clear aim in view combine for the task, fit themselves out for action and achieve the desired end." 15

But both the Russians and the Germans, before the last war began, could have subscribed to this without compunction. The deeper we go into this matter of trying to discover what freedom is, the less chance there seems to be of finding it.

It will be a shock to many of the adherents of libertarian ideas to learn from Malinowski that discipline and drill are essential in a free system. He says that "no human culture can exist without the factor of discipline, with force as its ultimate sanction." (Italics mine)

However, it is not to be inferred that Malinowski has reference to the discipline exercised by Hitler or a Stalin. A democratic discipline is preferable, but all we have to do to get the measure of such a course in a democracy is to walk down a busy street and notice the behavior of the people on foot and those who are in vehicles. Democrats using the revolving doors of a department store or an office building may give one an idea of the difficulties to be confronted in an attempt to impose discipline upon the herd. Washington itself, in and out of Congress, is a notorious example of lack of discipline.

I recommend "Freedom and Civilization" because it comes from the mind of a scientist and in its analysis of this term differs widely from any other work I have seen.

"Back to Kant!"

THE EXEGETISTS of our day have departed far from the idea of freedom that was held by Moses and Joshua—two of our oldest experimentalists who are worthy of all respect. They had known what slavery was and were eager to enter a promised land where there would be no more of it. The imperatives of the Decalogue were explained to the children by Moses who changed hordes of slaves into a people prepared to obey the commandments of God. At Sinai "all the people answered together and said: All that the Lord has spoken we will do." After a while they were tired of obedience, and some generations later they were obliged to obey the imperatives of the Code of Hammurabi.

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¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 99-100.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 196.

But since the day of the disobedient children we have had many philosophers who have left us records of what they thought about freedom. Since Plato there have been innumerable men in all European States who have gathered the best that has been thought and said upon this term, and none greater than Kant himself. Perhaps it is time that our instructors in the universities should revive the old slogan, "Back to Kant!" I seem to remember such philosophers as Stirling, Caird, Calderwood, and several others using this slogan, or words that conveyed the same notion, and when I think of them and their zeal for downright knowledge of the subject, I am bewildered at the utter confusion of the men of our day who use this term freedom so frivolously.

Perhaps a revival of Kantian studies is due, for several excellent works about him from philosophers of great attainment have been produced in recent years. The last one to come to my notice is from the mind of Dr. H. J. Paton, a Fellow of the British Academy and White's Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Oxford. It is called "The Categorical Imperative, A Study in Kant's Moral Philosophy." If this work did no more than purge away the stupid confusions that have choked a clear understanding of Kant's philosophy, it would serve an excellent purpose. For the notions that some professors have held of Kant are so far from a true appreciation that it is small wonder many have gone astray. Dr. Paton says:

A list of names of men who have blundered would include not a few modern philosophers and sociologists.

Paton takes the "Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals," and he shows how the moral philosophy fits in with other parts of the critical

London, Hutchinson's University Library, 1946.
 Ibid., Preface, p. 15.

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doctrine. Beginning with Kant's declaration: "It is impossible to conceive anything in the world, or even out of it, which can be taken as good without limitation, save only a good will,"19 our author proceeds to apply the critical method to the statement, and the task he sets for himself in attempting to accomplish this feat is an achievement of high worth. In the exercise of this philosophical excursion many of the misconceptions of Kant's purpose and doctrine are cleared up. Kant held that "principles without content are empty, impulses without concepts are blind."20 (Italics mine)

In the sixth chapter of "The Categorical Imperative," entitled "The Law," Dr. Paton says:

Universality is the essential characteristic of law as such. A law, in the strict sense of "law," must hold for all cases and admit of no exceptions. A law of nature, for example, must hold of all events in time without exception. If the principle that every event must have a cause is a law of nature, then there can be no exceptions to it; and if we were convinced that any exceptions were possible, we should at once deny this principle to be a law of nature. So it is also with what Kant calls "the law of freedom"-that is, the law in accordance with which a rational agent would act if reason had full control over his inclinations. This law of freedom, or moral law, cannot have exceptions without ceasing to be law. There cannot be one moral law for me and another for you. The law must be the same for all.21

Such an idea could never be put into practice by political governments. Indeed, this freedom is not for the group; it is for the individual. Once we bring reason, in the Kantian sense, to bear upon this concept, we must conclude that the freedom we talk about so lightly concerns merely our goings and comings in the routine of daily existence. It never seems to get beyond political bounds. Our author continues:

The Idea of freedom is a concept which pure reason cannot but entertain; yet if we suppose, as many do, that this Idea can give us knowledge of any reality, we fall into illusion. The supposedly real use of pure reason in this way is very natural, and even irresistible, but it does not thereby cease to be illusory. . . . 22

The Imperatives

I know of no work upon Kant that presents the imperatives so clearly as Dr. Paton's. There has been so much misunderstanding of what these are and the way they should be interpreted that I strongly urge students of

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¹⁹ Ibid., p. 34.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 61, footnote.

²¹ Ibid., p. 69.

²² Ibid., p. 99.

philosophy to follow Paton's examination of them. At the risk of being wearisome in a short review, I shall present them in the form set down in "The Categorical Imperative":

Formula I or the Formula of Universal Law:

Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.

Formula Ia or the Formula of the Law of Nature:

Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a UNIVERSAL LAW OF NATURE.

Formula II or the Formula of the End in Itself:

So act as to use humanity, both in your own person and in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end, never simply as a means.

Formula III or the Formula of Autonomy:

So act that your will can regard itself at the same time as making universal law through its maxim.

Formula IIIa or the Formula of the Kingdom of Ends:

So act as if you were always through your maxims a law-making member in a universal kingdom of ends.²³

It will be seen that the Universal Law of Freedom, as pronounced in the Imperative, will never get beyond the philosophical mind. The first step toward a realization of this utopia is the cultivation of a good will, and that is far to seek today. Dr. Paton writes:

agent, and so in every man, however much it may be overlaid by irrationality. Hence man, and indeed every rational agent as such, must be said to exist as an end in itself, one which should never be used simply as a means to the realisation of some end whose value is merely relative.²⁴

It will be a surprise to many of those who hold false notions of Kant's so-called rationalism to learn that

opposed to the letter of the moral law, insisting as it does on the spirit as opposed to the letter of the moral law, is his version of the Christian doctrine that we are saved by faith and not by works. His formula of the End in Itself is his way of expressing the Christian view that every individual human being has a unique and infinite value and should be treated as such. His Formula of the Kingdom of Ends as a Kingdom of Nature

²³ Ibid., p. 129.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 169.

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is quite explicitly his rational form of recognising a church invisible and visible, the Kingdom of God which has to be made manifest on earth.²⁵

Dr. Paton holds that "Kant is very much nearer to that original doctrine than is commonly supposed." But in dealing with the problem of the utility of the imperatives, he says:

It is sheer error to suggest that Kant is trying to explain how pure reason can be practical or how freedom can be possible. These questions Kant has not only refrained from answering: he roundly asserts that they are beyond the power of human reason to answer.²⁷

Kant as a Pioneer

Kant was a pioneer, the first who contrived to say something new about morality, and so far no one has succeeded in presenting a better performance. To interline morality and freedom with good will was a remarkable achievement.

This brief review of "The Categorical Imperative" is intended to bring Dr. Paton's monograph to the notice of those who have found it difficult to formulate an idea of freedom which will be of service in the chaotic condition brought about by the war. However, I do not expect that many students will find it easy to read his book.

I would therefore recommend what I consider to be a work that might be called "First Steps to the Understanding of Kant's Metaphysic of Morals." It contains the "Lectures on Ethics" given by Kant in 1780-81 and goes by that title. To celebrate the bicentenary of the philosopher's birth, the Kant-Gesellschaft took three students' notebooks and drew from them a volume which was published in Germany in 1924. The English translation by Louis Infield was brought out by the Century Company in 1930.

The lectures deal with a wide range of subjects, and it is surprising how easily they are read and understood. They afford the necessary equipment for young scholars who will venture to read Dr. Paton's work. No doubt it will be gathered from both the volumes that it is high time our practical men who have made such a mess of things should turn to the philosopher and learn from him how to do something to help our youth to cultivate the good will Kant calls for as the essential of understanding the Imperatives of the Universal Law of Freedom.

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²⁵ Ibid., p. 196.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 205.

Regulating the Mixed and Public Corporations

INDUSTRIES that are and should be essentially monopolies or that, for one reason or another, operate in areas that do not or cannot attract private competitive enterprise, have presented a problem since the beginning of capitalism. Apart from the publicly-regulated private monopoly, two means frequently advocated and adopted here and abroad for dealing with it are the mixed corporation and the public corporation. Examples of these are the Port of New York Authority and the Tennessee Valley Administration. These bodies have an enviable record. Nevertheless we have not worked out techniques by which the people can participate effectively (and be interested in doing so) in their regulation and control.

Fortunately, information on the problem is growing. Under the auspices of the Committee on Research in Economic History of the Social Science Research Council, two additions to the literature of the relationship between the State and economic life have appeared, one dealing with Massachusetts, the other with Pennsylvania. The latter is Prof. Louis Hartz's "Economic Policy and Democratic Thought: Pennsylvania, 1776-1860." Chester M. Wright of the University of Chicago, in reviewing this work for *The Journal of Political Economy* (Oct. 1948), focuses attention on the curious gyrations of public opinion on the question:

The early opposition to State ownership, which was not based on theory but on cost and practicality, by 1926 had given way (in Pennsylvania) to acceptance of the policy as sound, and outburst of activity followed. After 1873, when the resulting debt—combined with the corruption, the inadquate control, and the disappointing economic results of enterprises—left the State's finances in a desperate situation, the popular reaction resulted in a policy of rapid disposal of the State's public works and its stockholdings in mixed corporations. Supplemented by the rising ability of private enterprise to meet social needs, this led by 1860 to the conviction that State undertakings were both inexpedient and undemocratic (pp. 455-6).

The continental anarchists proposed regional and local syndicates and the English Constitutional Radicals municipal enterprises, in an effort to reduce the problem by localizing control. But even municipal ownership and municipal mixed enterprises do no more than make inadequate techniques operate as best they can. Until larger sections of the general public, through some type of civic association organized for the purpose or through present organizations, take a more active interest in and exert effective control over the policies and operations of these corporations, we cannot say that they are democratically controlled. Expert management, no matter how efficient, is not necessarily public management.

The Marginal Utility of Productivity Theory

By ELGIN WILLIAMS

PERHAPS NO OTHER PROPOSITIONS so embody the strength of academic economics as those that deal with "productivity." The point of these propositions is this. What is to be consumed must first be produced. Increased production waits upon more efficient utilization of resources; that is to say, upon increased "productivity." Therefore the key to increased consumption ("real wages," "standard of living") is increased productivity.

The strength of these propositions is the strength of truth. Nothing is truer than a truism. The full flower of the modern statistical, "empirical," "inductive" economics in its search after truth is certainly such propositions, as was true of the classic efforts in the science. What is to be consumed must first be produced. Production cannot be increased unless it can be increased. The complete irrefutability of these statements accounts for their constant repetition across the land, for who is there who speaks but wants to speak the truth? And who listens complacent with less?¹

Some Irrefutable Received Doctrines

Such is the main utility of the doctrine of "productivity." Professors are anxious to teach; students are anxious to learn. The full glow of imparted knowledge gratefully received is not felt save in the presence of statements of this order. But the tremendous popularity and the high survival value of the doctrine—it is found as far back as the literature of economics goes—is not wholly to be accounted for in terms of its intellectual value. This is great without doubt, for the theorems of productivity are true and truth is bread and meat to the intellectual, student and teacher alike. But there are other economic theorems of equal validity and sagacity which have attained nothing like the same popularity. There is, for example, the principle attributed to a President of the United States. "When large numbers of men are thrown out of work, unemployment results." Although in a certain sense this is a "famous" statement, its popularity does not compare with the statement, "What is to be consumed must first be produced." Somehow the former deliverance does not

¹ So great is the desire for truism, so great has it always been, that teachers with other things to say do well to couch them in the language of truism. "Verily, verily I say unto you. . . ."

intrude itself into current discussion with the frequency and poignancy of the latter. Although it is equally true and equally illuminating, equally sagacious and equally irrefutable, somehow the proposition of the President does not have the utility for economic instruction, either in the classroom or on the editorial page, as does that regarding productivity.

Anyone acquainted, for instance, with either economic treatises or economics courses can testify that "What must be consumed must first be produced" conveniently summarizes the whole burden of both. As has frequently been pointed out, this is what economists have to say. Yet it is true that this general emphasis, not to say reiteration, becomes more marked and explicit at certain times than others, and this is true of public as well as of academic discussion. Such marginal utility as may attach to the theorems of productivity (as over against, for example, the President's theorem of unemployment) may perhaps be elucidated from an examination of these latter instances.

The Wage-Price "Spiral"

THESE INSTANCES, as a brief canvass of events will bring to mind, are invariably situations involving proposals for some manner of alteration in the pattern of economic power and emolument. So long as no forces are seen to be moving toward, and so long as no movements are afoot which contemplate such an alteration, so long are the pundits of productivity not called upon for more than their normal (lengthy) working week. So soon, however, as a labor union official (say) shall suggest or announce an intention to prosecute a line of events looking toward an upward revision in the rate of pay, or so soon as an insufficiently sophisticated practitioner of economic science-"not dry behind the ears"-shall attempt to lend countenance to such an untoward attempt to get what the economists in their prescience are pleased to call "something for nothing," so soon do the pundits of productivity begin to put in what their fellow employees in industry have learned to expect compensation for as "over-time." The whole complex of productivity theory is brought into play, at length and with infinite patience, to show that the proposed alteration in the standard of emolument will quite possibly work out as harmful to the cause of the citizens whose incomes are raised, and at best will be nugatory. If wages or salaries are increased, it will be pointed out, prices will follow suit, with the result that "real wages" or the standard of living will decline or at best remain precisely what they were before the ill-advised attempt to "get something for nothing." The real road to improvement in the standard of living—and there is no high-road and no short-cuts—is the slow, painful process of increasing production by increasing productivity. With a deserved air of weariness in having so often to repeat what is so obvious the economists and editorialists repeat again, "Greater production must precede greater consumption."

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It is not the place here to note that sedulous and oft-repeated attempts have been made to convince the pundits of productivity of their own obtuseness and indifference to the obvious, perhaps so often indeed that the insufficiently sophisticated economists themselves are lately beginning to add inadvertently a similar note of weariness to their own patient instruction. All that repetition of truths can do, all that demonstration of the obvious can accomplish, all this has been done and accomplished. It is a commonplace that so far as the established economists are concerned this has amounted to: Nothing. The younger generation among the scholars has pointed out with patient good-will and ingenious demonstration that while it is true that what is to be consumed must first be produced, it is also true that what is to be produced must first itself be demanded, and that this is more to the point at issue. Again it has been noted, incessantly and in chorus, that increased production and increased productivity are not independent variables which are followed by increased consumption, but are themselves "derived demands" for which the prerequisite is precisely increased consumption demand. Over and over again in their youth and their earnestness the unsophisticated have tried to tell their betters that raising wages, and incomes of the lower two-thirds of the population generally, has its efficacy not in "getting something for nothing" for the indigent poor but in preventing that stoppage of production and retrogression in productivity which periodically afflicts the whole economy because of "sales resistance." The outcome and upshot of all this instruction has been, so far as the elder economists are concerned: Nothing—as might have been expected.

An Age of Sweet Reasonableness

SUCH AN OUTCOME and such an upshot might have been expected because while the theorems of "under-consumption" and "over-production" have much the same utility of intellectual beauty (lacking only that of the truism) as the theorems of productivity, they do not have that marginal utility which attaches to the latter. This marginal utility which adheres to the latter, and which accounts for their acceptance perhaps as much as their quality as truisms, is that they comport with the temper of the times.

As is commonly remarked, the temper of the times is the temper of science. This is the age of reason, and the propositions of productivity comport with the age of reason eminently well. For the citizens of the age of reason are irritably ill-content with the continuation in this enlightened day of so much as a single social custom, habit or tradition which even doubtfully smacks of any earlier, non-scientific age. They want to be sure, and the propositions of productivity assure them, that the economic customs, habits and traditions of which they find themselves possessed bear the trademark, "Made in the Twentieth Century," with no earlier importations slipping through in disguise; and the latter insinuation of importation is the insinuation of the "under-consumptionists" and "over-productionists." This accounts for the indifferent reception of their theories, for the lack of that marginal utility which ensures the continued overlordship of the professors whom they challenge.

Taken, therefore, not only in its academic but in its practical or "propaganda" context—that which has to do with proposals for alterations in economic customs, primarily customs of income distribution—the "point" of productivity theory is that the present standard of living and the present level of "real wages" is reasonable. Whatever this standard and whatever this level are, they are dictated by the level of technological efficiency and "productivity." If this standard and level are low, it is the niggardliness of the machine which enforces the poverty of nations.

Of course, as the unsophisticated economists with a (malicious) bent for historical comparison have pointed out, the explanation for the poverty of nations used to be the niggardliness of nature. Such a comparison with its implied accusation of "rationalizing" completely misses the point. It is the intention of the pundits of productivity that the age of nature throughout their theorems shall be replaced by the age of the machine, "brought up to date," while retaining that insusceptibility to illusion which rightfully belongs to any hard-boiled (dismal) science.

Niggardly Masters, Those Robots

THE UTILITY OF THE THEOREMS of the modern Malthusians (as they may be called) is intellectual in that men of the machine age desire to hear and to repeat what is true and irrefutable. But the marginal utility of the theorems, which guarantees their pre-eminence over equally valid and illuminating rivals as well as over theorems which have not the virtue of truisms, lies in their contribution to the maintenance of the economic status quo. No matter how strongly it might appear that what condemns

Western society to poverty is what one of the unsophisticates called the "maladjustments of men," the modern Malthusians assure us that the blame really lies at the door of the machines, the "slaves of the lamp of knowledge."

The marginal utility of the doctrine of the Rev. Thomas Malthus, in addition to its intellectual utility, was that it identified the social order of the day with and certified it as the order of nature. The marginal utility of the doctrine of productivity is that it identifies the present social order and the present distribution of income and standard of living with and certifies it as the dispensation of the machine.

The two famous truisms—population cannot increase beyond the means of subsistence and what is to be consumed must first be produced—have done yeoman service not only in delighting and enlightening generations of students and professors but in providing a socially desirable replacement for those wrathful and jealous gods who were the source of niggardliness for an earlier day.

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The Dignity and Worth of the Individual

FREEDOM OF THOUGHT, conscience and religion; freedom of opinion and expression; freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention; the right of a people to choose their own government, to take part in its work, and, if they become dissatisfied with it, to change it; the obligation of government to act through law—these are some of the elements that combine to give dignity and worth to the individual.

The Charter of the United Nations reflects these concepts and expressly provides for the promotion and protection of the rights of man, as well as for the rights of nations. This is no accident. For in the modern world, the association of free men within a free State is based upon the obligation of citizens to respect the rights of their fellow citizens. And the association of free nations in a free world is based upon the obligation of all States to respect the rights of other nations. . . .

The maintenance of these rights and freedoms depends upon adherence to the abiding principles of justice and morality embodied in the rule of law.—George C. Marshall.

Rent Controls and the Construction Monopoly

IN A CRITICAL REVIEW of the work of the President's Council of Economics Advisers in *The Journal of Political Economy* (Oct. 1948), M. Bronfenbrenner of University of Wisconsin points out aptly how negligent we have been about attacking the construction monopoly, one of the chief causes of the housing shortage:

"When recommending controls at all, the President and his council emphasize a specific or pinpoint variety (price controls, rationing, allocations) which goes against the price system rather than the overall or blunderbuss variety (monetary, monopoly, and fiscal policy) which utilizes it. This writer's preference is all the other way, on libertarian grounds....

"This is not a wringing of the hands and shouting of 'Unclean!' at every mention of direct controls. They are suited admirably to short-term holding actions at critical points, since over-all controls take substantial time to stabilize an entire front. The objection is to exclusive reliance on burgeoning direct intervention to replace over-all controls, to postpone them indefinitely, to create a political atmosphere which accepts them 'too little or too late' or not at all.

"This can be made specific with reference to the muddled situation respecting the shortage of rental housing and the control of urban rents. Rent controls, in this view, are a useful and desirable temporary appendage to an all-out anti-monopoly attack on the unholy alliance of contractors, materials men and building labor back of the building blockade. Such controls could prevent landlords from saddling tenants with long-term contracts while waiting for anti-monopoly policy to enlarge the present trickle of new private housing. They have been used instead to concentrate the worst effects of building monopoly on an unfortunate minority of tenants and to lull the general public into avoidance of any trial of strength with the construction rings" (p. 379).

So long as we tolerate monopoly in land, labor or capital, or in any combination of them, we must resign ourselves to malfunctioning of our economic system, produced by the action of criminals and parasites. As Mr. Bronfenbrenner argues so forcefully, inadequate controls, no matter how direct the intervention, lead to no control whatever by the general public and chaotic control by the criminal classes who masquerade as "business men" and "labor leaders."

The Civic Revival in Obio

Samuel M. Jones: The Man Without a Party

By ROBERT H. BREMNER

(Tune: "Battle Cry of Freedom")

I'm a man without a party, a free untramelled soul, Striving for liberty and freedom; An undivided portion within the human whole, Striving for liberty and freedom. SAMUEL M. JONES

SAMUEL MILTON JONES, mayor of Toledo from 1897 to 1904 and the first of the Civic Revivalists, was born in Wales in 1846. His family immigrated to America when he was three years old and settled in western New York. At ten he was "hired out" to a farmer for three dollars a month. At fourteen he was working twelve hours a day in a saw mill. A little later he got a job on a Black River steamboat, and when about nineteen, excited by stories of high wages, he went to the Pennsylvania oil regions. This was to be Jones' home for twenty years. After the death of his first wife he moved to Lima, Ohio, where new oil fields were He leased land, drilled wells, and was one of the inbeing opened. corporators of the Ohio Oil Company which was later absorbed by Standard Oil. In 1892 he remarried and moved to Toledo. Meanwhile he had been working on improvements in oil well appliances and in 1894 organized the Acme Company to manufacture the steel sucker rods which he had invented. Three years later Jones was nominated for mayor by the Republican party. He won the nomination because three other men were fighting for it. Two of them hated the third so much that they withdrew from the race and gave their combined support to Jones. At this time Jones had been a resident of Toledo for only about four years. As an employer his labor policies had attracted considerable local attention. He was considered an orthodox party man with some mild eccentricities which it was hoped would attract the labor vote to the Republican ticket. In a normally Republican city he was elected by the comparatively narrow margin of 534 votes.1

¹ The chief source of material on Jones' life up to 1899 is the autobiography which forms the first chapter of his book, "The New Right," (New York, 1899).

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THE MAN WHO BECAME MAYOR of Toledo under such ironic conditions was destined to dominate Toledo politics for seven years. His ideas, turned into issues by his attempt to apply them to specific conditions, were to be the fundamental ones in Toledo for almost another decade. Out of his reflections upon certain of his experiences he had already constructed a fairly definite social philosophy. His political theory was not yet definitely formulated, but the events of his first term would crystallize into a political philosophy attitudes which were already a part of his personality.

Jones' experiences were not unique, but his reactions to them were at the very least, unusual. As a young man working (usually out of work) in the oil fields of Pennsylvania, he and some friends discovered that the planks on a certain bridge were in such bad condition that the bridge was all but impassible. Appropriating some boards from an abandoned oil derrick, Jones and his companions repaired the bridge, built a toll gate. and began to charge the teamsters who used the bridge ten cents. At first the teamsters were glad to pay the toll. At length, however, they joined forces and demanded a free bridge. Jones and his friends were forced to give way, but not before they had collected about twenty-seven dollars as their reward for the use of some other men's lumber and two hours of their own labor. "And I presume that we would have been taking toll to this day had not the teamsters asserted their rights : . . ," he wrote.2 The moral Jones drew from this episode was "combine and stop injustice." Most business men of his day would have said: "This shows how anybody who has initiative can get ahead no matter how hard times are."

Jones' experience with the Standard Oil Company was typical of what happened when independent operators were confronted by the trust: The Ohio Oil Company was forced to sell out and Jones' attempt to interest Standard in the improved sucker rods he had invented was unsuccessful. These events were instructive rather than embittering to him. Looking back upon them several years later, Jones said that from the Standard Oil Company he had learned that competition leads inevitably to monopoly. The methods of Standard Oil were simply the methods of business. It had succeeded in mastering the game all business tries to play. Instead of passing laws to prevent the consolidation of business, he said, the public should assume the ownership and operation of all the trusts. Then the savings made possible by the trust (which savings he regarded as social products) would be distributed for the benefit of all of the people.³

² Ibid., pp. 52-3.

³ Ibid., pp. 57-61.

Without a doubt the event that had the greatest influence on Iones' later career was the opening of the Acme Sucker Rod Company in Toledo in the depression year of 1894. The experience gained from this venture shocked him into a realization of the problems of the city worker.

While the factory building was being made ready for occupation, hordes of men swooped down on Jones, begging him for a chance to work, a chance to do anything no matter how low the pay. For several years. according to his son Paul, he had been distressed by the labor strife of the early eighteen nineties. He had reasoned that the cause of it was low wages; if workers were paid better they would not strike and then there would be no violence.4

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Now he began to see that there were social problems which involved deeper issues than wages. He never recovered from the sense of shame and degradation, the feeling of physical nausea, which overwhelmed him at the thought of men eager to work but denied the right to do so through no fault of their own.5

Jones was forty-eight years old when the opening of his factory called his attention to social problems. His awakening was not accompanied by a revelation of what he should do about the conditions that disturbed him. He had to work out the answers for himself. The remaining ten years of his life were devoted first to an attempt to find a satisfactory personal solution to the economic and moral problems of the modern industrial world, and second, to a conscientious experiment in putting his convictions into effect in his daily life.

In this quest he got some help from books. One of the first things he read was an essay by George D. Herron, the Iowa Christian philosopher, called "The Philosophy of the Lord's Prayer." Herron's argument—that if we call God "Our Father" then we must treat all men as "our brothers" -made a deep impression upon Jones. He had always enjoyed poetry and now he began to read more deeply in what Brand Whitlock called "the literature that dealt fundamentally with life." He came to love especially the works of Whitman, Emerson and Tolstoi. From them he gained many ideas and appropriated phrases he liked to quote.

It appears, however, that consciously or unconsciously what he was looking for in them was an expression of the thoughts which were already forming in his mind. His reading buttressed his thinking rather than

⁴ Interview with Paul Jones, March 27, 1942.

For Jones' own account of this experience see "The New Right," p. 61 et seq.

Gones discusses the effect upon him of this essay, ibid., p. 400.
 Introduction to Samuel M. Jones, "Letters of Labor and Love," (Indianapolis, 1905).

made it. Despite the influence men like Herron and Eugene V. Debs8 may have had on Jones, he seems to have reached his philosophical conclusions mainly by a process of observation, reflection, and feeling rather than by consciously adopting a ready-made social program.

A question that must be answered is why it was that Jones' experiences and readings made such a deep impression upon him. Other men have had experiences similar to his and have read the same books without being impelled to do the things he did. The answer, or part of it, at least is that Jones had in a very real and literal sense a social conscience.

Jones was not a reformer. A year before he died he wrote: "I have never had a program; I have never planned a campaign to reform society. the city or the world. . . . I have simply tried to keep at peace with the eternal hammering within my breast."9 Jones was a religious man. Just as simply as a child he wanted to be good. The strongest religious belief he had was a faith in people and a feeling of kinship with them.

He differed from most pious men in refusing to separate humanity into categories of good and bad. We are all people, he would say, just people: all good, all bad, all alike and all different. We are not equal in strength, in wisdom, in hereditary advantages or in social opportunities. But we are equal in the sense that we are all brothers and all dependent upon each other; all contributing something to society and all bearing a responsibility for society's failures and injustices.

To Jones, not the value of land alone, but our whole civilization was a social product. Even the most original inventor builds upon the work of other experimentors; even the most radical thinker uses the ideas and language of other men. Perhaps the chief reason why the Golden Rule appealed so strongly to him was because of its social implications. There must be "others" as well as "you."

For one with such a conviction of the brotherhood of man it was as impossible to live placidly in an inharmonious world as it would be for a sensitive man to live happily in a wrangling family.

IN ORDER TO KEEP at peace with himself, Jones adopted the labor policy at the Acme Sucker Rod Company which won him his nickname, "Golden Rule." He had the Commandment printed on a piece of tin and hung

1903), 1964-65.

⁸ In a Socialist Party broadside Debs claimed that a speech he delivered in Toledo in 1895 was chiefly responsible for starting Jones on his career of agitation for better social 9 "The Non-Partisan in Politics," The Independent, LV, 1963-1966 (August 20,

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it up as the only rule of the factory. The eight-hour work day was established. A minimum wage of two dollars a day was paid employees. Each employee received a week's vacation with pay and at Christmas time was given a bonus amounting to five percent of his year's wages. He encouraged his employees to join a union both for the practical benefit he felt they would derive from membership in it and because he favored all organizations which made men brothers rather than competitors.

In order to bring the men into closer relations with each other and with himself Jones had low cost meals served in a dining room operated by the company. He insisted that making men was as important a part of the company's work as making money. Next to the shop was an acre tract of ground called Golden Rule Park. On Sunday afternoons in the summer, Jones, his employees, and other interested people would gather here for discussion and music.¹⁰

Jones looked upon the park, and upon Golden Rule Hall, later constructed across the street from the shop, as forums where the workers and the public could discuss social problems. To an interviewer he tried to express "how much like men it makes us feel" to think that part of our time is spent in learning how to help each other rather than in complete devotion to the business of making a living.¹¹

Jones was always careful to point out that the Acme Company's labor policy was not adopted because of his philanthropic interest in the working men. It was an earnest expression of his belief in the social origin of the wealth produced by his factory, and a recognition on his part, of the injustice of the existing wage system. As Jones saw it, the wage system was unjust because the employees of the Acme Company did not receive the full value of the labor they put into the sucker rods produced by the factory. They got the value of their labor, minus the company's profit. Under present conditions, said Jones, the only purpose for which any factory is operated is to make money out of labor; when a shop is unable to make money out of a man's labor, that man is fired.

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¹⁰ A typical program included music by the Golden Rule Band and the Golden Rule Singing Club; an address, "The Church of Yesterday and the Church of Tomorrow," by Charles Ferguson; and the participation of the audience in the singing of two of Jones' "Freedom Songs": "Freedom Day" and "Promise." Golden Rule Park Program, Sunday, May 17, 1903 (Jones Family Scrapbooks).

Sunday, May 17, 1903 (Jones Family Scrapbooks).

11 Orison Swett Marden, "Little Visits with Great Americans," New York, 1905, p. 506.

¹² See "Letters of Labor and Love," pp. 91-8, for Jones' discussion of the labor policy of the Acme Company and his reasons for adopting it.

¹³ Jones' theory of wages is most clearly stated in "The New Right," p. 210.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 158.

All he was doing, Jones insisted, was adopting expedients to distribute the wealth created by his employees a little more equitably than was done in most factories. He saw no hope of a really fair distribution as long as society retained the system of competition and private ownership of industry (i.e., as long as the employer's profit was extorted from the value of the employee's labor).

From first to last, the social problem that most interested Jones was unemployment. It had a special significance to him because he felt work was necessary to the proper development of personality. He was as truly sorry for the idle rich as for the unemployed poor. Furthermore, he had convinced himself that the right to work was as much a natural right of man as the right to breathe. 15 But to him the right to work encompassed more than mere employment—more than slavish toil at a monotonous task. It meant the right to do honest work, useful work, work to which the individual was suited, and the right to receive full pay for the labor expended. It meant the chance to do artistic work, the kind of work William Morris had in mind when he said, "Art is the expression of man's joy in labor." 16

Jones was distressed by the way unemployment was forcing men into poverty and crime. The right to self support seemed to him an especially acute problem in a democracy. Without that all of our boasted liberties are a myth, he said, and he was not sanguine of the possibility of long retaining other individual rights in a country where the overwhelming majority of people had no legal claim to a livelihood.

It was typical of Jones that he did not point to any individual or classes as the cause of unemployment. As an employer, as mayor, and as an open-eyed man, Jones was constantly confronted by unemployment. But unlike many men less familiar with the realities of the problem than he, Jones declined to put the blame on the unemployed. They are shiftless; they are lazy; they drink; they don't want to work. None of these worn cliches convinced him.

There is something wrong, he agreed, but it is something deeper than the frailties of the poor. He did not blame machinery. Machines have added speed, intensity and discomfort to production so that many factory jobs are equivalent to imprisonment at hard labor, but they are not the cause of unemployment.

In his opinion the chief cause of the most pressing problem of our time was the competitive system. This system has failed, Jones would say, for

¹⁵ The "New Right" of which Jones wrote was the right to work; ibid., pp. 115-61. 16 Ibid., p. 150; this was one of Jones' favorite quotations.

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it has not given men jobs, adequate pay, or reasonable hours of work. It has failed because it is not geared to satisfy the needs of society but only to fill the pockets of a few individuals.17 He hated it because he saw in it a denial of brotherhood. It makes our lives a scramble for money, said Jones; it makes the strong exploit the weak and the weak kick the weaker. The more he thought about it the more convinced he became that the competitive system must be replaced by one of cooperation.

Jones did not think this an impossible thing to hope for. In his own lifetime he had seen men accomplish such wonderful things for themselves that he was sure they could do even more wonderful things for each other. Enthusiastically he noted "the larger recognition of social obligation that is coming to us, and coming with whirlwind speed in these closing years of the nineteenth century."18

He believed that with the help of this awakening spirit the substitution of the co-operative for the competitive society could be brought about by combining political action with the personal regeneration of the individual -i.e., by a program of legislation and education. In the meantime, while working for the fundamental reform, Jones recommended some immediate steps to combat unemployment: divide the day into eight-hour shifts, thus making more jobs available19 and organize a public works program to bring together idle men and idle capital.

HIS ANNUAL MESSAGE to the Council for the year 189820 reveals that by the middle of his first term as mayor, Jones had arrived at some conclusions regarding the function of government, and that he was ready to propose measures to carry out his theories. As indicated above, he believed that the State [i.e. any political unit], to which he habitually referred as "all of the people," was the agency through which social reforms should be affected. He believed this to be true because he felt the State was the only organization of which every person was a part; it was the only instrument

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 142. Jones quotes a sentence to this effect which he attributes to Alfred Russel Wallace. 18 Ibid., p. 150.

¹⁹ Over the entrance to Jones' factory was a sign bearing this message:

[&]quot;Every man who is willing to work has a right to live
Divide up the day and give him a chance."

One of his most popular songs was entitled "Divide the Day." Words and music to it may be found in Toledo Saturday Night, May 13, 1899.

²⁰ Toledo, Annual Statement . . . and Reports of the Various Departments for the Year Ending April 1st 1898, pp. 13-38. (Hereafter cited as Toledo, Annual Statement, with year). There is a brief, understanding statement of Jones' political beliefs in Ernest Crosby, "Golden Rule Jones, Mayor of Toledo," (Chicago 1906), pp. 43-8.

through which men could express their love and concern for all their fellows.

Jones' political ideal was Whitman's "land of comrades." He liked to picture the ideal State as similar to the ideal family. We should notice, however, that the thing that attracted Jones to the family as the pattern for the State was not its disciplinary aspects—the stern father keeping turbulent children in check by meting out just punishments—but the equality that members of a well-knit family share. He liked the all-forone, one-for-all spirit which common interests and common ownership of the things necessary for life promotes within a family group.

He wanted the citizens of Toledo to be members of a family that owned the things necessary for its life, and that did things for its members. In the city-family of which he dreamed, no members would make money at the expense of others, and all members would contribute something more to the city's life than their mere presence and the payment of taxes.²¹

In order to bring this ideal nearer to actuality, Jones, in his message of 1898, presented an ambitious program of civic improvement for the consideration of the council. He proposed the erection of a city hall; increased appropriations for streets and parks; the establishment of public baths, playgrounds, kindergartens, and better market facilities. He recommended the adoption of the merit system in all city departments.

More threatening to certain interests within the city and the Republican party were Jones' proposals that the city should own and operate its own gas and electric lighting plants; that the contract system of carrying on public work should be replaced by a policy of direct employment of labor for these projects by the city; and that no grants of new or extensions of old franchises should be made to private companies without the approval of the voters.

Jones' humane attitude toward city problems is shown by his recommendation in the message that the city's licensing laws should be revised. He thought it both unnecessary and undesirable that Toledo should obtain revenue by forcing the poor to surrender to the city, in the form of license fees, a part of the money they scraped together from such activities as peddling and junk collecting.

It is plain that Jones was already acting upon the ideas that he was later (in his book, "The New Right," for example) to express in words: politics is the science of doing good through government; governments

²¹ For an example of Jones' analogy of the family and the state see "Letters of Labor and Love," pp. 32-3.

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exist to serve people, not to rule them; and the function of government is to even up social inequalities rather than to create distinctions by granting privileges to some men.

Jones' idea that government exists to serve rather than to rule was not revolutionary. It was precisely what the politicians and business men of Toledo believed. But they believed in it like the religious revivalist whom they imported to stir up moral indignation against Jones believed in the Golden Rule—"up to a certain point." They believed government existed to serve them and to rule the people.

As mayor, Jones made a conscientious effort to administer the affairs of Toledo in such a way that the interests of all the inhabitants, or, when this was impossible, the interests of the city as a whole, would be protected. This was the fundamental issue between Jones and his opponents: Who shall the government of Toledo serve, all of the people of Toledo or certain groups of Toledoans?

When the party leaders began to realize that this man whom they had elected was really sincere in the things he said, and that he really did look upon himself as "the Mayor for all the people," it was clear to them that they must get rid of him. Jones was no man to have in office when the street railway company wanted its franchises renewed and when the contract for lighting the streets was soon to expire.

At the Republican city convention in 1899 Jones was denied renomination. His party irregularity was held against him by many delegates, and the votes of others, who had professed to support him, were quite openly bought.²² Jones had earlier warned that he would not consider himself bound by the action of this convention, which he believed had been elected in an irregular manner.

He immediately issued an announcement of his independent candidacy for re-election to the mayoralty.²³ In this document he reiterated the promise he had previously made that he would oppose all grants of new franchises or extensions of existing ones and that he would work for public ownership of all public utilities.²⁴

IV

INDEPENDENCE WAS THRUST upon Jones, but he accepted it as gladly as if the choice had been his own. "I am a man without a party, a free

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²² The Convention is described by Jones in "The New Right," pp. 89-91. See also Wendell F. Johnson, "Toledo's Non-Partisan Movement," Toledo, 1922, p. 12; the Toledo Blade, March 4, 5, 1899, and the Toledo Bee, March 4, 5, 1899.

²³ Reprinted in Toledo Saturday Night, April 22, 1899.

²⁴ Toledo Bee, Feb. 18, 1899.

untrammeled soul, owing allegience to nothing less and determined to serve nothing less than the whole human family, rejecting none, excluding none, permitting and inviting all. I believe in the absolute . . . unity of the entire race. . . ."²⁵

It was as an advocate of absolute non-partisanism in all politics that he won his widest fame. He ran for Governor of Ohio in 1899 as an independent and his later mayoralty victories were scored as an independent candidate. In 1900 he declined the Democratic nomination for Representative to Congress from his district and he steadfastly refused to organize an independent third party in Toledo.

One party is as bad as another, was his attitude. He disliked parties not only because of the use to which they were put by privilege-seeking business men, but also because, by their very nature, they were representatives of only part of the people. He wanted to serve all. He opposed them, too, because he felt they robbed men of their intellectual freedom by blinding them with prejudice and bias.

He came to look upon the non-partisan as playing the same rule in politics that the non-resistant plays in war: the only way to stop war is for individuals to stop fighting, he said; the only way to get rid of the curse of partyism is to renounce parties. ²⁶ Jones believed that partisanship would linger longest in national elections. He was convinced that it was already disappearing from municipal politics²⁷ and he always insisted that his victories in Toledo were not personal triumphs but were evidences of a popular discontent with parties; they were object lessons in what the people could do when they really wanted to discard, not only the boss and the machine, but the whole institution of Party.

The acceptance of non-partisanism marks the beginning of a shift of emphasis in Jones' philosophy. Heretofore he had been primarily interested in the ills of society. Now he began to devote more thought to how the individual (and he meant Jones as much as anybody) could make himself a better person. He had always recognized the necessity for this. On the fence at Golden Rule Park he had painted a line from his favorite poet, Walt Whitman: "PRODUCE GREAT PERSONS—THE REST FOLLOWS."

In the last two or three years of his life, without giving up his earlier collectivism, he stressed this individualistic, passive aspect of his thinking more than formerly. The magazine articles that he wrote emphasizing

27 "Mayor's Message," Annual Statement, 1901, p. 16.

^{25 &}quot;Letters of Labor and Love," p. 119.

²⁶ For Jones' mature reflections on political parties see his article, "The Non-Partisan in Politics," The Independent, LV, 1963-66.

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the duty of every man to improve himself and his right to do nothing contrary to what his heart told him was good presumably reached a larger audience than his book, "The New Right," which was published in 1899. It was these articles along with his championing of the idea of non-partisanism in politics, which made him known as a philosophical anarchist.

Although he did not lose his faith in people Jones began to doubt whether, in the long run, government could be much better or worse than the average citizen. He retained his belief in municipal ownership and continued to advocate the submission of franchise grants to popular referendum, but he wryly acknowledged that in a city of thieves municipal ownership of public utilities would not produce a righteous social order. Our politics will not improve radically until our personal ideals are raised to a higher plane.

Certainly, he said, there will be little improvement as long as our criterion of success is the possession of things. He did not forget his hatred of the competitive system but he realized more keenly than before the impossibility of establishing a co-operative system until education and evolution had produced co-operative citizens.²⁸

These conclusions were not induced by any bitterness or disillusion on Jones' part. They were not stale platitudes mouthed by a dispirited old man. They deserve our consideration because they were the sincere reflections of a man matured by work, experience, reading and thought.

Jones knew more about people, more about politics, and more about business than most men. He had read, seen, done, and thought more than most. It is significant that nearly all of the leaders of the Civic Revival, travelling by different roads, arrived finally at the same conclusion as Jones. When you put your faith in individual men rather than in God, supermen, or classes, the inevitable deduction is that society will improve only as the average man becomes better.

The Civic Revivalist pointed out that "the system" (Jones called it "competition") makes it hard for people to be good. Jones is important to us because he provides an example of the kind of man we will all have to become before the co-operative commonwealth is a reality.

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²⁸ This trend of Jones' thought is well illustrated in the following articles: "Patience and Education the Demands of the Hour," *The Arena*, XXV, pp. 544-6 (May 1901) and "The Way to Purify Politics," *The Independent*, LIV, pp. 512-3 (Feb. 27, 1902).

Men in a Barrack Society

THE PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS will publish the record of one of the largest social science investigations ever made. The United States Army during World War II did something no army in history had ever done. It called in trained psychologists, sociologists, and other experts in opinion research to make studies of the morale problems of soldiers all over the world. Using the most modern scientific methods, hundreds of studies were made. In all, more than a half million men were interviewed during the war, in situations guaranteeing anonymity. At first the Army command was skeptical of the value of such research, but later came to lean upon it in making some of its most important policy decisions.

Findings of this vast series of inquiries are being made available to the public in a series entitled "Studies in Social Psychology in World War II." The first two volumes analyzing what soldiers thought, and why, are entitled "The American Soldier." Volume I deals, generally, with problems of personal adjustment during Army life. Volume II deals more specifically with psychological problems of combat and its aftermath. Volume III will analyze experiments in mass communication and Volume IV will contribute new techniques of measurement and prediction.

These volumes deal with American young men at war and are a unique contribution to American history, but their aim is much broader. They represent one of the most elaborate applications ever made of the new methods of objective study which are revolutionizing social science research and taking the study of man out of the realm of guesswork and conjecture. These are not mere studies of soldiers, but are studies of men associating with other men, and many of the findings have applications in business, in education, and in civilian society generally.

The research enterprise was carried out during the war in the Information and Education Division of the Army, headed by Maj. Gen. F. H. Osborn. Publication is under the auspices of the Social Science Research Council. The basic research cost the Army more than a million dollars, and additional funds to make possible the elaborate analysis were provided by the Carnegie Corporation.—[An announcement from the Princeton University Press.]

Man, Industry's Greatest Problem

By JOHN A. DEVos

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THE PARADOX of growing unrest and dissatisfaction on the part of labor with management, despite climbing wages and constantly improved working conditions, stands as one of the most perplexing problems industry has ever faced. The past two decades have witnessed the greatest advance in the development of personnel policies and practices in industrial history. The improvement in the methods of selecting and training candidates for managerial positions has produced supervisors with well-rounded, practical knowledge of personnel management.

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The results of such training in increased production and in employeeemployer relations are well known. With these changes it was anticipated that labor unrest and disputes would soon become a thing of the past. Now, however, we find that, despite the improved conditions, labor seems to become more restless every day, and personnel managers are seeking new methods of approach, in an attempt to stem the tide of rising discontent. The efforts of trained psychologists and personnel directors have had seemingly little effect in halting this growing dissatisfaction.

There is unrest where wages and working conditions leave much to be desired, and there is unrest where wages and working conditions are good. The dissatisfaction of labor with the status quo is prevalent in almost every industry. The problem is general; it involves labor the nation over.

Personnel practices and methods are of inestimable value in helping to solve small-group or individual problems, but none has been produced which has lessened the growth of general anxiety. Personnel managers, like trained pathologists, must seek the cause of this abscess which is fast paralyzing industry. They must examine an integral part of the great body of labor thoroughly and methodically, beginning with an analysis of its psychological makeup and ending with a complete study of its relationship with other individuals and groups in society.

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WHEN INDUSTRY EMPLOYS an individual, it hires not only a physical being, but a reasoning, thinking mind as well. Man does everything by taking thought. It is his *mind* that feels, perceives, reasons and wills. Mind is the storehouse of literally thousands of ideas, each of which is classified

in its proper place. These ideas are called up for use from time to time through a process we call thinking. All of the muscular functions of our body are controlled and motivated by this mind; the voluntary muscles are directed by conscious mental effort and the involuntary muscles by subconscious or automatic thought.

To visualize the magnitude of the individual's mental power one need only recall a period of learning to drive an automobile or to ride a bicycle. The struggle to complete several movements simultaneously was intense. Repetition of these co-ordinated muscular acts lessened the effort required, as mental cataloguing soon placed them in the automatic or subconscious mind. It was not long before the novice did not have to think about co-ordination of muscular function at all.

The skilled worker in industry is one of those who accomplishes much of his work without conscious mental effort, thus permitting a release of mental power for the development of speed or a higher degree of perfection. The worker who must continually use his mind, consciously or subconsciously, consumes as much fatigue tissue as the man who is engaged in purely physical labor. The employee, therefore, in order to perform his work satisfactorily, depends upon the free flow of ideas from his mind.

We see from the foregoing that it is mind, not muscle, that is the motivating force of all production; mind, the omnipotent power, the builder and wrecker of the universe. Thus, it is incumbent upon industry to help find the cause of mental instability and to aid labor, through education, to destroy it.

The brain is the most intricate and delicately balanced of all bodily organs. When distress or conflict enters it, the delicate equilibrium is upset, thus providing an obstacle to the thought processes. If such an obstacle remains, it must be overcome by conscious mental effort, thus consuming greater mental energy to accomplish the desired end. Work, at best, is monotonous and irksome, and the continued existence of this barrier to unhampered thought will, in time, intensify the irksomeness of the work until the employee begins to resent not only the job but the supervision that goes with it as well, regardless of the method of approach used by his supervisors.

The condition of the worker who has temporary financial distress, family or personal ill health, or other trouble is a good example of mental instability. His production falls off, he does not get along with his fellowworkers, and he finds fault with everything, especially management. In an individual case of this type the efficient supervisor will immediately

recognize the problem and, through discussion or other medium, determine the cause and endeavor to correct the condition or make recommendations to higher-level management for its consideration and disposition. When the cause of his condition is corrected, the worker soon becomes his normal self again.

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At the present time, however, all labor seems to have symptoms similar to those formerly confined to occasional individuals. The majority of employees now are nervous, irritable and argumentative creatures who never seem to be satisfied, regardless of attempts to settle their grievances. No sooner does management settle one problem than another arises to take its place. Labor, in general, is restless, irrational and dissatisfied. If only a few industries were concerned, the problem would be simple, but the fact remains that the great majority of industries are affected. The managements of many corporations are comparing notes and holding conferences in an attempt to find an answer to this problem. As long as they do not seek the cause of general unrest, the only place where improvement will be evident is in those businesses in which conditions were already far worse than average.

Industry must find the cause which makes labor, in general, restless at any given time or place. All labor is suffering from this mental obstacle which prevents rational thinking. Strikes involving thousands of people and over incidents so trivial as to be unbelievable are becoming commonplace. A short time ago most of the men involved would have laughed to scorn anyone who would have been irrational enough to demand a strike for the same reasons.

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THE CHIEF DESIRE of all men is security—not only current but future security for themselves and their families. The thing that makes all labor feel insecure and at odds with industry is that the future looks black and to the employee industry seem to be to blame. I have interviewed many of these people and, in general, they have felt that there is something wrong with the set-up of their corporation but could not place a finger on any specific fault. The worries over the future economic instability of the nation have made labor become cognizant of the national and international economic problem. Newspapers, radio programs and magazines are filled with optimistic pictures of the post-war world, based upon what some economic authority has said; but an equally high authority will present a pessimistic picture of the post-war world.

Labor has recognized the possibility of coming chaos in our economic life

and is worried about it. The worker believes that, because the leaders are unable to find a solution, he is doomed to live under the continued threat of unemployment. This is his constant worry.

Here, then, is the cause of the unrest and dissatisfaction of labor with management—the common denominator, economic instability. John Dewey, one of America's leading educators, says:

The most marked feature of present civilization is insecurity. . . . It is hopeless to look for mental stability and integration when the economic bases of life are unsettled.¹

The common topic of discussion among workmen on and off the job is their economic problem and its future. This is reflected in the bargaining of organized labor for some sort of annual wage and guaranteed employment program. The worker, recognizing the inability of the scholars and leaders to find a way out of economic chaos, carries this problem on his mind awake or asleep. He retires completely fatigued from the exertion of the day's labor and finds that he is even less rested when he arises in the morning. A tired man is a bitter, nervous and irrational person at best.

IV

THE PROBLEM that faces industry as a personnel problem is, in reality, a social problem. Industry, as a major factor in modern society, cannot afford to stand by and watch the decline in living conditions. The breakdown of relations between management and labor should spur both groups on to find the answer to their common problem. Labor and a large percentage of most managerial staffs believe that corporate policy is the determining factor in wage problems. These people think that labor must fight management for everything deemed necessary. Both must learn the truth; that, in most cases, there is no basis for any discord in the relationship between labor and capital. For wages are controlled by natural law and not by the dictates of corporate policy or legislative act.

It has been my experience, in teaching fundamental economics to groups of employees, both supervisory and non-supervisory, and to union officials, that all resentment toward management vanishes when the truth is understood. If industry desires the full co-operation of all of its employees (all other conditions of employment being reasonably good), it must educate its personnel, not by propaganda but by actually conducting classes in the principles of political economy. Millions are spent annually in training personnel, but if these people are trained only in working procedures and

^{1 &}quot;The Lost Individual," The New Republic, Feb. 5, 1930, p. 294.

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safety methods and nothing is done to explain the economic background of the wage structure, how can they be expected to function rationally in chaotic times? These years after the war are and must continue to be, disjointed ones. Only those who understand the underlying principles of economics will be able to keep their heads in labor-management relations.

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Let us review a few of the common beliefs as to the causes of economic instability:

I. The belief on the part of the majority of workers that industry is not giving fair consideration to the wage question; that industry is exploiting labor, to its own benefit. These employees blame industry for economic instability (low wages and higher living costs) and organize to protect their own interests. Their attitude has been that, unless forced to do so through the pressure of organized labor, industry would not give fair consideration to the question of wages and working conditions.

Looking at the facts, we find that, in general, wage rates have constantly risen as a quantity but have fallen as a proportion. Interest, the return on the capital invested in industry, has been on the decline. Interest rates today in any field have been actually the lowest in history.

The facts seem to show that both labor and capital are being slowly squeezed out. Labor is actually fighting for its very existence, and capital is fighting to maintain its business. The purpose of machinery in production is to make it possible for labor to produce more with less effort. The advent of machinery should have increased the earnings of both labor and machine-owner but, as new machines have been developed, each party has received a smaller proportion of the increase.

II. The belief that the banking field is responsible for depressions and general economic instability. It seems odd to me that no one has considered the fact that, as an institution, banking is relatively young and international banking still younger. This world of ours had wars and depressions long before the existence of any such institution. Money manipulators are also blamed for these evils, but regardless of the fluctuation of value, labor soon finds it out. Our dollar is now worth fifty-seven cents. What laborer does not know it? It never has taken long for the value of money to be reflected in the cost of living.

There are other groups who insist that the stock market is an evil and should be abolished. Call it what you will, speculation in commodities or stocks is something that men will never abandon, law or no law. By

denying the right to speculate we would deny the primary law of nature: that men seek to satisfy their desires with the least exertion. Men desire security and luxuries, and they believe they can get them through speculation with the product of their labor. Get rich quick! Many have gained riches and many have lost. Men always have and always will gamble with either their lives or their fortunes, hoping for a lucky strike that will place them above want and insecurity.

III. Lastly, we come to the belief that political administrations are to blame for our world difficulties. If through legislation, politicians could raise wages and thus benefit all the people, is it not logical to assume that they would have done so long before this? By so doing they would have perpetuated themselves in office; no one would change his political affiliation as long as he was benefiting from the existing administration. The only time men vote for a change is when they think their status as wage earners is adversely affected by the party in power.

The centuries-old history of government shows the inability of political administrations to cope with the problem of unemployment and poverty. In Greece, four centuries before Christ, Pericles, the great statesman, appropriated the funds in the public treasury and with them instituted a public works program very similar to our WPA, hiring the unemployed Greek freemen to build the sea walls, roads and the beautiful Parthenon, all of which are still in existence. Despite this program, history tells us that the Greeks themselves opened the gates and actually welcomed the Roman conquerors. The same is true of Roman civilization; the government distributed coins to the starving Romans, and again the people themselves opened the gates of Rome to admit the Huns from the north. Conditions apparently were so bad that any change for the worse would have destroyed them. They could not suffer any more than they already had, and they hoped they might be better off under the conqueror.

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THE TREND toward government ownership of industry, the abolition of private enterprise, is the result of labor's demand for protection. When labor understands that (for the most part) industry is not to blame for the conditions under which the former exists, labor will seek the true causes for its woes and remove them. If industry is to continue as private enterprise, it must take an active part in the re-examination of the premises on which political economy is based, in an effort to correct any error in those premises. With the correction of a few misconceptions and after

following the principles thus disclosed, labor will know the true cause of maldistribution of wealth and turn its efforts toward achieving a more rational distribution.

Labor and capital both desire the justice that Thomas Jefferson wrote about in the Declaration of Independence: "That all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Economic, not political, principles provide the basis of social life and happiness, and, therefore, life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness may only be enjoyed when the society is built upon the firm foundation of proven economic principles. The injustices of the existing system can only be abolished by the efforts of the masses. Knowledge of the truth will provide the motive force.

Chicago

Land Nationalization in Burma

WHEN BURMA ADOPTED the Burmese Land Nationalization Act late in 1948, according to information from New Delhi, it caused international complications between that former colonial kingdom and the new State of India.

More than a quarter of Burma's 12,000,000 acres of rice fields, it turned out, were owned by Indians, who valued their holdings at about 90 crores of rupees. Feeling that the compensation that the Burma Government was likely to give would be on such a low scale that it would practically be expropriation, the Government of India called a conference of Indian landowners to discuss ways and means of pressing for a more generous scale.

After a meeting between members of the Indian landowners of Burma and officials of the Commonwealth Relations wing of the External Affairs Ministry, the Madras Premier, A. P. Ramaswami Reddiar, had a conference on the situation with Jarwarhalal Nehru, Prime Minister of India.

Land reform by nationalization inevitably raises issues of compensation, and frequently with foreign absentee landowners backed by their governments. It is another reason why a land reform program based on a tax program that gradually appropriates for social purposes the economic rent of land is more practicable.

Responsibility for Improving Living Standards

SINCE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AGENCIES on the international level multiplied upon the end of the war, many persons of good will have fixed their hopes for improvement of the common weal on "world government" or some similar nebulous idea. Instead of working to clean up the messes in their own back yards, they have devoted much energy to debating how this "world government" should be organized so that it can set about correcting, by some global magic, the major social ills of our time.

Secretary of State George C. Marshall, in an address before the General Assembly of the United Nations, pointed out that democracy, like charity, begins at home, and that while international action to deal with international aspects of economic problems must be pressed, the job of improving living standards is the task of each national government. He might better have said that it is the job of the people of each nation.

"While the United Nations and its related agencies are increasingly helpful in the economic and social fields," the Secretary pointed out, "primary responsibility for improving standards of living will continue to rest with the governments of the peoples themselves. International organizations cannot take the place of national and personal effort, or local initiative and individual imagination. International action cannot replace self-help, nor can we move toward general co-operation without maximum mutual help among close neighbors."

Of course, the peoples who slave in the dictatorships of our time can do very little to help themselves. The way to impel them to struggle against tyranny and dictatorship to achieve a large measure of democratic freedom, as our forefathers did, is by example.

The Geopolitics of the Baltic States

By Joseph S. Roucek

IT HAS BEEN SAID1 that the fundamental Baltic problem is "the struggle for dominance, latent or active, between Russia and Germany." The fate of the three small nations, hemmed about in the corner between two great nations, seems realistically summarized in this sentence. But up to 1914 the history of the Baltic provinces had never been faced with a clear-cut Russo-German alternative. The second world war decided the issue.2

Historically, throughout the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Baltic provinces were a battleground over which Poland, Sweden and Russia contended; a good deal of what is called the "dominium maris Baltici" hinged on the possession of these small but strategically located territories. "Only after the conquest of Livland from Poland could Gustavus Adolphus enter upon his great historical career. And it was only with the conquest of the Baltic provinces that Russia, under Peter the Great, was opened up to the West and became a European power."3 The same can be said of the problems of Lithuania.

The Geopolitical Aspects. Living along the south-eastern shores of the Baltic, the life of the Baltic peoples has been linked up with that sea, with the Vistula and the Daugava (Dvina), with the trade routes going up these rivers and continuing south-eastward down the Dniester and the Dnieper. "In fact, it was this broad ribbon stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea, limited by the Vistula and the Dniester in the West, the Daugava and the Dnieper with its tributaries in the East, that made up the Lithuanian-Polish Kingdom of the sixteenth century. The Baltic States thus form the northern outlet for the Ukraine and for Asia beyond, linking them up with the Baltic Sea, the Scandinavian countries, Britain, the wide open oceans. Like Flanders, the Baltic States lie at the crossroads."4

Although the Baltic region is economically the coastal outlet for landlocked Russia, it is deprived of its hinterland because it is, culturally, the outpost of Western Europe, which received its religion and civilization

¹ S. H. Thomson in a review of W. F. Reddaway, "Problems of the Baltic," Journal

of Central European Affairs, I (1941), p. 112.

² Hans Rothfels, "The Baltic Provinces: Some Historic Aspects and Perspectives," Journal of Central European Affairs, IV (July, 1944), pp. 117-46.

³ Ibid., p. 117. ⁴ F. W. Pick, "The Three Baltic Nations," Journal of Central European Affairs, IV (January, 1944), pp. 416-40.

from Germany and Sweden by way of the Baltic. Consequently the national aspirations of the Baltic peoples are foreign to those of the Russians. The Baltic coast has been the base of cultural diffusion, and has remained the line of commercial contact with the world at large. Three of the four capitals are coastal cities, the principal ports of their respective countries: Riga, capital of Latvia, stands eight miles up the Dvina River, accessible to the Hansa ships which traded there during the Middle Ages, but protected, in a way, from piratical raids; Tallin (Estonia) began as a Danish foothold on a crag of the escarpment which rises above the Gulf of Finland and combines defense point and harbor; Helsinki (the capital of Finland) has a superior harbor, screened by protecting islands.

Historical Background. Time and again, unification of the Baltic coast, attempted by the Teutonic Knights, and more than once by Sweden and Russia, has failed after shortlived shackling. Neither the commercial unity of the Baltic Sea nor the profits coming from handling the export trade of Russia has united the Baltic peoples with each other and their neighbors across the Baltic and on the Continental hinterland.

The divergent historical experiences are the bases of divergent nationalism of each Baltic nation. Latvia, deeply indented by the Gulf of Riga, was alternately subjected to Teutonic Knights and German bishops for four centuries. Then followed a period of shorter vassalage of parts of the area to Sweden, Denmark, Poland, and Russia. Latvia, just like Estonia and Lithuania, hemmed in by the Germans, the Poles and the Russians, and watched from overseas by the Danes and Swedes, suffered of being both the battlefield and colony for half a dozen neighbors. Influenced by them all, the Latvians, the Estonians and the Lithuanians nevertheless preserved their own particular features, and in 1917 emerged as clearly formed nations.

But while more than half the population of Latvia is Lutheran, a quarter Roman Catholic and a considerable number Orthodox, Lithuania is more than 80 per cent Roman Catholic. Furthermore, Lithuania's coastline is short and has not a single harbor. Memel, a Prussian Protestant port on the German frontier, was given to Lithuania at the end of the first World War, but was granted semi-autonomous status. In the beginning of 1923, Lithuania annexed it, and in the following years there was constant friction between Germany and Lithuania in the territory. Immediately after the seizure of Czechoslovakia, on March 22, 1939, Germany forced Lithuania to surrender the territory. At any rate, Lithuania, a country of forests, heaths, and marshes and without a harbor, made its capital at

Vilna, an inland route focus in disordered moraine country. Military expansion along natural routes in sparsely settled country made Lithuania a large State during the Middle Ages, and gravitated to Poland, the country of the Vistula Basin.

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The Ests speak an agglutinative language of Asiatic origin, and Estonia has been Danish and Swedish for long periods, interrupted by a prolonged Germanization under the Teutonic Knights. The county accepted the Lutheran version of reformed Christianity and is predominantly an outlet for products of the boreal coniferous forest. And what is even more important, Estonia is an ice-free outlet for Leningrad.

Changes in Foreign Domination. The story of the German invaders begins in 1186, when the German knights first appeared on the Baltic coast, quickly overrunning Latvia and Estonia. Backed by the Popes, these crusading Brothers of the Sword set up a Bishopric in Ragia in 1201. The Danes helped them to carry out their work of far-flung subjection within a generation. Tallinn (Reval, that is, Taani Linn or Danish Town) was founded in 1219. By 1227 the Order controlled the whole of Estonia. The forerunners of the "master race" brought serfdom, the feudal system and enforced Roman Catholicism, and the history of their domination is characterized by blood-letting and ruthless cruelty.

The Danes withdrew in 1347. Lithuania, a well-organized, powerful State, was more fortunate. It was saved from the Knights and even able occasionally to oppose them. Mindaugas, the Lithuanian King-Unifier of the thirteenth century, temporarily accepted Christianity, only to repudiate it and fight the Knights the more determinedly. In the fourteenth century, Gediminas allied himself with Poland to safeguard his rear. His grandson, Jogaila (Jagiello), who married Hedwiga, the young queen of Poland, ruled both over Poland and Lithuania, adopted Christianity, and together with his cousin Vytautas, to whom he surrendered the government of Lithuania according to the Compact of Vilnius (1401), defeated the Knights in the famous battle of Tannenberg on July 15, 1410. Thereafter the social history of Lithuania became not wholly unlike the history of the other Baltic states. By 1466, Casimir IV, another Lithuanian-Polish ruler of the Jageillonian line, was able to control the Baltic Sea, even taking Danzig. On July 1, 1569, the Polish-Lithuanian temporary union was transformed into a permanent union, the "Union of Lublin," and both Lithuania and Poland were to go under together and to re-emerge, on the strength of the national, not the monarchical principle, as two distinct units.

The Swedish period of the Baltic States began at the end of the sixteenth century. The region became the battleground for the warring Vasas of Sweden and Poland, as well as for the Swedes and Russians. Russia under Ivan III had already endangered the Baltic. In the seventeenth century, Latvia and Estonia were freed from Polish rule and conquered by Sweden, which lasted for over a century when Russia conquered the lands. Riga, Parnu and Tallinn were Peter's by 1710. Lithuania followed the fate of Latvia and Estonia within the same century. When Poland was partitioned, Lithuania went to Russia.

In the Sixties, the story of modern Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania begins with the spiritual awakening going hand in hand with the economic reforms. Riga, Tallinn, and Paldiski became ports of growing importance. In spite of the short period of intensified Russification under Tsar Alexander III (1881-94), the nationalistic spirit of the Baltic peoples was growing. With the turn of the twentieth century, national movements based on the mass of the peasants were laying the foundations of what were to become the free states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania after the first World War.

The first World War made the Baltic region a battleground between the Russians and the Germans. The latter overran Lithuania and the German advance stopped mid-way in Latvia where a front was established and held until 1917. Most of Latvia fell to the Russians in 1917. But the tottering Russian regime and the German advance led to the formation of the free states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in 1918, as a sort of buffer between Soviet Russia and the West.

The two post-war decades were but a period when the rivalry between Germany and Russia were temporarily dormant. By tradition, however, Russia was anxious to obtain ice-free ports, together with control of the Baltic. In September and October 1939, Soviet Russia availed itself of the European war to force Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia to agree to establishment of Russian naval bases and garrisons on their territory. German influence in this region was ousted by Russia, and German minorities were shipped to Germany. In 1944, the Russian armies started pushing the Germans back there, and the Second Baltic Army of Russia finally reached the Baltic Sea west of Riga on August 1, 1944. The Baltic states suffered terribly as a battleground of the Russian and Nazi forces, but that was only a prelude to their ultimate political fate: absorption into the Soviet system.

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Religion and Social Politics

MALCOLM MUGGERIDGE, the English journalist, in a candid and slightly acid comment on the English political situation in The New Leader, New York labor weekly, harked back to the sins of his youth.

"I remember as a child going to a Socialist Sunday School, where we had hymns accompanied by a harmonium, an address from some local worthy, and a collection, just like any other Sunday School," he writes. "The only difference was that, where more orthodox children were encouraged to look forward to gaining admittance to the pearly gates of Heaven, we were encouraged to look forward to raising the school-leaving age, nationalizing key industries, and being provided with guaranteed employment. Had we but known it, our hymns and exhortations were directed toward installing Mr. Atlee in Downing Street. It was to this end that, all unknowingly, we raised our childish voices."

Had Mr. Muggeridge and his childhood companions clung to a more orthodox liturgy, they might have come out slightly worse, with a Tory installed in Downing Street. Religion is an indispensable essential of a progressive social movement, but only when the application of its moral truths is based upon scientifically demonstrated economic and sociological principles.

A Program for Facing Segregation

AN ENDURING PROGRAM of reconversion from totalitarian racial segregation was advocated by Dr. Howard W. Odum, Kenan Professor of Sociology at the University of North Carolina, in an address at the Cooper Union Forum, New York.

"Segregation is a major problem of American democracy, which might very well destroy the soul of the South and cripple a great nation," Dr. Odum said, "Manifestly, the problem deserves the best that social science and political strategy can achieve. It deserves the same sort of basic inquiry which was undertaken by the founding fathers.

"Many of the national intellectuals are so naive as to assume that race prejudice and folk conflicts are morally motivated and that their elimination will be found in simple edict. Many Southerners are so naive as to assume that the Southern regions can continue in an isolation which takes pride in its segregation economy in a world whose changing social structure seeks equality of opportunity for all."

Debates, resolutions, organized propaganda and action programs should be made incidental to a basic four-year inquiry into four relevent fields, Dr. Odum declared. This proposed study, which he suggested be undertaken by universities working under endowments from foundations, would include:

1. The South's resources and peoples in all their traditional and historical backgrounds.

2. The structure of American democracy, with its organic elements of geographic representation, state participation and judicial structure.

3. The total segregation picture of the South and of the Nation, with an inventory of the total segregation configuration as it relates to the total structure of American society.

4. An appraisal, in terms of actual programs, of what, in priority schedules and actual costs, will be involved in the enactment of changes demanded.

Only upon such information, Dr. Odum said, "can the South and the Nation determine the necessary ways and means within the framework of orderly democracy". [An announcement from the Cooper Union.]

Economic Fallacies and Economic Teaching

By HARRY GUNNISON BROWN

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It is HIGHLY IMPORTANT in the teaching of economics that students be taught to analyze various widely held fallacies and that they learn how to refute them convincingly. Any teaching which leaves them the easy victims of such (often) plausible fallacies is to that extent inadequate and superficial. Any such teaching is not less-but, rather, all the moreimportant when some of the fallacies have had the support not only of many of the politically "great" but of well-known professional economists!

Among the fallacies which, in my own teaching, I seek to guard my students against, through explanation, analysis of quotations, general discussion, and written examinations, are the following:

- (1) That if workers in a particular line are able, through union control of the number of wage earners in it, to get an increase of wages, the prices of goods will rise not only in this line but also in other lines. In fact, in the absence of increased circulating medium, prices and wages in other lines will tend downward.1
- (2) That the initiatory force in bringing about business depression is a "state of mind" manifesting itself in "liquidity preference" or a tendency to hold money idle (i.e., a reduced velocity of circulation), rather than a decrease of circulating medium as by sharp and persistent bank credit restriction.2
- (3) That spending by government for public works can be relied on as an effective way to mitigate unemployment, entirely regardless whether it is new and additional circulating medium which is thus spent, or funds secured through borrowing from or taxing persons who are thus made to spend less in order that government may spend more.3
- (4) That if other countries depreciate their currency in relation to gold

¹This is discussed at length in my "Basic Principles of Economics," 2nd edition, Columbia, Mo. (Lucas Brothers), 1947, Chapter V, §5. Cf. also, "A Postscript and Questions," Columbia, Mo. (Lucas Brothers), 1946, Part II, Chapter V, §5.

² See "Basic Principles of Economics," Chapter VI, p. 129, and "A Postscript and Obsessions," Part II.

Questions," Part I, pp. 40 and 41. Compare, also, my recent paper in Am. Jour. Econ. Sociol., Vol. VII, No. 2 (April, 1947), entitled "Two Decades of Decadence, in Economic Theorizing," especially pp. 164-5. In this connection, too, I would refer the reader to a communication by Dr. Clark Warburton in The American Economic Review, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 1 (March, 1948), entitled "Hansen and Fellner on Full Employment

Policies." This, though brief, is an effectively presented challenge and discussion.

3 "Basic Principles of Economics," pp. 121-2, and "A Postscript and Questions," Part I, pp. 30-32.

(as by raising an official government price of gold), we must do likewise or have depression and unemployment. In other words. they will "export their unemployment" to us.4

- (5) That an increase by the United States in the official price of gold. sufficient to prevent the outflow of gold, is the same in its effect on foreign trade as the levy of a protective tariff, i.e., that it similarly reduces international division of labor.5
- (6) That there is no loss or economic disadvantage in having a huge national debt provided it is domestically held, so that "we owe it to ourselves."6
- (7) That government borrowing (as by selling its bonds) cannot, according to the condition of bank reserves and whether government does or does not spend the proceeds, either increase or decrease the volume of circulating medium and the general level of prices.7
- (8) That "exploitation" of the workers by "capitalists," by making it "impossible for the workers to buy back what they produce," is the cause of business depression and unemployment.8
- (9) That the existence of low wages and a "low standard of living" in a country gives it a better chance to produce goods cheaply and thus "undersell" countries with higher standards of living.9
- (10) That to give certain groups subsidies or tariff favors increases the demand for goods because the favored groups have more to spend, and that thus there is no loss but rather a gain to the groups that are taxed to make the favoritism possible.10
- (11) That the best system of valuation of public utilities for the purpose of rate regulation is on the basis of "prudent investment," i.e., the amount in dollars "actually, honestly and prudently invested" in the plant at some date in the past and with no allowance for any change either in particular cost prices or in the general price level.11
- (12) That if inequality is unjustifiably great and thus some have large 4 "Basic Principles of Economics" p. 116, and especially, "A Postscript and Questions,"
- Part I, pp. 113-4. 5 "Basic Principles of Economics," pp. 165-6, and "A Postscript and Questions," Part I, pp. 111-2.

 6 "A Postscript and Ouestions," Part I, pp. 25-6.

7 "Basic Principles of Economics," pp. 114 and 121-2, and "A Postscript and Ques-

tions," Part I, pp. 30-6.

8 "Basic Principles of Economics," Chapter VI, §7. Cf. "A Postscript and Questions," quotations and questions in Chapter VI, §7.

9 "Basic Principles of Economics," pp. 149-51 and Appendix, §1, and, especially, "A

Postscript and Questions," Part II, Chapter VII, §3, numbers 7 and 8.

10 "Basic Principles of Economics," pp. 167-71. 11 Ibid., Chapter VIII, §§5 to 10 inclusive.

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incomes to which they are not properly entitled while others are poor, a good way to obviate the evil is through a government policy of restricting the production of the things the well-to-do desire and of encouraging relatively the production of the necessities and comforts of the poor.12

- (13) That the invention and use of labor-saving machinery decreases the opportunities for employment and tends to bring about widespread unemployment.13
- (14) That the most expensive part of the supply of a commodity can be identified—at least theoretically—as that part produced by the "high-cost firm" or firms; and that the so called "marginal cost curve" of such an individual "high-cost" firm necessarily indicates the price which must be paid to get that part of the supply produced. Whereas the truth is that marginal opportunity cost is fundamental in the explanation of supply in a way that the socalled marginal cost of the individual firm (really marginal outlay) is not.14
- (15) That the value of capital is determined only indirectly by cost, i.e., that cost of production of any kind of capital determines the amount of it produced, that the amount of it produced determines its yield, and that its yield determines (through the process of capitalizing or discounting) its sale value, and that it is only through this indirect process that the cost of production of capital has any causal relation to its value. 15
- (16) That the productiveness of capital affects the rate of interest only indirectly, i.e, only through its effect on the "time shape of the income stream" or (otherwise expressed) through "over-endowing the future" as compared with the present.16
- (17) That interest on capital is not earned in the same sense as wages, viz., through contribution by the saver (if he truly earns what he saves) to production, over and above what would be produced in the absence of the capital his saving made possible.17
- (18) That when tangible capital is taxed, mortgage holders, bond-holders

¹² Ibid., Chapter VIII, pp. 216-7.
13 Ibid., pp. 258-9, and "A Postscript and Questions," Part II, Chapter XI, §1. 14 "Basic Principles of Economics," Chapter XI, §§3, 4 and 5 and Appendix, 3; also,

[&]quot;A Postscript and Questions," Part I, pp. 19-20. 15 "Basic Principles of Economics," Chapter XIII, §§3, 5 and 9 and especially pp.

¹⁶ Ibid., Chapter XIII, §§2 to 6 inclusive and 9.

¹⁷ Ibid., Chapter XII, §5, and Chapter XIII, pp. 336-7 and §10.

and other lenders "escape" taxation unless intangibles are also directly taxed. 18

- (19) That the willingness of some wage earners to work for less than labor is worth in a free market, compels other workers to accept equally low wages and so "brings down the whole level of wages," 18
- (20) That there is no distinction significant for economic theory or policy, between capital and land or between the interest yielded by capital and the rent of land.²⁰
- (21) That the effect of taxing land values is to increase the rent paid by tenants, whereas it definitely tends to reduce rent and to increase wages.²¹
- (22) That (within the limit of the amount of revenue either one could yield) a graduated income tax is more favorable to the welfare of wage earners than a tax which would appropriate nearly all of the annual rental value of land.²²
- (23) That although changes in economic policy, including tax policy, which redound to the general advantage are to be desired in other cases, nevertheless an increase in taxes on land values relative to other taxes is ethically indefensible regardless of its beneficence.²³
- (24) That in teaching economics it is just as well to leave out—or to barely mention—the question of who should have to pay whom for permission to work and to live on the earth, in those locations where work is relatively effective and where life is not too unpleasant.²⁴

Could it possibly be that the younger generation of economists have given their time so completely to the study of bizarre theoretical systems which, though temporarily of the "new look" variety, may soon be—and perhaps already are—"on the way out", while giving inadequate attention to some of the most fundamental principles and most significant problems of economics, that they must be regarded as in considerable degree a "lost generation?"

And might it be, too, that by leaving out, especially, or soft-pedaling, what is perhaps the most exciting and vital question economists can face, they necessarily rob their teaching of its greatest and most dramatic appeal to students?

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18 Ibid., p. 378 and Appendix, §4.

19 Ibid., pp. 409-10.

²¹ Ibid., pp. 426 and 474. ²² Ibid., pp. 426, and 474-84.

²⁰ Ibid., pp. 264-5, 276, 310, 351-3, 378 and Chapters XV and XVI.

 ²³ Ibid., Chapter XV, §11, and "A Postscript and Questions," Part I, Chapter VII.
 24 See my booklet on "The Teaching of Economics," New York, Robert Schalkenbach
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Vested Interests in Scientific Research

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By T. SWANN HARDING

A PROMINENT INDUSTRIALIST once spoke of scientific research as being "the first line of defense of the capitalistic dynamic economy as opposed to a State-planned economy." Science thus itself becomes propaganda. Very often what appears to be an authentic scientific publication is nothing but disguised propaganda. Sometimes this is because one of the sponsors has some commercial, moral, religious, or public welfare interest he wishes to have served by a deflection of scientific findings to sustain his pet thesis. On the other hand, certain journals exist which print many purely synthetic articles written by ghost-writing bureaus to support the advertising propaganda of new drug preparations or healing devices with artificial clinical tests and synthetic case histories.

To a layman these publications are all esoteric, hence probably important. Science tends to be a glittering generality to most laymen, and its good name is therefore widely transferred to endless questionable products and causes. Actually technical articles, booklets, and monographs frequently represent many things other than the altruistic pursuit of science by unbiased workers in laboratories. This is especially true when the distorted results reach the general public in advertising, and in campaigns to make it drink milk, buy certain cigarettes, avoid alcoholic liquor, fight venereal disease, and so on.

Scientists cannot be held responsible for these perversions except, like the Curies, insofar as a curiously perverted sense of social responsibility makes them ignore the popular utilization of their discoveries. But scientists also tend to become at home in certain comfortable theories and hypotheses and to fight the new quite as do other human beings. They are slow to accept drastic adverse criticisms even if based on demonstrable facts. They are reluctant to examine and try new and unusual hypotheses. Moreover many of them are suffused with the fallacy that since they are expert on something they are expert on everything.

Foibles of Scientists

ALL UNCONSCIOUSLY, SCIENTISTS became propagandists of their own chosen ideas. Subconsciously they build up their own work to fortify their pet theories. Their methods and their findings are half-surreptitiously presented at their very best, or certainly in a little better light than they

assume in day-by-day laboratory work, or in other laboratories in the hands of others. Over and over again a new group of workers claims to have repeated exactly the experimental procedures of a predecessor group and to have got quite different results. But each scientist must aim to feel convinced that his methods are sound and his findings important. He is inclined often to become emotionally controversial at scientific meetings and to say things he perhaps does not fully mean.

He also, perhaps unconsciously, slants his work a little, due to imponderable pressures brought to bear upon him, or to please his scientific director and conform to the director's theories. The work of an entire institution is often bent to please its financial or political sponsors. Hence there are intense rivalries between institutions as well as between individual workers. Great forces often clash whether research is suported commercially, by private grants, or by taxation. No great public research institution is wholly free from the inroads of propaganda.

Manufacturing concerns propagandize the remarkable savings to the public due to their laboratory investigations, saying nothing about the fact that the basic investigation upon which the whole structure stands, and of which their laboratories merely made applications, was financed by a private trust or by government appropriations. In any case the public pays for the research—for industrial research in the form of a fraction added to prices. Furthermore the stated savings may or may not ever reach the ultimate consumer, who is demonstrably overcharged by really very excellent corporations which perform much creditable research in their laboratories. Monetary values assigned to scientific discoveries made in tax-supported institutions are qualified by many buts and ifs, for the savings, however accurately calculated, normally benefit others rather than the great public the institutions supposedly serve.

Commercial firms frequently maintain test laboratories predestined to make findings which seem to support contentions made in advertising and publicity campaigns. They issue pseudo-scientific or "research" publications which are subtly slanted and artfully prejudiced. Thus skilled treatment of data and deceptive use of line graphs may be used to "prove" that a liquid antiseptic (which is in reality little more than an oral cosmetic) is a mighty slayer of menacing germs. Wrong inferences abound; factual misstatements are far from infrequent.

Business and advertising unhesitatingly pounce upon the findings of unbiased research workers in the most reputable institutions and, by a process of elimination, deletion, perversion, and distortion make these seem the

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to support their contentions. Thus the Research Department of the National Confectioners' Association once apparently distorted the meaning of the picturesque phrase "fats burn in the flame of carbohydrates," to make people think eating candy would remedy obesity. For Dr. Meyer Bodansky protested to the Journal of the American Medical Association for Feb. 16, 1929, that he had used the phrase in his textbook merely to describe graphically the interrelationship in the intermediary metabolism of dextrose and fatty acids. This gave no warrant for the notion that a diet high in sugars would aid people to get thin. A grape fruit juice advertising campaign has used similar techniques.

The Journal of the American Medical Association for Oct. 28, 1933 carried a long editorial showing why it was unscientific to add vitamin A or carotene to cough drops. In November 1935 the Federal Trade Commission announced that Smith Brothers Inc. agreed to cease advertising propaganda that their cough drops or cough syrup were effective remedies in the treatment of colds, or to say that either preparation had a unique advantage over other similar preparations because of its vitamin A content. This sort of thing happens over and over again and is commonplace. Dangerous radium preparations kill some people and lethal preparations of sulphanilimide made up in diethylene glycol kill others, the murderous aftermath of basic scientific discoveries.

Effects of Commercial Pressure

At other times commercial pressure is more insidious. It seeps through laboratory walls. It subtly induces workers in reputable institutions to produce and publish findings that seemingly confirm an advertising theory about certain foods, drugs, cosmetics, or tobacco products. A whole absurd structure of pseudo-science, a veritable caricature of science, is laboriously reared in the printed word and over the radio to establish the "scientific" contentions of some new cosmetic, toothpaste, cigarette, or antiseptic.

It is a mistake to suppose, as has been intimated, that research supported by public funds escapes all such pressure. Fresh fruit and vegetable growers are always able to procure, from research workers supported by their own State, results tending to show that arsenic and lead spray residues offer no menace to human health, or reports of new insecticides deadly to insects but harmless to man. Indeed an investigation being carried on in a federal laboratory to determine once for all what cumulative toxic effects such residues had was summarily discontinued, and the

animals destroyed, by an act of Congress instigated by individuals who preferred the facts to remain unknown.

Nutrition experts in Government agencies know that Americans consume too much sugar and cereals and too few fresh fruits and vegetables. But if they present the facts too forthrightly, loud protests arise from the cereal and flour interests. If it be said we eat too much meat the packers exert pressure. The sugar interests protest against any efforts to decrease sugar consumption in the interests of public health. Dairy scientists insist that children drink a quart of milk daily for health's sake, though nutrition experts are divided as to the necessity for that.

Right while state and federal food chemists are alarmed about the arsenic and lead spray-residue problems, governmentally paid entomologists are experimenting with adhesives and other means of making the poisons stick to fresh fruits and vegetables long enough surely to kill the insects that menace the grower's profits. Finally, other governmentally supported research workers are publishing imposing bulletins to prove—after a bit of very superficial and scientifically infirm investigation—that this or that new chemical is deadly to bugs, but positively harmless to human beings. When cases come to court all experts are equal before the law and the word of some prejudiced scientific worker with little specialized training or experience may outweigh the considered opinion of the greatest toxicologists in the land.

Any scientific publication of any sort may, for all the reader knows, represent the drive of a particular factor, interest, group, or prejudice. The article that so augustly proves that rats must have vitamin F, that they can absorb it through their skins, and that this is a new discovery, fails to reveal that vitamin F is just another name for linoleic and linolenic acids well known to occur in lard. Instead it is really propaganda to induce the makers of cosmetics to put "vitamin F" in their cold creams—this despite its figures, graphs, tables, and technical language.

The scientific article that presents a new and rapid method for the determination of the presence and effects of lead is not at all what it seems. The method habitually gives low results. It errs on the side of those inclined to be careless about lead spray residues and who therefore want it in the "literature" to quote for their own justification. Once in print it is sanctified and forms part of the scientific literature, the modern sacred texts. The same may be said for the medical article prepared by the ghost-writing and bibliography-searching bureau. Even the case histories are fictitious. But it tells how such and such a drug was successfully used

in so many cases of so-and-so. It now forms part of the "literature" and can be quoted as a proof text.

The 'Uses' of Science

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In SIMILAR MANNER science is abused in moral, racial, political, and religious campaigns. It is used to sustain the Nordic myth, to provoke hatred of the Jews, to denounce alcohol or tobacco, to defend eugenics, or to formulate the thesis (even in the formerly erudite New Republic) that the way to wipe out venereal disease is first of all to abolish prostitution. Science, so-called, is thus dragged along by the heels to support the preconceived views of the writer or group, constituting its unethical use for avowed moral or social uplife. Again facts and findings are suppressed. Again, also, scientists who neglect public relations, lay education, economic factors, and social ends themselves contribute to the extinction of the free spirit of inquiry by totalitarian governments founded on dictatorship and false racial theories.

The biochemist L. J. Henderson, and others, demonstrated conclusively that the theory of acid-base balance and dietary acidosis is untenable and fallacious, but the theory marches on. The physiologist Yandell Henderson, and others, proved that the effects of alcohol on human beings are ill-understood, while there is a wide variety of literature on its apparent toxicity and its productivity of cirrhosis of the liver—both for and against. The same diversity of opinion exists about the evil effects of smoking and the causes of dental caries, but such divided authority bothers those in charge of moral or advertising campaigns not the least bit.¹

Those who condemn the use of tobacco, the drinking of alcoholic beverages, or of tea, coffee or soda pop, always try to back their propaganda with a transfer of scientific prestige. Today it has been shown that the old so-called whisky paralysis, in other days attributed to drinking, is due

¹ The Journal of the American Medical Association for March 14, 1936, in answer to a query, said that the toxic effects to human beings of tobacco and its smoke as customarily used had not been definitely established. In the following references Dr. Abr. L. Wolbarst of New York gave considerable proof to indicate that the suppression of prostitution will result in increased dissemination of the venereal diseases: New York Medical Journal, May 4, 1931; Social Hygiene Bulletin, June 1921; New York Medical Journal, April 1921 and Lawrence, Journal Social Hygiene, Jan. 1924. The following articles argue pro and con about the relation between chronic alcoholism and cirrhosis of the liver—another as yet unproved relationship: Journal American Medical Association, June 18, 1932, p. 2213; Supplement to Science, April 3, 1936; J.A.M.A., October 10, 1936, p. 1200; Belgian letter to Medical Record, Feb. 3, 1937, p. 132; J.A.M.A., April 9, 1938, p. 1159. Fanatics have recently adduced what they call scientific evidence to prove that smoking tobacco causes cancer though the National Cancer Institute says this is a wholly unproved thesis.

to a lack of part of the vitamin B complex. Patients who are kept intoxicated recover from the paralysis, provided they are given the vitamin. The cirrhosis of the liver once surely attributed to alcoholism can no longer truthfully be so attributed, since expert opinion is divided on the subject, with the preponderance favoring the contrary. It has also been shown that the addition of dilute alcoholic solutions to food, as in wine drinking, effectively stimulates the flow of gastric juice and aids digestion.

Vegetarianism is a doctrine often sustained on the theory that vegetarian animals are not fierce, yet the bull, the African elephant and the buffalo, all strict vegetarians, are as fierce as any animals. Meat does not make the tiger fierce; it is being a tiger that does it. The raw and so-called "natural" food cults are often buttressed on "science", though scarcely any food is truly natural today, while cooking is known to improve both the digestibility and palatability of many foods. The wheat and potato plants as we know them today are far removed by breeding from their original wild or natural ancestors.

When it comes to the "science" served the general public by the more unethical commercial interests almost anything goes. Entire technical monographs have been studiously written to found a pseudo-scientific theory in the field of electricity, in order that they might be cited as "scientific" evidence for the validity of the principle involved in making a medical salve. Articles and booklets appear in profusion devoted to the erudite exposition of scientific principles about which true science knows and cares nothing whatever. The extent of this is all but incredible.

Deceiving the Elect

SOMETIMES THIS PROPAGANDA operates at so high a level as to deceive the elect. For instance, take the many impressive advertising claims made for tinted or specially shaped lenses in glasses. Some of the lenses eliminated "glare," others were made of special dark glass. One particular manufacturer invented the merry farce of quoting a serial number of a patent supposed to cover the formula for making his glass, the advertised product being sky blue and the formula productive of a brilliant, transparent glass of reddish hue!

This whole business of wearing tinted glasses lacks scientific foundation. Lenses of scarcely visible tint have no more value than so much window glass. They neither increase vision nor eliminate "eye-straining glare." The merits of wide-vision lenses are much exaggerated. A person will usually turn his head rather than roll his eyes abnormally. The in-

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whole question of eyestrain and the function of glasses has been much suffused with pseudo-science.

Eye fatigue is in the main fatigue of attention. Eyestrain is as much a matter of psychological disturbance as anything else. The more-light-to-save-the-eyes doctrine, propagated by M. Luckiesch, F. K. Moss, and A. J. Pacini, has no standing with ophthalmologists, though it is a natural for propaganda by light companies. There is no dependable scientific evidence that dim light injures the eyes any more than there is that slight odors injure the nose and faint or indistinct sounds the ears.

Poor illumination causes neither nearsight nor any other organic eye trouble. The average person can judge the amount of illumination he uses with comfort and act accordingly. However, he can readily be fooled. In tests made on electrical workers it was shown some years ago that they would praise the better lighting effected when a mock change was made, the replacement bulbs being of exactly the same strength as those removed. Their work output also increased. At the other end of the scale they would complain about poorer illumination, when a mock change was made, and their work output suffered, though the lights were no dimmer than before!

Eyestrain does not result in organic disease of the eyes. Glasses are mere crutches which, however, lack therapeutic value, and "wrong glasses" do not injure the eyes, any more than they are injured by working with the light over the wrong shoulder, or by reading in bed, or on moving vehicles. But so confused are we by subtle pseudo-scientific advertising propaganda that we believe all sorts of things about our eyes, our surroundings, and our health generally which are untrue. The glasses, the illumination, and the position we assume while reading which give us the most comfort are all that is necessary.²

Glucose once had a bad name. That was when it was made by primitive methods and was often impure. Ultimately it appeared on the market rebaptized as "dextrose, the new health-giving sugar the body needs," yet it was neither to any appreciable extent. Vegetable fats were once considered inferior to animal fats for cooking purposes. But so successful was the publicity of the former that animal cooking fats now sometimes try to masquerade as vegetable fats in order to improve sales. Indeed

² For confirmation of material in the last five paragraphs see: W. W. Coblentz' report for the Council on Physical Therapy, Journal of the American Medical Association, 102 (April 14, 1934) 1223; Dr. David G. Cogan, "Popular Misconceptions Pertaining to Ophthalmology," New England Journal of Medicine, 224 (March 13, 1941) 462-66; Management and the Worker, 1941, by F. J. Roethlisberger and Wm. J. Dickson, assisted by Harold A. Wright.

certain scientists are right now working to impart to lard the superior appearance and keeping quality of trademarked vegetable cooking fats. We were once admonished to eat a box of raisins daily to get the iron we needed. Many other foods contained more iron than raisins. Aside from that, the one-ounce box of raisins recommended would furnish but one-twentieth of the quantity supposedly needed daily by adults.

In its issue for January 30, 1937, the Journal of the American Medical Association examined the propaganda put out by the California Fruit Growers' Exchange to the effect that Sunkist navel oranges were "22 per cent richer in vitamin C." This presumably was meant to reflect upon Florida oranges as a source of vitamin C. Actually, however, the difference in vitamin C content of large average samples of oranges from the two states was wholly negligible. The publicity was both misleading and unethical.

In its issue for April 19, 1938, the Journal of the American Medical Association printed a long editorial on a cosmetic cream containing a powerful sex hormone, the makers of which had elaborated an impressive scientific theory to put it over. The editorial claimed that the putting of the hormone substance estradiol in a face cream constituted a serious menace to health rather than an agency to restore the "pink freshness of a youthful skin" and ended: "The continued reckless and indiscriminate use of this substance in a cosmetic cream is certainly unwarranted until it has been proved beyond the shadow of a doubt that the menace clearly established in animals does not likewise prevail in human beings."

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This recital could continue indefinitely, but sufficient examples of such commercial perversion of scientific findings are well known to everyone to render this unnecessary. Even the specially tufted and shaped tooth brushes of varied design, each sold as alone scientifically correct, appeared to be all wrong when dental experts queried almost unanimously chose a straight trim on a straight brush! Meanwhile public organizations, some of them with the best of intentions, frequently abuse scientific knowledge in their propaganda.

Science and the Press

A FEW YEARS AGO the British Medical Association and the British Milk Marketing Board were in dispute about the advocacy of increased milk

³ New Hampshire Health News for April 1938, published by the N. H. State Board of Health, carried an expose of the ridiculously pseudo-scientific claims made by another skin beautifier and cosmetic launched with high-powered publicity presumably buttressed firmly upon established scientific facts.

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consumption in Great Britain where pasteurizing is not universal and tuberculin-tested cows are in a minority. The Board, for economic reasons in aid of the dairy industry, advocated increased milk consumption—even if the milk had to be given to the children of the poor. The medical association contended that it was much more important to advocate safe milk first of all, even if such insistence upon pasteurization and tuberculin-testing did temporarily decrease milk consumption.

But the newspapers affiliated with the British Newspaper Proprietor's Association were reluctant to use the medical association's propaganda. Therefore the association offered it in the form of paid advertisements. These the press association also rejected. Certain weekly journals of opinion with relatively small circulation did consent to print them, however. But they did so along with some caustic adverse comment about the newspapers suppressing opinion, and also anent the fact that, though the doctors probably did not know what they were talking about, they should be heard.

The British Medical Association felt that the dangers of drinking raw milk had been established scientifically, that heating milk to pasteurize it did not damage its nutritive qualities, and that even if such compulsory pasteurization of milk and herd testing did for the time decrease milk consumption and injure the dairy industry, it was obligatory as a public health measure. The marketing board was accused of overlooking the necessity for safe milk, of insufficiently emphasizing the health menace of raw milk, and of dwelling in its propaganda too exclusively upon the high nutritive quality of milk and its value as a food.

About the same time the Bureau of Milk Publicity of the State of New York was publishing paid advertisements in the press of New York State advocating the increased consumption of milk as a protection against colds. Milk was said to supply double protection, by contributing an alkaline ash and containing the anti-infective vitamin A. Here were twin fallacies. The acid-base-balance theory is not scientifically established and a glass or two of milk daily would not perceptibly change the body's chemical reaction anyway. The theory that "alkalinizing" will ward off colds is in a class with the theory that carrying a raw potato will ward off rheumatism, while vitamin A is not anti-infective in any such sense as would enable it to prevent colds.

Whether the advocacy of milk drinking at the rate of a quart a day for children is fully justified scientifically is still in doubt. Milk is naturally deficient in iron and in certain vitamins. It violently disagrees with many people. Other foods can be used to supply any or all the nutrients customarily supplied by milk. The attempt to feed children diets that rapidly accelerate "growth" (really weight-gain) in rats has insufficient scientific justification, and that it is beneficial remains an unproven hypothesis. Yet all these debatable points are naturally ignored by any public bureau which sets out to aid the dairy industry. If it did not try to stimulate the consumption of dairy products it would soon get in trouble. The trouble would be nothing unique nor even especially reprehensible.

Just before World War II the frozen fruit ("frosted") and vegetable industry began to make serious inroads upon commerce in fresh fruits and vegetables. For this reason new associations of fresh fruit and vegetable shippers and dealers were hurriedly formed to combat the spread and popularity of frosted fruits and vegetables. They developed rather an interesting pseudo-scientific kind of propaganda, instead of merely making a declaration of war, and boldly stating that they intended to wipe out their competitors if this proved possible.

Resort was had to a tender solicitude for the public welfare and, naturally, to science. The campaign became one of broad public service, the performance of a hitherto forgotten duty to consumers, an obligation for the sake of public health, and a vindication of scientific principles. A fresh fruit and vegetable "protective" fund was raised to finance the work of compiling research findings already in the literature which bore upon the necessity for fresh fruits and vegetables in the diet.

New research was also to be instituted. This was to demonstrate that the freezing process, or certainly the processing of the material before freezing, destroyed the nutritive value of fresh fruits and vegetables. For physicians had recommended only "fresh" and never "frozen" or "frosted" fruits and vegetables—as is very natural since the latter are quite a new development. Science therefore was said to be on the side of fresh fruits and vegetables, though of course new research was contemplated to prove this absolutely.

The fact was brought out in the propaganda that frozen products are not truly "fresh" and should not be so regarded legally. For they have been processed before freezing; they have been soaked in salt water, bleached or blanched with lye, steamed, artificially colored, the ferments have been destroyed, the vitamins have been injured, the mineral salts have been lost. "The fresh, natural products are, by reliable medical authorities, declared to be more healthful and beneficial." The consumer must be protected.

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We read: "Research and investigation show that we have the right, from a scientific basis, to advertise to the consumer that fresh fruits and vegetables are the best for the human diet." Then the propaganda became somewhat less opaque. Efforts must be made, it was said, to build up the natural resistance of Americans to something new. Americans must be kept in the habit of eating fresh foods, never frozen foods. The frozen food habit must never grip them as the tin-canned food habit had.

But the basic fact was overlooked that the "fresh" fruits and vegetables usually reached the housewife in an aged, infirm, and withered condition. What is more, the average American housewife can very readily destroy more of the nutritive value of foods by her own slap-dash kitchen methods of preparation than commercial processors are ever likely to destroy and long remain in business.

Scientists as Propagandists

When a scientist engaged in a research project makes a new finding of importance which is not exactly in line with the project as originally expounded in a program and so financed, he heads for trouble. The new finding may prove more important scientifically than the entire old project as formulated. It is imperative that it be followed up, but there is no way of making it appear "practical" to legislators or other sponsors. Hence the old project is reformulated in such terms that money can be procured really to finance a new project. Camouflage, diplomacy, and a certain amount of gentle misleading are inevitable.

We ordinarily regard as "propaganda" only that sort of advocacy which tends to influence people to accomplish what we regard as bad ends. Hence research scientists probably do not recognize as propaganda the means they use to bolster up scientific projects by properly slanted description and exposition, or the efforts they sometimes make to get the general public to accept the results of scientific investigation. On the other hand, we readily recognize propaganda in fields wherein we have little or no emotional interest.

Propaganda forms an integral part of scientific endeavor from start to finish, as we have seen. It is probably ineradicable so long as human beings remain about what they are, our commercial system remains what it is, our system of education is not modernized, and present methods of financing research continue. But it can be recognized as such by those with a bit of training and, somewhere along the line in our education, we

should be exposed to sufficient training to distinguish between fact and fancy, and to locate and use original sources which are authoritative.

It should be a very distinct and important function of our huge and expensive educational system to enable future members of the general public to recognize propaganda by its marked characteristics, and to make due allowance for it, or to ignore it as necessity dictated in specific instances. This cannot be too strongly emphasized. Even our higher institutions of learning tend too much to teach facts and truths as if they were final, instead of general principles and methods involved in finding out a dynamic truth which is always in process of change—ever becoming, never finally in being.

There is a certain historical value in knowing what science considered true in George Washington's day. But that is not of great practical value to an individual in the world of today. Neither is the solid, final truth of four or six or eight years past much good to a person when he gets out into the world today. What he needs is a training that will provide him with a method of sifting statements, consulting authorities, comprehending the processes of verification, and finding out what is objectively true for today, and what is propaganda issued for ulterior motives.

Not a great deal can be done to reduce the amount of propaganda in science and the abuse of science by propaganda until our educational system is modernized in this respect. That means until it gives special training to all in what facts are verifiable and how to verify them. The effort to inject this sort of teaching into our educational system is a first step toward regeneration.

Falls Church, Va.

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Winston Churchill's War Memoirs

By Francis Neilson

When I finished reading Winston Churchill's book, "The Gathering Storm," I was foolish enough to predict that no one at present would have the courage to point out the inaccuracies it contained. I was mistaken. In an article published in *The New York Times* of May 9, 1948, Hanson Baldwin reviewed a staff study made under the direction of Major General C. F. Robinson, entitled "Foreign Logistical Organizations and Methods." This report was prepared for the Secretary of the Army. Baldwin tells us that the facts in this survey take "sharp issue with some of Winston Churchill's contentions."

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He then deals with several assertions that appeared in the serial production of the book and remarks:

These conclusions are at sharp variance with some of Mr. Churchill's statements. . . . The staff survey shows that in 1934, when Mr. Churchill first commenced to express his concern, Germany produced only 840 combat aircraft, 1,968 of all types, and that up until 1940, at least, Germany's production did not markedly outstrip Britain's. . . .

So it was with tanks and trucks up to the outbreak of war in 1939. If the figures given in the staff report are approximately correct, much that Churchill has written on Germany's preparations for war should be read with caution and thoroughly examined by all who desire to know the facts, because there are many other statements in the book which will not be readily accepted by those who have made a study of the causes of wars.

Joseph Kennedy, who was American Ambassador to Great Britain in 1939, pointed out in a letter to *The New York Times*, of Sept. 26, 1948, several other slight inaccuracies in "The Gathering Storm." On Oct. 17, 1948, Churchill's son, in a reply, admitted that his father had "erred" in giving wrong dates for certain happenings.

Let us admit at once that it is a very hazardous job for a recorder to deal impartially with current events, such as this war. It is one thing to quote from documents what happened long after the turmoil has passed. It is quite another for a man to reject all the propaganda and set sanely to work to find the truth in the fog of national and personal interests. Here the moral reputation of a government is at stake; there the prestige

of a statesman must be shielded at all costs. Any statement that questions the probity of the administration is not to be tolerated by its servants. Furthermore, it is regarded as blasphemy to impugn the political integrity of men who, with the aid of propaganda, have been placed upon pedestals, or to cast doubt upon their words and actions.

After World War I, it was difficult enough to make people understand that there were no angels holding portfolios in European cabinets when the conflict began. Shortly after the Treaty of Versailles was signed, tens of thousands of intelligent people who had believed the propaganda stories issued by the governments were amazed to find critical works written by reputable authors—American, British, French, and Italian—which revealed the hollowness and falsity of the claims of those responsible for the conflict.

Churchill's Feud with Stanley Baldwin

WHEN CHURCHILL WROTE this first volume of his memoirs, he was conscious that it would not pass as history. He says frankly, "I do not describe it as history." In the first place, he was a protagonist. Indeed, a wit has already said that the proper title of the book might well be "The One-Man War." There are twenty-five I's in the preface of barely two pages. In the second place, he set before himself a thesis that is reduced almost to a personal matter. He is quite candid in stating what that thesis is. Stanley Baldwin, when Prime Minister, did not see eye to eye with Winston Churchill, who had been a private member since the year 1925—a long time for an ambitious politician to be out of office.

As early in the book as the second chapter, Churchill begins his story of his conflict with Baldwin. He says:

. . . My relations with this statesman are a definite part of the tale I have to tell. Our differences at times were serious, but in all these years and later I never had an unpleasant personal interview or contact with him, and at no time did I feel we could not talk together in good faith and understanding as man to man.¹

This feud was carried on intermittently until Baldwin retired in 1937, when the coronation of the present King took place; and a great part of "The Gathering Storm" is devoted to the differences that arose between the Prime Minister and Churchill. We can easily understand Churchill's resentment at Baldwin for not offering him a place in the cabinet. He is just as human as any other member of the House, and in reading his book, it is plain that he felt slighted at this neglect.

^{1 &}quot;The Gathering Storm," Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948, pp. 19-20.

In a passage that lights up this two-men drama in a shadowy scene, Churchill declares:

Mr. Baldwin certainly had good reason to use the last flickers of his power against one who had exposed his mistakes so severely and so often. Moreover, as a profoundly astute party manager, thinking in majorities and aiming at a quiet life between elections, he did not wish to have my disturbing aid. He thought, no doubt, that he had dealt me a politically fatal stroke, and I felt he might well be right. . . . 2

But what he takes chapters to tell of this parliamentary quarrel will in all probability be reduced to a page or two by the historian; for the simple reason that other matters of far greater moment were taking place, many of which are not even noticed by Churchill in his book.

Churchill vis-a-vis Lloyd George

It will be difficult for anyone who knew what the real issues were in Great Britain and on the continent during the years when Churchill was a private member of the House to comprehend how he has succeeded in ignoring the cases presented by his opponents in Parliament. In several instances he omits the views of those opposed to him in debate.

Now Lloyd George was certainly no Nazi and, although he said: "Hitler is one of the greatest of the many great men I have ever met," he would be the last to agree with Hitler's system of government. The record of the controversies in the House clearly reveals that some well-informed members were not impressed by Churchill's fulminations. In a remarkable debate on Feb. 5, 1936, Lloyd George reviewed the position of the powers in connection with the final protocol of the Locarno Conference, and he declared: "We are responsible for creating the atmosphere of fear. Is it not possible to break this circle of death before it is too late?"

It is important to mark the date. About a month later—March 10—after Churchill delivered "an alarmist diatribe," Lloyd George surveyed the whole question of armaments and said he did not agree with Mr. Churchill's estimate of the power of Germany. He then went on to show the cause of much of the friction:

For 12 years or more France refused to carry out her undertaking to disarm, and even after Locarno, which was intended partly to provide a basis for disarmament.

He also remarked that some people thought that Germany "was the only enemy we had to think about."

² Ibid., p. 201.

In the House of Lords, March 2, 1937, Lord Lothian dealt with the government's policy of armed alliances. He said:

. . . That is a policy which in the first fifteen years of peace concentrated on keeping Germany without arms and encircled, and which is now concerned in building up a system of armed alliances about it, a policy, I may add, for which we and the United States of America must bear our full share of blame.

It is impossible for any unprejudiced person to study the parliamentary debates before the Sudeten crisis arose and to give a satisfactory reason why Churchill in his book has ignored the criticism of his policy made by men who not only imagined they had reliable sources of information but who were as devoted to the interests of Great Britain as Churchill himself.

However this may be—and only a thorough investigation of the controversy may decide the matter—it is just as well to bear in mind that Churchill tells us in his book what his attitude had been since the autumn of 1933. In the following extraordinary passage, which antedates so many important events, he remarks:

It is difficult to find a parallel to the unwisdom of the British and weakness of the French Governments, who none the less reflected the opinion of their Parliaments in this disastrous period. Nor can the United States escape the censure of history. Absorbed in their own affairs and all the abounding interests, activities, and accidents of a free community, they simply gaped at the vast changes which were taking place in Europe, and imagined they were no concern of theirs. The considerable corps of highly competent, widely trained professional American officers formed their own opinions, but these produced no noticeable effect upon the improvident aloofness of American foreign policy. If the influence of the United States had been exerted, it might have galvanised the French and British politicians into action. . . (Italics mine) ³

The immediate cause of this outburst was "The MacDonald Plan" to which he was opposed. But Hitler did not become the Führer until March, 1933. Here is an example of Churchill's method of writing about an event long after it has happened, and judging it on the basis of information gathered some years later.

In the passage quoted above there is an indication of his utterly undemocratic notions of parliamentary government. Was he in accord with Hitler in his contempt of free institutions? In his book, "Amid These Storms," published in 1932, he said:

Democratic governments drift along the line of least resistance, 3 Ibid., pp. 77-8.

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taking short views, paying their way with sops and doles and smoothing their path with pleasant-sounding platitudes. . . . 4

Some sympathy might be found for him in expressing himself so causticly, for he must have felt rather isolated politically by men who did not appreciate his worth. We may infer from the above that he realized he stood alone in an apathetic world. How strange that this man who had formerly proclaimed from many platforms the right of the people to determine the policy of their government should now find an obstinate electorate paying little heed to his call to arms!

Still, it may be said that the people in Great Britain, France, and America knew a lot more about affairs than he thought they did. There were books enough in circulation to edify a schoolboy of sixteen; and many of them published in England presented facts that Churchill ignored from the beginning. His present work gives no indication anywhere that he was at any time conscious before he began to write letters to himself, March 13, 1936, that the public had these sources of information. The reason for his neglect to consider the probability of an informed public, or one that did not want another war, may be that he knew he was making an excursion upon slippery ground when he started to write about the part that he took in these affairs after Hitler became leader of the Third Reich. He had placed himself in a very difficult position, for on the one hand he had praised Hitler and his achievements; and, on the other, in letters written to himself and in speeches in and out of the House, he had conducted a campaign against the man who had merited his approval.

Churchill on Hitler's "Remarkable Exploits"

THE AMERICAN EDITION of his book, "Step by Step," was published in 1939. The preface to it is dated May 21 of that year. In a letter written to himself, under the date of Sept. 17, 1937, explaining his anxiety about the rearming of the German forces, he said:

To hold these opinions is not to be hostile to the German Government, and still less to the Germans as a nation. To feel deep concern about the armed power of Germany is in no way derogatory to Germany. On the contrary, it is a tribute to the wonderful and terrible strength which Germany exerted in the Great War, when almost single-handed she fought nearly all the world and nearly beat them. Naturally, when a people who have shown such magnificent military qualities are arming night and day, its neighbors, who bear the scars of previous conflicts, must be anxious and ought to be vigilant. One may dislike Hitler's system and yet admire his patriotic achievement. If our country were defeated I hope we should

^{4 &}quot;Amid These Storms," New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1932, p. 78.

find a champion as indomitable to restore our courage and lead us back to our place among the nations. (Italics mine) 5

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In "The Gathering Storm," Churchill says:

. . . The Weimar Republic, with all its liberal trappings and blessings, was regarded as an imposition of the enemy. It could not hold the loyalties or the imagination of the German people. For a spell they sought to cling as in desperation to the aged Marshal Hindenburg. Thereafter mighty forces were adrift; the void was open, and into that void after a pause there strode a maniac of ferocious genius, the repository and expression of the most virulent hatreds that have ever corroded the human breast—Corporal Hitler.⁶

Surely the intelligent reader will wish to know why the Corporal rather suddenly became "ferocious" and "the repository" of "virulent hatreds." Because Churchill in "Great Contemporaries" extols Hitler's "patriotic ardor and love of country" and says his story "cannot be read without admiration for the courage, the perseverance, and the vital force which enabled him to challenge, defy, conciliate, or overcome, all the authorities or resistances which barred his path." Moreover, in the same essay Churchill tells us:

. . . Those who have met Herr Hitler face to face in public business or on social terms have found a highly competent, cool, well-informed functionary with an agreeable manner, a disarming smile, and few have been unaffected by a subtle personal magnetism. Nor is this impression merely the dazzle of power. He exerted it on his companions at every stage in his struggle, even when his fortunes were in the lowest depths. Thus the world lives on hopes that the worst is over, and that we may yet live to see Hitler a gentler figure in a happier age.

This is the most bewildering psychological cataclysm that has been recorded, and it all took place in about twelve months. It was more than a "breakdown"; it was a spiritual earthquake. What caused it? Let the student probe this question. If he does so, and goes deeply enough into it, he will learn something about the European political system that will amaze him, something indeed that very few Americans understand.

The panegyric on Hitler to be found in "Great Contemporaries," published in 1937, is one of the most extraordinary tributes paid to a foreign politician by an Englishman:

. . . When Hitler began, Germany lay prostrate at the feet of the Allies. He may yet see the day when what is left of Europe will be prostrate at

^{5 &}quot;Step by Step," New York, G. P. Putnman's Sons, 1939, pp. 143-4.
6 "The Gathering Storm," p. 11.
7 "Great Contemporaries," New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1937, p. 232.

the feet of Germany. Whatever else may be thought about these exploits, they are certainly among the most remarkable in the whole history of the world.8

The difficulty that faced Churchill when he sat down to write his story was how to reconcile the conflict of his esteem for Hitler and the campaign that he had waged against him since he became Fübrer. An explanation of any worth could not be given without raising the whole matter of the Sudeten question, the Anschluss, and that of Danzig and the Corridor. Churchill was a bitter opponent of the Munich settlement and denounced it in the House of Commons.

There is so much more to be told of these affairs that what is now known about them might easily fill two or three volumes as big as this one under our notice. History will demand from students much deeper consideration of the problems raised in Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Poland than Churchill gives to them. Slightingly he refers to Lord Snowden's accusation that Hitler's peace overtures before Munich had been ignored. Students will want to know the nature of these overtures.

In the days to come serious-minded people will not be satisfied with merely part of the history of events that led up to the war; they will want to know the facts, irrespective of whether they come from a German source or any other, just as they did after the last war. It is not the business of historians to defend this or that State, or this or that politician; if they are honorable men, free to speak clearly, they must sift the data they have collected and present to their public an intelligible statement of what occurred.

Churchill's Attitude toward Germany

CHURCHILL ADMITS that he has been charged with being an enemy of Germany. It is true that he has often been denounced on English platforms as a fomenter of war. Many examples could be given of the way his former colleagues criticized his demands. Here a single one must suffice. Sir Herbert Samuel, a leading Liberal, in the House, July 13, 1934, said:

... He [Mr. Churchill] comes forward and tells the nation that we ought straightaway to double and redouble our Air Force, that we ought to have an Air Force four times as big as we have now, without giving the smallest reasons why this collossal expenditure should immediately be undertaken. That is rather the language of a Malay running amok than

8 Ibid., p. 226.

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of a responsible British statesman. It is rather the language of blind and causeless panic.9

However, before Churchill went to the Admiralty in 1911, he might have been called a pro-German, for some of his speeches were undeniably pacific and in a few he extolled Germany and her people for their achievements. During the naval panic of 1908 he delivered a remarkable speech at Swansea on Great Britain's relations with Germany, in which he said:

I think it is greatly to be deprecated that persons should try to spread the belief in this country that war between Great Britain and Germany is inevitable. It is all nonsense. In the first place, the alarmists have no grounds whatever for their panic or fear. . . . Look at it from any point of view you like, and I say you will come to the conclusion in regard to the relations between England and Germany that there is no real cause of difference between them, and although there may be snapping and snarling in the newspapers and in the London clubs, those two great people have nothing to fight about, have no prize to fight for, and have no place to fight in. . . .

that far and wide throughout the masses of the British dominions there is no feeling of ill-will towards Germany. I say we honour that strong, patient, industrious German people, who have been for so many centuries divided, a prey to European intrigue and a drudge amongst the nations of the Continent. Now in the fulness of time, after many tribulations they have by their virtues and valour won themselves a foremost place in the front of civilization. I say we do not envy them their good fortune; we do not envy them their power and prosperity. We are not jealous of them; we wish them well from the bottom of our hearts, and we believe most firmly the victories they will win in science and learning against barbarism, against waste, the victories they will gain will be victories in which we shall share, and which, while benefiting them, will also benefit us. (Italics mine) 10

The Churchill who recognized then that Germany was "a prey to European intrigue and a drudge amongst the nations of the Continent" was certainly not the man who in 1911 was sent to the Admiralty by Asquith to prepare for war with Germany. Nor could he have had the Swansea speech in mind when he wrote, in "The Gathering Storm":

. . . Five times in a hundred years, in 1814, 1815, 1870, 1914, and 1918, had the towers of Notre Dame seen the flash of Prussian guns and heard the thunder of their cannonade. Now for four horrible years thirteen

10 Quoted in F. Neilson, "How Diplomats Make War," New York, B. W. Huebsch, 1915 (5th printing, 1940), pp. 108-10.

⁹ Quoted in Churchill's "While England Slept," New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1938, p. 126n.

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Not even Gladstone excelled Churchill in delivering homilies upon naughty politicians and their nations. But students of the past wars in this century should be able to conclude by now that moral sentiments expressed by politicians are slippery things. Still, it is possible to form a judgment as to why they change so frequently and adapt their morals to fit the circumstances that arise from time to time. Lord Acton, the finest European mind of the past century, wrote in a letter to Mary Gladstone:

. . . The inner reality of history is so unlike the back of the cards, and it takes so long to get at it, which does not prevent us from disbelieving what is current as history, but makes us wish to sift it, and dig through mud to solid foundations.¹²

The Attitude of the Historian

THERE IS ONE THING to be avoided in writing the history of political and diplomatic events, and that is the rather natural desire of the writer to create an atmosphere in which his own country will appear in a favorable light. He would be a perfect historian who was not prone to do this. What puts the stamp on a historian worth his salt is the attitude of aloofness that he takes to the national interests of the countries involved in the struggle. Before I read the volume with which I am now dealing, this idea came to me, and I wondered if Churchill could resist the temptation of preparing the reader's mind for a ready acceptance of the story he had to tell. Referring to World War I, he writes at the very beginning of his memoirs:

Whether it was courage or effrontery that prompted him to write this statement may be left for the honest student of the first World War to determine. Not a few, when they read it, will say that no one knew better than Churchill himself that Germany was not "the head and fore-

^{11 &}quot;The Gathering Storm," p. 5.

^{12 &}quot;Letters of Lord Acton to Mary Gladstone," ed. by Herbert Paul, New York,

The Macmillan Co., 1904, p. 131.

13 "The Gathering Storm," p. 4.

front of the offence." French, British, and American authors who investigated the causes of the war have shown in their works that the idea spread abroad by propaganda that Germany was wholly responsible for World War I is not true.

And as for its being a peoples' war and not one of governments, there is not the slightest evidence for this statement. Churchill knows that not even ten per cent of the members of Parliament on the 3rd of August, 1914 knew the causes of it. Certainly the French people did not; and as for the Germans, who have been condemned for taking so little interest in foreign affairs, they knew less than the British or French. There were in all the capitals small gatherings of rowdy rowdies who were fighting mad and cheered the declarations of war. But as for the people at large, they knew scarcely anything about its real causes until after the Treaty of Versailles was signed.

The second instance in which Churchill attempts to prepare the mind of the reader is as follows:

Empire. They remembered the preventive war which Bismarck had sought to wage in 1875; they remembered the brutal threats which had driven Delcassé from office in 1905....14

This canard was shot to pieces by Jaurès, the French Socialist leader, soon after it took the wing. The facts were published in L'Humanité, Oct. 13, 1905, and the whole matter may be traced in the Paris papers of that time. But the man who knew the inside story was Robert Dell, the Paris correspondent of The Manchester Guardian, and his detailed report of it may be found in the British publication, Foreign Affairs, for November, 1922. The history of the Delcassé yarn is exciting reading but not quite nice for decent-minded people because in it there is revealed a conspiracy that was certainly not to the credit of Great Britain. It is strange indeed that this nauseating affair should be revived by Churchill.

There are so many passages in this work to which the industrious and well-informed student will take exception that it is difficult to know which one or two should be considered in a critique. But it is essential for the reader to remember that Churchill is not only a protagonist, but one who shows in his work that it was necessary for him to defend his actions. Therefore, many of his recordings should not be accepted as history but as the opinions of a man who has a personal case to present.

One very important matter that must be dealt with is the following:

¹⁴ Loc. cit.

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The Foreign Secretary has a special position in a British Cabinet. He is treated with marked respect in his high and responsible office, but he usually conducts his affairs under the continuous scrutiny, if not of the whole Cabinet, at least of its principal members. He is under an obligation to keep them informed. He circulates to his colleagues, as a matter of custom and routine, all his executive telegrams, the reports from our embassies abroad, the records of his interviews with foreign Ambassadors or other notables. At least this has been the case during my experience of Cabinet life. 15

I doubt if there is one in a hundred historians here or in Great Britain who knows what underlies these statements. When the government of Campbell-Bannerman was formed in December, 1905, Mr. Churchill was not a member of it. The first post he held was that of Undersecretary for the Colonies. Still, I do not think he should be ignorant of the fact that only three members of that cabinet really knew Grey had taken over the agreement from the outgoing government concerning the secret understandings with France. These provided that the British and French staffs should meet for the purpose of making plans in case of war. Lord Loreburn, who was Lord Chancellor (certainly a principal member of the cabinet), reveals that the matter was not brought to the notice of the cabinet over a period of eight years. Loreburn deals with this particular case in his book, "How the War Came." He writes: "This concealment from the cabinet was protracted, and must have been deliberate. Parliament knew nothing of it till 3rd August 1914, nor anything of the change in policy which the suppressed communications denoted."16

Sir Edward Grey, in his speech to the House on Aug. 3, 1914, said:

... Upon that occasion a General Election was in prospect. I had to take the responsibility of doing that without the Cabinet. It could not be summoned. An answer had to be given. I consulted Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the Prime Minister; I consulted, I remember, Lord Haldane, who was then Secretary of State for War, and the present Prime Minister [Asquith], who was then Chancellor of the Exchequer. . . . 17

This extraordinary account of what happened astonished not a few members who knew it could not be true. In the first place, there was no difficulty about calling a cabinet meeting in 1905, as Lord Loreburn points out in his book. Besides, it was easy enough after the debate to trace the movements of Bannerman, Haldane, Asquith, and Grey himself at the time he gave the pledge to France. If the student will refer to my sequel

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¹⁵ Ibid., p. 239.

^{16 &}quot;How the War Came," London, Methuen & Co. Ltd., no date, p. 81.

¹⁷ Quoted in "How the War Came," appendix, p. 326.

to "How Diplomats Make War," entitled "Duty to Civilization," he will find in it a record of the places in which these ministers spoke during the election. They were all within short distances of one another.

The importance of this can scarcely be exaggerated if the people are to know the causes of wars and how perilous it is to surrender their interests to the care of politicians. After World War I was over, both Bonar Law and Sir Austen Chamberlain declared in the House that if Parliament had known of that engagement with France, there might have been no conflict.

Sir Edward Grey could not have consulted with the Prime Minister, for Campbell-Bannerman had not the slightest idea of what the commitments amounted to.

Arthur Balfour, in a speech delivered at the Albert Hall, in December, 1905, said:

I noticed with amazement that Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, at the Albert Hall, in the speech to which I have just referred, announced to his audience that he meant to cut down the cost, and, as I understood him, with the cost the number and magnitude of the defensive forces of the Crown—Army and Navy, as the case may be. I wonder whether he consulted the present Secretary of State for War [Haldane] before giving that pledge. I doubt whether he did. 19

I know for a fact that John Morley, who was Secretary for India at the time, was not informed of Grey's policy. John Burns, who was President of the Local Government Board, knew nothing about it. Morley and Burns resigned when the crisis came in August, 1914. Perhaps Churchill may say that Morley and Burns were not principal members, but he cannot state that the question was ever discussed at a cabinet meeting at any time during the eight years before the war began.

There is another matter that Mr. Churchill has overlooked, which should be well within his recollection, and that concerns the movement of the fleet in July, 1914, without knowledge of the cabinet. If he wishes to refresh his memory on this, he has only to turn to the French Yellow Book. In Dispatch No. 66, M. de Fleuriau, French chargé d'affaires at London, informed his government on July 27:

The attitude of Great Britain is confirmed by the postponement of the demobilization of the fleet. The First Lord of the Admiralty took this measure quietly on Friday on his own initiative.²⁰

Furthermore, The Times of July 27 said that the fleet sailed from Wey-

20 Ibid., p. 241.

New York, B. W. Huebsch, Inc., 1923, pp. 20-1.
 Quoted in "How Diplomats Make War," p. 301.

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mouth, "a welcome earnest of our intention to be ready for any course which the national interests may render desirable."21 Moreover, wellinformed naval correspondents told their public:

... Mr. Churchill was almost the only Minister who appreciated the gravity of the situation, and is understood to have given early orders "on his own" for the mobilization of the entire British Fleet a fortnight before the Servian coup. . . . Italy was told there was going to be a storm . . . the English ambassador got the tip. Hence the assembly of the whole Fleet for inspection by the King. Mr. Churchill's extraordinary courage, decision, and foresight were never excelled by his great ancestor. England, thanks to Mr. Churchill, begins the war at her selected moment, not at the chosen moment of the Mad Dog of Europe.22

Churchill was a member of the cabinet at that time, and an important one. Indeed, he was First Lord of the Admiralty, and I was assured by some ministers that the matter had not been brought to the attention of the cabinet. Other instances could be given of actions taken by individual members of the "Inner Circle," which were not presented to the cabinet as a whole.

Britain's Pledge to Poland in 1939

As AN EXAMPLE of how Mr. Churchill has gone to work to create an atmosphere of his own making, we may take the case of the pledge to Poland given in March, 1939. If the student will turn to the letters that he wrote to himself in "Step by Step," he will find the last four dated after the pledge was given. In the one entitled, "The Russian Counterpoise," Churchill writes to himself as follows:

. . . The preservation and integrity of Poland must be regarded as a cause commanding the regard of all the world. There is every reason to believe that the Polish nation intend to fight for life and freedom. They have a fine army, of which now more than 1,000,000 men are mobilized. The Poles have always fought well, and an army which comprehends its cause is doubly strong. . . .

These are days when acts of faith must be performed by Governments and peoples who are striving to resist the spread of Nazidom. The British Government, who have undertaken to go to war with Germany if Poland is the victim of aggression, have a right to ask the Polish leaders to study the problem of a Russian alliance with a sincere desire to bring it into lively and forceful action. We do not know at present what proposals have been made by the Russian Government to Great Britain and France. There is reason to believe that they are bold, logical and far-reaching. . . . 23

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²¹ Ibid., p. 242.

²² Ibid., p. 250. ²³ "Step by Step," p. 318.

The above is all we have from him before the war began about the pledge which many have believed did more to bring about the conflict than any other action taken up to that time. The statement he makes in the letter dated May 4, 1939, is so moderate that not a note of alarm is sounded in it. Writing in "The Gathering Storm," long after the event, he presents us with the following tirade:

And now, when every one of these aids and advantages has been squandered and thrown away, Great Britain advances, leading France by the hand, to guarantee the integrity of Poland-of that very Poland which with hyena appetite had only six months before joined in the pillage and destruction of the Czechoslovak State. There was sense in fighting for Czechoslovakia in 1938 when the German Army could scarcely put half a dozen trained divisions on the Western Front, when the French with nearly sixty or seventy divisions could most certainly bave rolled forward across the Rhine or into the Ruhr. But this had been judged unreasonable, rash, below the level of modern intellectual thought and morality. Yet now at last the two Western Democracies declared themselves ready to stake their lives upon the territorial integrity of Poland. History. which we are told is mainly the record of the crimes, follies and miseries of mankind, may be scoured and ransacked to find a parallel to this sudden and complete reversal of five or six years' policy of easy-going placatory appeasement, and its transformation almost overnight into a readiness to accept an obviously imminent war on far worse conditions and on the greatest scale. (Italics mine) 24

In this explosion of temper for which no parallel can be found, the student must not imagine that in 1939 Mr. Churchill was unaware of "the pillage and destruction of the Czechoslovak State." For in "The Gathering Storm" he says:

. . . Immediately after the Munich Agreement on September 30, the Polish Government sent a twenty-four-hour ultimatum to the Czechs demanding the immediate handing-over of the frontier of Teschen. . . . 25

It would be an almost interminable exercise for the most industrious budding historian to go through Mr. Churchill's works published since 1932 and present a comparative portrait of him as he was in thought and action before the war and as he appears in this volume. The mass of contradictions of attitude of mind is most bewildering—certainly beyond the understanding of what is called "the intelligent reader." Although in the preface he assures us that his book must not be taken as history, he is dealing to a great extent with historical crises, actions in which he was involved. Giving full allowance for his rôle as a protagonist, it is

25 Ibid., p. 322.

^{24 &}quot;The Gathering Storm," p. 347.

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still obvious to anyone who followed the week-by-week happenings of the war that Churchill presents a very one-sided view of many of the most significant events.

What the "hard-boiled" historian will say about the Norwegian campaign, as narrated by Churchill, will astonish readers of the future. It is not easy to follow the dates in Churchill's story of that disaster. Furthermore, much of it concerns movements of the fleet, which information might have been put into a volume on naval operations. So that the reader may have an idea of the mystery of events referred to by Mr. Churchill, it is necessary to mention a report of singular interest to be found in *Les Fossoyeurs* by Pertinax, who tells us that the waters of Norway were sown with British mines on April 8, 1940.

Mr. Churchill, in his book, refers to the visit of Admiral Darlan to London on April 9, 1940. Pertinax informs us that Darlan was in London on the preceding March 28 and that, while he was in his room at the hotel, an Italian valet stole from him a memorandum relative to the operations under consideration by the Allies. Pertinax thinks that in this way the Germans were informed "en détail sur les desseins franco-britanniques et que leur apparition en Scandinavie, le 9 avril, (24 heures après la pose des mines) n'ait pas été simple coïncidence."26

I have seen no contradiction of this curious incident. Perhaps we shall not know the truth of it until the persistent investigator sets to work. Its importance cannot be overestimated because the invasion of Norway by the Germans was the turning point in the European war, and people who pay for its cost in blood and taxes deserve to know the real causes of what Churchill calls "Frustration in Norway."

What the British people will say about Mr. Churchill's book is a question that interests me deeply. That many will resent the tone of it I doubt not. Those who were colleagues in the war parliament will not take some of his animadversions complacently; and as for his feud with Baldwin, others will complain that the book gives a one-sided review of it.

Still, if it be possible to overlook the shortcomings in this volume, we may be thankful that it was written, for it is a portentous lesson to those who believe that alliances are to be relied on when the moment comes for concerted action. It was not Churchill's intention, of course, to point this moral, but the reader can gather it for himself. Agreements, under-

^{26 &}quot;Les Fossoyeurs," two vols., New York, Éditions de la Maison Française, Inc., 1943, vol. I, p. 64. (The Germans were informed in detail about the Franco-British plans, and that their appearance in Scandinavia on April 9 (twenty-four hours after the laying of the mines) was not simply a coincidence.)

standings, alliances, or whatever they may be called by diplomatists, failed to save Czechoslovakia and Poland, to mention only two States. And the result is a distracted Europe, fearful of the future.

New York

Report on the Greeks. By Frank Smothers, William Hardy McNeill and Elizabeth Darbishire McNeill. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund 1948, 226 pp., 13 illustrations, maps, \$2.50.

A survey of the social and economic status of the Greek people and their attitude toward the political issues confronting their country, this book contains much valuable information on several aspects of the Greek economy, society and State. The all-pervading influence of general poverty and economic insecurity is set out. The nature of the land question, the industrial problem, the tax burden and the class character of the State are indicated. The recommended policies for economic revival are superficial.

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